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Abstract: 
In 2008, China enacted the Water Pollution Prevention and Control Law (WPPCL) in 
response to the severe water quality degradation associated with the rapid economic 
expansion since the 1980s. Article 20 of the law stipulates the Water Pollution Discharge 
Permit (WPDP) institution and authorizes the State Council to draft the regulations for its 
implementation and enforcement. However, until today, national regulations have not been 
established and the permitting system has been operating according to provincial regulations. 
The WPPCL has used the Total Effluent Control (TEC) strategy and the discharge allocation 
method so far as its major instrument. In this framework, a permit serves mainly as a 
description of waste load allocation. With the TEC strategy, the WPDP has lost its legal 
deterrence due to the widespread non-compliance with the permit requirements or discharge 
without permit. The continued deterioration of China’s water quality indicates that the 
WPPCL has not achieved its objectives. 
 
The Clean Water Act (CWA) together with its National Pollutants Discharge Elimination 
System (NPDES) has been operating in the USA for over 40 years. Although the law has 
inherent problems, water quality in the USA has significantly improved since the 1970s. The 
CWA/NPDES employs technology-based standards to set a nationally uniform requirement 
for point dischargers and water-quality-based standards to ensure the protection of water 
integrity. Furthermore, enforcement measures are in place to ensure law compliance.   
 
The CWA/NPDES experience offers a valuable reference for China’s water permit system. 
This author is motivated to conduct a comparative study on CWA/NPDES and 
WPPCL/WPDP. Overall, this author is dedicated to identify concepts and methods that are 
shown to be feasible and effective in the USA for China’s reconstruction of its water permit 
system. The differences in legislative design, administrative measures and court decisions of 
the water pollutants discharge permit system are studied. To understand how to install and 
adjust the permit system within China’s legal framework is the ultimate aim of this study.  
 
It is challenging to compare the laws of two countries as different as the USA and China. The 
two countries have different social and political structures and different economic priorities. 
Even for a specific topic, such as the water pollutants discharge permit system, this author is 
confronted with the difficulty of finding a good method for law comparison. In Chapter 2 of 
this thesis, the well-established functional method of comparative law is described, but the 
method used in this study is better called referential, because the functioning of the 
environmental law must be studied in the entire legal framework of the respective countries. 
Because (1) the political, social and economic factors in the two countries exert different 
pressures on the environment and (2) the impact of the environmental law can only be 
accessed long after its implementation, it is difficult to conclude whether the USA law is 
better than the China law by means of functional analysis.   
 
Chapter 3 of the thesis describes the legal framework of the CWA/NPDES and Chapter 4 the 
legal framework of the WPPCL/WPDP. Chapter 5 compares the permit discharge standards 
and Total Emission Control (TEC) strategy of the WPPCL/WPDP in China with the dual 
standards of the CWA/NPDES in the USA, and Chapter 6 compares permit enforcement in 
the two countries. In Chapter 7, water pollution of the Taihu Basin and the water pollution 
prevention measures are analyzed to examine the effectiveness of the WPPCL/WPDP. In 
Chapter 8, the differences between CWA/NPDES and WPPCL/WPDP are summarized and 
recommendations for improving WPPCL/WPDP made.  
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Despite the large differences between the laws and practices regarding effluent permit, it is 
meaningful to use the CWA/NPDES as a reference for the improvement of the 
WPPCL/WPDP. Many recommendations can be made, but the most important ones are:  
 
Ethical Premise: China should promote its traditional ethical premise of “nature-human 
harmony” and the modern ethical premise of clean environment. The Chinese politician Deng 
Xiaoping led China to a market economy, and his famous slogan was: “Poverty is not 
socialism; Wealth is glorious”. However, the single-minded pursue of wealth does not allow 
China to achieve the true objectives of socialism, but stimulated the most populated country 
to seek economic growth at any costs, often at the expanse of the environment, in particular 
the water environment. While the objective of the WPPCL is to “balance” economic 
development and environment protection, the “balance” is tilted to economic growth. As 
China’s water environment continues to deteriorate, the protection of water integrity should 
be solemnly incorporated within the legislative design and the economic indicator should no 
longer be the determining indicator for peoples’ welfare. 
 
Concrete Law: the WPPCL only stipulates the principles and its implementation is done 
through administrative regulations. An unusual outcome is that the WPPCL, enacted in 2008, 
is yet to be fully implemented due to the missing administrative regulations. The National 
People’s Congress of China should legislate concrete laws that are directly implementable. 
 
Discharge Standard: the main function of China’s WPDP is to allocate the pollution load to 
enterprises to serve the TEC strategy. This strategy has flaws by design and large risks of 
failure. The dual standard system employed in the NPDES functions much more reasonably. 
The technology-based standard has proven to be effective, and the total maximum daily 
loading (TMDL) technique is necessary for the TEC strategy to function. China’s 
WPPCL/WDPD should adopt the dual standard approach.  
 
Enforcement: A major problem of China’s WPPCL/WPDP is the weak enforcement. In 
theory, the enforcement of the WPPCL/WPDP employs administrative, civil and criminal 
measures, but in practice relies mainly on the administrative measures which bypass the 
others. Therefore, China should activate its entire legal system to enforce environmental laws. 
Citizens should be authorized to participate in the law enforcement. They should enjoy the 
right and have the means to access environmental data and to take legal actions against 
polluters and non-diligent administrative bodies. Finally, the law should promote cooperative 
responsibility and incentives for compliance with the law.  
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Zusammenfassung: 
 
China verabschiedete im Jahr 2008 das „Wasserschutz und Verschmutzungskontroll 
Gesetz“ (Law of the People's Republic of China on Prevention and Control of Water Pollution 
- WPPCL) als Antwort auf die schwere Wasserverschmutzung während des raschen 
wirtschaftlichen Wachstums der Volksrepublik seit den 1980en Jahren. Artikel 20 des 
Gesetzes statuiert die Einrichtung der Abwassereinleitungsgenehmigung (Water Pollutants 
Discharge Permit - WPDP) und ermächtigt den Staatsrat Chinas, die Vorschriften für die 
Durchführung und Durchsetzung des Genehmigungssystems zu entwerfen. Jedoch hat der 
Staatsrat bisher keine nationale Regelungen erlassen und die Implementierung des 
Genehmigungssystems wird vor allem nach Landesvorschriften reguliert.  
 
Das WPPCL Chinas folgt primär der Strategie der Gesamt-Emission-Kontrolle (TEC) und 
verwendet instrumentell hauptsächlich das Verfahren der Entladungsallokation für 
Wasserschutz. Daraus folgt, dass eine wasserrechtliche Genehmigung (WPDP) im Grunde 
betrachtet nur eine Beschreibung ist für die Aufteilung der Entladung von verschmutztem 
Wasser. Mit der TEC-Strategie hat die Genehmigung  seine rechtliche 
Abschreckungswirkung verloren gegen die weitverbreitete Missachtung von 
Genehmigungspflichten und wasserschutzrechtlichen Verstöße durch die Industrie. Die 
anhaltende Verschlechterung der Wasserqualität in China deutet darauf hin, dass das Gesetz 
seine Ziele nicht erreicht hat. 
 
Der Clean Water Act (CWA) zusammen mit dem National Pollutants Discharge Elimination 
System (NPDES) ist in den USA seit mehr als 40 Jahren im Betrieb. Obwohl das Gesetz seine 
eigenen Probleme hat, hat sich die Wasserqualität in den USA seit den 1970er Jahren deutlich 
verbessert. Das amerikanische System (CWA/NPDES) verwendet technologie-basierte 
Entladungsstandards, um eine national einheitliche Regelung für Punktquellen sicherzustellen, 
und gleichzeitig die auf der Wasser Qualität basierten Entladungsstandards, um den Schutz 
der Wasserintegrität zu gewährleisten. Des Weiteren gibt es effektive rechtliche 
Durchsetzungsmaßnahmen, um die Einhaltung der Gesetze zu sichern.  
 
Damit bietet das amerikanische System eine wertvolle Referenz für das Genehmigungssystem 
Chinas. Die Autorin hat es sich zur Aufgabe gemacht, eine Vergleichsstudie über das 
amerikanische CWA/NPDES und das chinesische WPPCL/WPDP durchzuführen. Sie 
versucht die rechtlichen Instrumente, die sich in den USA bewährt haben, herauszuarbeiten, 
um eine Rekonstruktion des WPPCL/WPDP zu unterstützen. Dazu werden die legislativen, 
administrativen und justiziellen Unterschiede der beiden Länder eingehend beleuchtet. Ziel 
dieser Arbeit ist es herauszufinden, wie ein Genehmigungssystem im Rechtsrahmen Chinas 
installiert und verbessert werden kann.  
  
Es ist eine große Herausforderung, ein Gesetz aus zwei so unterschiedlichen Ländern wie den 
USA und China miteinander zu vergleichen. Die beiden Länder haben andere soziale und 
politische Strukturen und unterschiedliche wirtschaftliche Prioritäten. Sogar für ein so 
spezifisches Thema wie das wasserschutzrechtliche Genehmigungssystem wurde die Autorin 
mit der Schwierigkeit konfrontiert, eine angemessene Methode für die Vergleichsstudie zu 
finden.  
 
In Kapitel 2 wird zunächst die etablierte „funktionale Methode der 
Rechtsvergleichung“ zusammengefasst. Allerdings sollte die in dieser Studie verwendete 
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Methode besser als „referenzielle Methode der Rechtsvergleichung“ bezeichnet werden, da 
die Funktionen des Umweltgesetzes im gesamten rechtlichen Rahmen der jeweiligen Länder 
und in deren jeweiligem Kontext untersucht werden müssen. Die politischen, sozialen und 
wirtschaftlichen Faktoren in beiden Nationen üben unterschiedliche Umweltbelastungen aus 
und die Wirkungen des Umweltgesetzes lassen sich nur über eine längere Zeit beurteilen, so 
dass ein rein funktional-normativer Vergleich zwischen den beiden Gesetzen sich verbietet. 
 
Kapitel 3 der Arbeit beschreibt allgemein das CWA/NPDES und Kapitel 4 das 
WPPCL/WPDP. Das Hauptinteresse der Autorin lag hierbei auf dem Vergleich der 
unterschiedlichen Ziele, Institutionen, praktischen Durchführungen und 
Durchsetzungsmaßnahmen dieser Gesetze in den jeweiligen Ländern.  
 
Kapitel 5 vergleicht rechtstechnisch die beiden Genehmigungsarten: Die Entladungsstandards 
vom WPPCL/WPDP auf der einen und der Dual-Standard des CWA/NPDES auf der anderen 
Seite. In Kapitel 6 geht es sodann um die rechtstatsächliche Gesetzesdurchsetzung in beiden 
Ländern. 
 
In Kapitel 7 geht die Autorin auf praktische Fälle ein und analysiert die Effektivität der 
jeweiligen Gesetze vor dem Hintergrund des Umweltschutzes; insbesondere die 
Wasserverschmutzungen im Taihu Becken in China. An Ende der Arbeit (Kapitel 8) wird 
versucht, im Vergleich mit dem amerikanischen CWA/NPDES-System, Empfehlungen und 
Verbesserungsansätze für das chinesische WPPCL/WPDP-System vorzuschlagen. 
 
Trotz der großen Unterschiede und Gegensätze zwischen den USA und China ist es sehr 
sinnvoll, das amerikanische CWA/NPDES als Referenz für einen effektiven Wasserschutz in 
China zu nehmen. Die wichtigsten Empfehlungen und Lehren hieraus lauten thesenartig wie 
folgt: 
 
Ethische Prämisse: China sollte den traditionellen Wert der "Natur-Mensch-Harmonie" und 
die ethischen Prämissen von sauberer Umwelt fördern. Der Chinesische Politiker Deng 
Xiaoping führte China zu einer Marktwirtschaft, und sein berühmter Ausspruch war: "Armut 
ist nicht Sozialismus und Reichtum ist herrlich". Allerdings werden die wahren Ziele des 
Sozialismus nicht durch das zielstrebige Streben nach Reichtum erreicht, anstatt dessen trägt 
diese Philosophie dazu bei, dass das bevölkerungsreichste Land das Wirtschaftswachstum auf 
jeden Preis erzeugt, oft auf den Kosten der Umwelt und Wasserqualität. Daraus folgt, dass das 
wirtschaftliche Wachstum nicht mehr als den einzigen Indikator für den Wohlstand benutzt 
werden sollte, und dass das Ziel des WPPCL nicht mehr die "Balance" zwischen 
wirtschaftlicher Entwicklung und Umweltschutz sein sollte, sondern allein der Schutz des 
Wassers. 
 
Ausführliches Gesetz: Das chinesische WPPCL legt nur die Grundsätze fest und ihre 
Umsetzung wird durch Verwaltungsvorschriften gewährleistet. Bemerkenswert ist, dass das 
WPPCL, obwohl schon im Jahre 2008 verabschiedet, bis heute noch nicht vollständig 
umgesetzt wurde aufgrund fehlender Verwaltungsvorschriften. Der Nationale Volkskongress 
Chinas sollte deswegen ausführliche Gesetze erlassen, die nur mit ergänzenden Regelungen 
direkt umsetzbar sind.  
 
Entlastung Standard: Die Hauptfunktion von Chinas WPDP im Rahmen der TEC-Strategie 
ist es, die Verschmutzung-Entlastung den entsprechenden Unternehmen zuzuweisen. Diese 
Strategie hat Mängel im Grundkonzept und trägt das große Risiko des Scheiterns bereits in 
sich. Das Dual-Standardsystem im NPDES funktioniert wesentlich besser: Die Technologie-
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basierten Standards haben sich als sehr effektiv erwiesen, und die maximale Tagesbelastung 
(TMDL) Technik ist unverzichtbar für einen effektiven Umweltschutz. Das WPPCL/WDPD 
sollte deswegen das Dual-Standardsystem auch in China implementieren.  
 
Durchsetzung: Ein großes Problem von Chinas WPPCL/WPDP ist die schwache 
Gesetzdurchsetzung. Von Gesetzes wegen stünden zur Durchsetzung der WPPCL/WPDP die 
allgemeinen verwaltungs-, zivil- und strafrechtlichen Instrumente zur Verfügung, in der 
Praxis jedoch bleibt es in aller Regel bei rein administrativen Maßnahmen ohne die 
Einbindung des Rechtssystems. Deshalb sollte China sein Rechtssystem für die Durchsetzung 
der Umweltgesetze aktivieren. Die Bürger sollten ermächtigt werden, in diese Durchsetzung 
des Wasserschutzes involviert zu sein. Sie sollten das Zugriffsrecht auf Umweltdaten haben 
und das Recht und die Mittel, gerichtliche Schritte gegen die Verursacher und fahrlässig 
handelnde Verwaltungsbehörden einleiten zu können. Schließlich sollte das Gesetz die 
Kooperation zwischen den einzelnen Parteien fördern und Anreize für die Industrie zur 
Einhaltung der Wasserschutzvorschriften bieten. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Background 
Water is essential to human existence and the natural environment. Today, water is 
increasingly used for industrial, agricultural, domestic and commercial purposes, and thus 
water quality is greatly affected by human produced pollutants discharged directly or 
indirectly into water bodies, such as lakes, rivers and aquifers. More than one billion people 
lack access to safe drinking water, and 40% lack access to basic sanitation.1 Water pollution 
poses a major environmental threat to developing countries like the People’s Republic of 
China (PRC)2, 3, as well as developed countries such as the United States of America (USA).4  
 
Law is essential for water pollution prevention and control. It is conventional that surface and 
ground waters, freshwater and oceans are regulated by separate policies and laws, although 
they are physically interrelated. The focus of this dissertation is on surface freshwater 
pollution prevention and control through the institutions of law. 
 
Based on the origins of pollutants, surface water pollution is categorized into point and non-
point source pollution. Point sources are discrete conveyances (e.g. discharge pipes from 
sewage treatment plants or city storm drains). They are largely regulated by legislations such 
as the Water Pollution Prevention and Control Law (WPPCL) in the PRC, and the Clean 
Water Act (CWA) in the USA. Although the WPPCL and the CWA differ in implementation 
and enforcement mechanisms, both require dischargers to obtain a permit to discharge 
pollutants into water bodies, and discharge without permit is unlawful. 5 Non-point sources 
are pollution sources which are untraceable and unidentified as a result of long-range 
transport or multiple sources such as polluted runoff from agricultural areas draining into a 
river. Studies show that non-point sources are the leading cause of water pollution in the 
                                                
1  United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO, 2006): Water: a sheared 
responsibility. The United Nations World Water Development Report 2.  
2 China Daily (7 Jun 2005): China says water pollution so severe that cities could lack safe supplies. 
3 New York Times (26 Aug 2007): As China roars, pollution reaches deadly extremes.  
4 USA EPA (Oct 2007): National Water Quality Inventory: Report to Congress for the 2002 Reporting Cycle – A 
Profile. No. EPA-841-F-07-003. 
5 Drelich, D. (2009): Restoring the cornerstone of the Clean Water Act. Columbia Journal of Environmental Law 
34:2, p267-328.  
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USA6, and non-point sources are being gradually included in its permit program. In China, 
non-point source control and regulation are still at infancy.  
 
Since the implementation of the “Reform and Opening-up” policy in 1978, China has 
undergone a rapid economic development over a period of nearly four decades. During this 
period, China’s GDP has been increasing at 10% per year on average. However, this has been 
achieved at a cost of massive energy and natural resource consumption and environment 
degradation, in particular air and water pollution. Frequent environmental pollution accidents 
have provoked public anger and distrust towards the governments and manufacturing 
enterprises. Thus, China needs to establish an effective environmental legal system to protect 
the environment. This situation is similar to the earlier stages of development in the USA. 
Since the early 1970s, the USA has undergone an explosive increase in environment-related 
rulemaking, litigation and public actions against polluters. Among them, the most significant 
legislative actions and policy breakthroughs have focused on water pollution control, because 
in comparison to air pollution and soil contamination, water is even more essential for human 
existence.     
The Chinese government has invested a great amount of energy to strengthen water pollution 
control by establishing the WPPCL in 19847 with subsequent revisions in 19968 and 20089. 
However, the legislative efforts seem to be alive only on paper and in reality often fail to 
achieve their objectives. The “Water Diversion Project from Luanhe River to the Tianjin 
City” can be used here as an example to support this claim. The project was designed to 
supply drinking water from the Luanhe River to the Tianjin City. According to the CCTV 
(China Centre Television) “Half an Hour for Economy” program on 3 Jul 2013, the project in 
fact stimulated the economic development of the riverside districts. The two major reservoirs, 
“Daheiting” (大黑汀) and “Panjiakou” (潘家口), were intensively used for aquaculture, and 
located along the river are 149 industries that directly discharge highly polluted wastes into 
the river. As a consequence, contrary to the original purpose of the project, the Luanhe River 
                                                
6 USA EPA (Oct 2007): National Water Quality Inventory: Report to Congress for the 2002 Reporting Cycle. 
No. EPA-841-R-07-001. 
7 SCNPC (1984): The Law of the People’s Republic of China on Prevention and Control of Water Pollution.  
8 SCNPC (1996): The Law of the People’s Republic of China on Prevention and Control of Water Pollution.  
9 SCNPC (2008): The Law of the People’s Republic of China on Prevention and Control of Water Pollution. 
Water Pollution Prevention and Control Law (WPPCL). Promulgated 11 May 1984; Amended 15 May 1996 and 
28 Feb 2008; Effective 1 Jun 2008; http://www.chinaenvironmentallaw.com/wp-content/uploads/2008/03/water-
pollution-prevention-and-control-law.pdf, last visit on 26 Jul 2015. 
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became more severely polluted. This example demonstrates that it is a great challenge in 
China to ensure the compliance of environmental laws.   
China was preoccupied with economic development that often undermined the attempts of 
environmental protection until the 2nd Global Environmental Conference in 1992, also known 
as the Earth Summit, organized by the United Nations (UN). The Earth Summit urged all 
governments to rethink about economic development and to protect the environment from 
irreversible destruction. The concept of “sustainable development” became widely accepted 
with the “Rio Declaration”, which was signed by 178 countries.  
Since the Earth Summit, China has substantially upgraded and enriched its environmental 
protection legal system (Fig 1.1).  All environment-related laws have been revised with new 
concepts and institutions. The Environmental Protection Law (EPL) was passed by the 12th 
National People’s Congress (NPC) on 24 Apr 2014. Effective from 1 Jan 2015, this Act is the 
leading statute for the environmental protection legal system in China. The Civil Law, 
Criminal Law, Administrative Law and Civil Procedure Law have also been amended with 
provisions to coordinate and support the new environmental law system.  
In general, China’s highest law makers - the NPC and SCNPC (Standing Committee of the 
NPC) are diligent in drafting new statutes regarding environmental protection, but they pay 
little attention to the concrete clauses. For example, the EPL has only 70 articles and the 
WPPCL only 92 articles. It is not possible to rely on the principal laws to control pollution, 
and thus the implementation and explanation of the law are given to the authorized rule 
makers such as the State Council, the MEP (Ministry of Environmental Protection), the 
provincial level legislators and local governments, which have more discretion with law 
enforcement.  
 14 
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Figure 1.1: Legislation time line of environment laws in China during 1978-2014. The major environmental laws 
include the Constitutional Law10, Criminal Law11, Marine Protection Law12, Water Pollution Prevention and 
Control Law (WPPCL)13, Water Law, Environmental Protection Law (EPL)14, Air Pollution Prevention and 
Control Law15, Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) Law16, Noise Pollution Law17 and Solid Waste 
Pollution Law18.   
                                                
10 NPC (1954, 1975, 1978, 1982): Constitutional Law. Three early constitutional laws (1954, 1975 and 1978) 
were superseded in turn. Current version was adopted on 4 Dec 1982; Revisions in 1988, 1993, 1999 and 2004.   
11 NPC (1979, 1997, 2011): Criminal Law. Promulgated on 6 Jul 1979; amendments 1997, 2011.  
12 NPC (1999): The Marine Environment Protection Law of the People's Republic of China. Revised on 25 Dec 
1999; Promulgated on 1 April 2000. 
13 Id, 7, 8, 9 
14 SCNPC (1989): Environmental Protection Law of the People’s Republic of China. Promulgated on 26 Dec 
1989. 
15 SCNPC (2000, 2002): Law on the Prevention and Control of Air Pollution of the People’s Republic of China. 
Promulgated in 2000; Amended in 2002. 
16 SCNPC (2002): Environmental Impact Assessment Law. Promulgated on 28 Oct 2002; Effective on 1 Sep 
2003.  
17 SCNPC (1996, 2004): Law of the People's Republic of China on Prevention and Control of Pollution from 
Environmental Noise. Promulgated on 29 Oct 1996; Effective on 1 Mar 1997; Amended in 2004. 
18 SCNPC (1995, 2004): Law of the People's Republic of China on Prevention and Control of Environmental 
Pollution by Solid Waste. Adopted on 30 Oct 1995; Revised and promulgated on 29 Dec 2004. 
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1.2 Motivation 
During the last 20 years, effluent discharge has caused many notorious pollution accidents 
which in turn have led to social unrest and massive economic costs. According to China’s 
Statistical Yearbooks, water pollution accidents accounted for more than a half of all 
environmental pollution accidents during 1995–2010 (Fig 1.2a), and the economic cost of all 
forms of environmental pollution was much higher than the reparation input and 
administrative fines (Fig 1.2b).  
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Figure 1.2: (a) Total pollution accidents and water pollution accidents (1995-2010) in China; (b) Economic cost 
vs. reparation and fines (1995-2010). Data are from China Statistical Yearbook of 1995 to 2010.19  
 
 
                                                
19 National Bureau of Statistics of China (1995-2010): “China Statistical Yearbook 1995”. Id. for 1996, …, 2010.  
http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/, last visit on Apr 26, 2012. Data of economic cost, reparation and fines up 2010 
are not available. 
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Consequently, the NPC approved the revised WPPCL in Feb 2008 to strengthen pollution 
permit system as a major measure to control point source effluents. Article 20 of this law 
stipulates that:  
 
“The State implements water pollutants discharge permit system.  
 
Any enterprise and public institution which discharges industrial effluents or medical 
sewages or any other pollutants into the water bodies directly or indirectly shall obtain a 
permit; the operator in charge of facilities for central treatment of urban sewages shall obtain 
a permit. The specific measures and implementation procedures for permitting are to be 
stipulated by the State Council. 
 
Enterprises and public institutions are forbidden by law to discharge above effluents and 
sewage without permits, neither are they allowed by law to violate the requirements of 
permits.”20 
 
In 2011, the State Council published “Guidelines for Strengthening the Key Tasks in 
Environmental Protection”21. Article 13 of the document requires the provincial governments 
to implement the water permit system and to carry out the permits trading program (a 
technique22 also practiced in the USA), both highlighted as the key measures in the new water 
pollution control era. Since then, more than 20 provinces and municipal cities have passed 
their own provisional permit regulations based on their understanding of the permit system 
such as, for example, the “Provisional Measures for Pollutants Discharge Permit System in 
Zhejiang Province” in 2010, “Management Measures for Water Pollutants Discharge Permit 
in Jiangsu Province” in 2011 and “Management Measures for Pollutants Discharge Permit in 
Gansu Province” in 2013.23 However, until 2014, the State Council had not yet completed 
nationwide permit implementation regulations.   
 
                                                
20 Translated by the author.  
21 State Council of China (2011): “State Council’s Guidelines for Strengthening the Key Tasks in Environmental 
Protection” 国务院关于加强环境保护重点工作的意见, 国发〔2011〕35 号.  http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2011-
10/20/content_1974306.htm 
22 King, D. M. and P. J. Kuch (2003): Will nutrient credit trading ever work? An assessment of supply and 
demand problems and institutional obstacles. Environmental Law Reporter, News & Analysis, 33 ELR 10352-
10368.  
23 Office of Major Science and Technology Program for Water Pollution Control and Treatment of the MEP (27 
Mar 2014): Recommendations for the thorough enforcement of water pollutants discharge permit system in 
China.  http://nwpcp.mep.gov.cn/zxjz/201403/t20140331_269884.html 
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The water pollution permit system is not a new concept and has been practiced for more than 
20 years in China. In 1988, the former State Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA) 
published “Provisional Measures for Management of the Water Pollutants Discharge Permit”. 
A pilot program for permit implementation was then carried out by the Chinese government, 
with the participation of 18 cities, including Beijing and Shanghai. In 1994, SEPA declared 
that the permit system shall be applied across the country.24  However, taking Wenzhou city 
(温州) as an example, during 1997-1999, there were only 316 permits issued, and permit 
holders accounted for 20% of the total point source dischargers. Rui’an city (瑞安) issued 40 
permits in 1996, while during 1997-2000, no permits were issued.25 Obviously, the first round 
of permit issuance since 1994 did not achieve its goal of wastewater discharge control. On the 
other hand, the permit system did promote changes in industrial structure and environmental 
thresholds of enterprises. It is therefore often called “chicken rips”.  
 
Yet, a water pollutant permit system is a key component of environmental management 
practices widely accepted in the world. China’s WPPCL (2008) and EPL (2015) used only 
several principle sentences to describe it. How to understand the permit system and to make it 
effective requires legislative review and analysis.  
 
The USA permit practice of the past 40 years offers China a relatively successful model for 
guidance. The author is thus motivated to carry out a comparison study on water permit 
systems in the USA, the country of its origin, and in China, the country of its transplantation, 
in order to identify the major pillars of the permit system and to examine the feasibility of 
developing an effective water permit system within China’s legal framework.  
1.3 Thesis Structure 
The thesis consists of eight Chapters. Chapter 2 discusses the functional and referential 
approaches to comparative law, as well as the comparability of the PRC and USA water 
pollution control laws. In Chapter 3, the author examines the legal characteristics of the USA 
CWA/NPDES (National Pollutants Discharge Elimination System), and in Chapter 4 the PRC 
WPPCL/WPDP system. Chapter 5 compares the core requirements of water pollution 
                                                
24 Id, 23, Office of Major Science and Technology Program   
25 Xu, J. L. (徐家良) and X. X. Fan (范笑仙) (2002): Institutional arrangement, institutional change and limits of 
governmental control - analysis of development of the effluents permit system. Quarterly Journal of the 
Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences, 2002-01, 13 - 20. In Chinese: “制度安排、制度变迁与政府管制限度——
对排污许可证制度演变过程的分析”, 上海社会科学院学术季刊 2002 年第 1 期, p13-20. 
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discharge permit systems in both countries, focusing on the discharge standards, while 
Chapter 6 the environmental law enforcement. In Chapter 7, the water pollution prevention 
practice in China is examined, using the Taihu Lake as an example. Chapter 8 summarizes the 
findings of this study and outlines the needs for future research. Also in Chapter 8, 
recommendations for implementation of the water permit system in China are discussed. The 
necessity of independent and sufficient judicial protection of public participation in permit 
issuance, implementation and enforcement are discussed. It is argued that public participation 
is a key component to combat the widespread unpermitted discharge of pollutants and to 
increase the incentives for the administrators to seriously enforce permit requirements.  
 
Overall, the author is dedicated to recommending theoretical and practical conceptions which 
have been verified to be feasible and effective by the USA Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) for China’s reconstruction of the water permit system. The differences of 
administrative, legislative and court’s judgments, even the different economic and social 
development status between the two countries are taken into consideration. Simply speaking, 
to understand how to install and adjust the permit system within China’s legal framework is 
the ultimate aim of this study. While China has a strong desire and need for a better 
environment, it remains questionable whether the Chinese society would fully accept and 
embrace the water pollution permit system and the associated consequences. History, e.g. the 
failure of colonialism in Africa and elsewhere, has taught us that one cannot simply impose a 
foreign legal system or tool on unwilling people. Without the acceptance of the people, and in 
case of China, of the political system, the legal tool will not work.26 It is particularly 
important to identify the aspects of the USA CWA/NPDES, which can be used as references 
of the PRC WPPCL/WPDP system.  
                                                
26 Junker, K. W., communicated to the author on 28 Jul 2014 
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Chapter 2: Methods 
 
This thesis is devoted to discuss China’s environmental legal problems with reference to the 
USA/CWA legal practice. A comparative legal study method needs to be applied for 
illustrating the similarities as well as the differences between the two countries. A functional 
approach to the comparative study is first considered, but found to be inadequate in the 
context of environmental law issues, because the functionality of the environmental law is 
strongly subject to the political, social-economic and cultural structures of the respective 
countries and the impact of the law on the environment can only be evaluated over a very 
long period of time. For the purpose of this study, it appears more appropriate to adopt a 
“referential approach” (an expression this author invented), as it is more valuable to use the 
40-year long history of the USA CWA/NPES legal practice as a reference for China’s 
WPPCL/WPDP system, and to offer the Chinese law-makers, governments, NGOs and 
citizens the experiences and inspirations. Despite their political differences, the USA and PRC 
have decided to collaborate in combating environmental problems and in 2003 the USA EPA 
and China SEPA signed the “Memorandum of Understanding on Scientific and Technical 
Cooperation”.27 This collaboration initiated a series of cooperative environmental protection 
projects, including the “China Environmental Law Initiative” in September 2007.28 However, 
from the view point of legal research, it is difficult to compare environmental laws of two 
entities with such profound contrasts in political systems, cultural backgrounds, governmental 
structures, economic developments and technological expertise. Therefore, methods must be 
developed to carry out a comparative study. While the functional approach, which is widely 
practiced in the legal research community, provides a good starting point, it is not necessarily 
the most suitable method for the present work. In this chapter, the functional approach is first 
discussed and then followed by an introduction to the referential approach. Furthermore, a 
comparative environmental law study should also incorporate evidence from the physical 
environment. The data collection and analysis of this study aims to identify where problems 
exist and to evaluate the functioning of the permit system. In essence, this author considers 
that environmental law must be a combination of law, politics, social-economics, science and 
technology.   
 
                                                
27 USA EPA and China SEPA (8 Dec 2003): Memorandum of Understanding on Scientific and Technical 
Cooperation 中美环境领域科学技术合作谅解备忘录.  
28 USA EPA (2007): EPA – China Environmental Law Initiative. 美国环保局-中国环境法合作项目 
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2.1 General Principles of the Functional Approach and Critics 
At the 1900 Paris Congress, Salleiles described the subject of comparative law as the 
discovery of concept and principles common to all civilized legal systems.29 This idea was 
later replaced by the “functional approach”, introduced by Rabel in the 1920s, which 
considers the entire legal milieu30. The starting-point of a comparative analysis is not the rules 
themselves, but the concrete social problems the rules help to solve. This approach became 
widely adopted, and is today a leading theory of comparative law.  
 
On the one hand, comparisons must not be based on the legal rules, concepts or institutions, 
but on the functions they fulfill. This places the emphasis on the comparison of law in 
practice and, when one looks at how courts apply a norm, one should understand the purpose 
for which they employ the norm.31 As the western legal norms are usually regarded as extra-
legal or simple matters of fact, the traditional norms of a country cannot be disregarded.32 
This means that when a country transplants western rules into its own traditional legal system, 
indigenous norms usually continue to function in practice. Thus, according to the functional 
method, comparison must extend to those indigenous norms. This is called “pluralistic”. 
 
Zweigert and Koetz (1998) postulated a methodological monopoly: “the basic methodological 
principle of all comparative law is that of functionality.”33 This approach focuses not on rules, 
but on their effects, and laws must be understood in the light of their functional relation to 
society. This approach considers that institutions are comparable if they fulfill similar 
functions in different legal systems. In the end, comparative law becomes a “better-law 
comparison” — the better of several laws is that which fulfills its function better than the 
others.  
 
To carry out law comparison using the functionalist methodology, one normally follows a 
procedure as outlined below:  
• To identify the social problems which the legal systems intend to solve; 
                                                
29 Fauvarque-Cosson, B. (2008): “Comparative Law in France.” The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law. 
Eds. M. Reimann & R. Zimmerman. Oxford University Press. p37.  
30 Reimann, M. and R. Zimmermann (2008): “The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law, Part I: the 
development of comparative law in the world”. Oxford University Press, p246. 
31 Id, 30, Reimann, M. and R. Zimmermann (2008), p245. 
32 Id, 30, Reimann, M. and R. Zimmermann (2008), p245.  
33 Konrad Zweigert and Hein Koetz (1971): “An Introduction to Comparative Law” (Translation by T. Weir, 3 
ed., 1998), p34, first published in “Einfuhrung in die Rechtsvergleichung“. Vol I, p27-48. 
 21 
• To study the legal resolutions applicable to the social problems, including rules, 
procedures and institutions; and  
• To analyse the reasons for the settlements.  
 
Also functional comparatists agree on some important elements:  
• Factual elements: functional comparison of law is meaningless if the factual situations 
in question are not identical, at least in their relevant respects; 
• Logical elements: one must take into account that legal concepts, institutions, and 
constructions are shaped by history of each country so that they acquire distinctive 
characteristics; thus, identical constructions may have different legal significance so 
that their functions are not necessarily identical. Therefore, seeking similarities or 
differences between legal constructions is merely preparatory work for functional 
comparison and it does not itself lead to functional analysis; and 
• Normative elements: there are certain legal principles which constitute the basis for 
evaluation; we may call them “law formation principles”. When we have identical 
facts and the law formation principles applicable to them are identical as well, then 
similar legal constructions can also be considered functionally equivalent. Thus, the 
equivalence of these law formation principles is the fundamental subject of 
comparison.34  
It is claimed that  
Identical facts + Identical law formation principles = Equivalent function of legal 
constructions 
 
In many areas of law, this formula may be applicable, but it is not the case for environmental 
law. The function of an environmental law that one country makes evolves over a long period, 
during which natural transition, policy changes, scientific and technological advances, 
people’s lifestyle and many other factors contribute to a variable effect of the legal 
construction. Even if the target environmental problems are identical, and the laws of 
different counties share the same legal formation principles, the function of the environmental 
legal constructions may still be very different from each other. Thus, for environmental 
comparative law studies, it is difficult to employ the functional method.  
 
                                                
34 Id, 30, Reimann, M. and R. Zimmermann (2008), p246-247. 
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Both the USA and PRC are confronted with the problem of industrial effluent discharge and 
both countries use the permitting system as a temporary measure to force the industries to be 
clearer step by step,35 although they are in quite different social fabric and legal systems. The 
USA is commonly considered to be a democratic country with a legal system as the core of its 
function, while the PRC an authoritarian country with a legal system that functions parallel to 
political decrees. In China, legal systems and political decrees often interfere with each other, 
but they also compensate each other on many other occasions.  
 
Environmental laws are unique in their broadness and their far reaching consequences on the 
social-economic activities of a nation, as they attempt to rule on human behavior with respect 
to nature. Consequently, the functions of the law are difficult to evaluate, as long-term and 
large-scale scientific evidence is necessary for the functional assessment. The tasks of 
function evaluation become practically impossible, if the laws are entangled with policies, 
administrative measures and a wide range of issues, e.g. law implementation, enforcement, 
governmental support, public education etc. The environmental legal system is such a 
complex system and the laws are intertwined with a large body of political and social-
economic elements, the function of the law no longer serves as the common basis for law 
comparison, even in a pragmatic sense.  
 
The functional approach for a comparison of the USA and PRC environmental laws is 
particularly difficult, because the environmental laws, at least in the case of the PRC, are 
continuously evolving. The USA and PRC find themselves in different stages of 
environmental law development and it is not reasonable to compare the functions of an 
evolving law with a well-established law. 
2.2 Referential Analysis  
The comparison of the USA and PRC environmental laws to be conducted in this study is not 
a “better-law comparison”. Instead, the USA environmental law is used as a reference to 
examine how the PRC environmental law can be further developed within China’s existing 
legal framework. The referential method proposed here is a pragmatic method and is not yet 
systematically developed and tested, but it differs from the functional method in the following 
important aspects:  
                                                
35 Junker, K. W., 28 Jul 2014, letter to the author. 
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• Nature of the Law: the laws to be compared are complex in that they not only regulate 
the behavior of the individuals but also the behavior of the entities which play major 
roles in the society, and thus the functionalities of the laws are strongly affected by 
factors which are beyond their constitutions. Environmental laws are such laws, 
because while they deal with specific environmental problems, their functionalities 
depend on the social-economic conditions of the countries in which they are 
implemented. In the case of China, the functionality of the environmental laws is also 
strongly affected by government policies and national development goals;  
• Stage of Law Development: the laws to be compared are at different stages of 
development, and the fabric and completeness of the laws differ to such a large degree 
that their functionalities cannot be used to define comparability. Specific to this study, 
for example, the USA CWA/NPDES is a fully developed law, while the PRC 
WPPCL/WPDP is a developing law in its early stages and is rapidly evolving. One 
cannot be sure, in the case of China, that the observed environmental changes 
(improvement or deterioration) can be attributed or not to the functionality of a 
specific environmental law; 
• Evidence of Law Functionality:  the assessment of the impact of the laws, a key 
measure of their functionality, requires data which cover over a large area and a long 
period of time, but are however incomplete or have large uncertainties, such that the 
comparison of the laws based on functionality becomes unfeasible. Environmental 
laws do not work over night and long-term (e.g. 10 years) environmental monitoring is 
necessary to conclude whether the laws have worked. In the case of China’s 
WPPCL/WPDP, the data required for its assessment are rather incomplete and the 
water quality data which can be found are difficult to use, because the change of water 
quality in China is largely determined by the forces beyond the power of this 
particular law.  
 
While the functional approach uses law functionality to define law comparability, the 
referential approach does not place its emphasis on this “norm”. Instead, it is taken to analyze 
the histories of a developed and a developing law and the political and social-economic 
conditions under which the laws are implemented and to identify the verified strengths and 
weaknesses of the respective laws, in order to improve the developing law. Griggs et al. (2009) 
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conducted a comparative study on water law and management in the USA and China. 36 The 
latter authors did not explicitly explain what method they employed for the comparison, but it 
appears essentially to a referential comparative law study.  
 
This author considers the USA CWA/NPDES as a valuable guide for the establishment and 
improvement of the PRC WPPCL/WPDP. Both the USA and the PRC have water pollution 
problems, but the USA began dealing with the issues 40 years earlier than the PRC. Both 
countries now employ a permit system for the realization of the laws, in particular for the 
control of point source water pollution. In the implementation of this measure, the PRC has 
encountered problems of permit requirement design, insufficient citizen input and law 
enforcement. On the other hand, the USA has already gathered experience of 40 years of the 
CWA/NPDES enforcement. For example, the legislators of the USA resort to governmental, 
as well as citizen enforcement, while the PRC relies heavily on governmental tools to correct 
permit non-compliances with little public participation in law enforcement, because public 
participation is perceived to be a threat to social stability which has been the highest priority 
in the PRC in recent years. It is now useful to examine how the CWA/NPDES and the 
WPPCL/WPDPS are enforced in the USA and PRC, whether law enforcement in the PRC can 
be strengthened and whether the USA experience provides a meaningful reference.  
2.3 Comparability and Incomparability of the CWA/NPDES and WPPCL/WPDPS 
Due to the recent industrialization and urbanization, China has been confronted with water 
pollution problems similar to the USA in the 1960-1970s.  However, the degree of water 
pollution in China is much more severe than in the then USA, because China has a population 
four times that of the USA but the total amount of available water similar to that of the USA. 
China also has the problem that its water distribution is substantially imbalanced between 
Southeast and Northwest.  
 
To combat the water pollution problems, the USA has undertaken earlier actions, achieved 
success and acquired experience. In addition to technological improvements and 
management-conceptual progress, the USA relies heavily on the CWA to limit water pollutant 
discharge into its national waters.37 The CWA introduced the NPDES38,39 in 1972 to regulate 
                                                
36 Griggs, B. W., J. C. Peck and Y. P. Xu (2009): Comparative water law and management: the Yellow River 
Basin in western China and the State of Kansas in the western United States. Kansas J. of Law & Public Policy 
XVIII:3, p431-461.  
37 33 U.S.C. §§1251-1387. 
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and control point sources, to “restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological 
integrity of the Nation’s waters”, and to establish a goal of providing swimmable and fishable 
waters and protecting the safety of the sources of drinking waters. Zero effluent discharge was 
a goal to be met by 1985. Although it is until today not yet achieved, national water quality 
has been improved enormously since the implementation of the CWA/NPDES. In 1972, the 
Potomac River was considered too dirty for swimming, Lake Erie was dying and the 
Cuyahoga River was so polluted that it burst into flames. Since the enactment of the CWA, 
the USA has made significant strides in the rehabilitation of their rivers, lakes and coastal 
waters: doubling the number of waterways safe for fishing and swimming; reducing industrial 
discharges by billions of pounds a year; more than doubling the number of American citizens 
served by adequate sewage treatment; reducing annual wetland losses by 75%; and reducing 
soil erosion from cropland by more than 1/3.40 
 
However, it has also been revealed in recent studies that the CWA has not worked well41 and 
has fallen into a dilemma42. The New York Times wrote that “the Act has grown old and 
fallen well short of its goal, crippled by uneven and sometimes nonexistent enforcement by 
state and federal agencies…”.43 It has been said that the number of facilities violating the 
CWA increased by more than 16% between 2004 and 2007, and 60% of the violations posted 
the highest public health or environmental risk.44 The report also concluded that the states 
lacked the ability to levy fines large enough to deter polluters, and the federal EPA hesitated 
to pressure the states enforcement officials to do better. Furthermore, the testimony of the 
USA General Accountability Office (GAO) given before the USA Congress noted that despite 
the increased funding for enforcement by the EPA and the states authorized to issue and 
enforce the permits, they still felt overwhelmed by increased enforcement responsibilities, so 
actions are needed to strengthen the enforcement program.45  
 
                                                                                                                                                   
38  U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). "National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System."  
http://cfpub.epa.gov/npdes/, last visit on 25 Jul 2015. 
39 Gaba, M. J. (2007): Generally illegal: NPDES general permits under the Clean Water Act. Harvard 
Environmental Law Review, Vol. 31, p409-473.  
40 http://www2.epa.gov/compliance/clean-water-act-cwa-action-plan, last visit on 25 Jul 2015. 
41 Benson, R. D. (2005): Pollution without solution: Flow impairment problems under the Clean Water Act Sec 
303. Standfort Environmental Law Journal 24, p199-267. 
42 Boudreax, P. (2007): A new Clean Water Act. Environmental Law Reporter, News & Analysis, 37 ELR, 
10171-10196. 
43 New York Times, Editorial (Oct 21, 2009): Clean Water: Still Elusive. 
44 Glicksman, R. L. and D. H. Earnhart (2011): Pollution Limits and Polluters’ Efforts to Comply: The Role of 
Government Monitoring and Enforcement. Chapter 1 by D. H. Earnhart and R. L. Glicksman, Pollution limits 
and polluters’ efforts to comply: the role of government monitoring and enforcement, p2. Stanford Uni. Press. 
45 Id, 44, Glicksman, R. L. and D. H. Earnhart (2011), p3.   
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In Oct 2009, the EPA issued the “Clean Water Act Action Plan”46. The goals of the plan are 
to “target enforcement to the most significant pollution problems, improve transparency and 
accountability by providing the public with access to better data on the water quality in their 
communities, and strengthen enforcement performance at the state and federal levels.”47 By 
2011, the EPA and state co-regulators have collaboratively researched a new retooled system 
for fundamentally revamping the NPDES permitting, compliance, and enforcement program.   
 
Since 2008, permit issuance in China became more popular. For example, Gansu province 
initiated permitting programs in the 1990s. By 2012, there were only 2806 permits issued in 
eight major regions across the province. After thoroughly revising the permit implementation 
measures with references to other 13 provinces, Gansu province began a new round of permit 
issuance, and issued 907 permits in 2013.48  The Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region has 
also been issuing permits since 2008. However, despite of the progress in permit issuance, 
industrial effluent discharge without permits remains widespread in China. The recently 
revealed incident of pollution discharge in the Tengger Desert is just one example.49  
 
Due to the reluctant involvement of industrial enterprises with permit compliance, the local 
governments have little motivation to enforce the permit system, because it has been so far a 
political priority to promote economic growth by minimizing environmental requirements, 
and for many Chinese officials, environmental protection is at conflict with economical 
development. It has been said that a clean environment is affordable only as a luxury. While 
this is probably 20th century thinking, it remains inherent among many policy makers. While 
the government can make laws that fine polluters, a more direct economic argument is 
necessary and industry participation in pollution prevention is essential.50  
 
The USA experience with the CWA/NPDES is particularly valuable to China for the 
following reasons. First, a long-term China-USA technical and legal cooperation platform for 
                                                
46 USA EPA (2009): http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/policies/civil/cwa/actionplan101409.pdf, last 
visit on 5 Jun 2012. 
47 http://www2.epa.gov/compliance/clean-water-act-cwa-action-plan, last visit on 25 Jul 2015. 
48 Wu, Y. P. (吴玉萍)  and L. L. Bai (白刘黎)  (2013): Gansu comprehensively promotes pollution permits 
management. 甘肃全面推进污染许可管理, 
http://www.hprc.org.cn/leidaxinxi/jjst/201305/t20130531_221708.html, last visit on 25 Jul 2015. 
49 Legal Daily (2014): Chemical enterprises discharge wastewater without any treatment directly into the desert. 
http://epaper.legaldaily.com.cn/fzrb/content/20140909/Articel07002GN.htm, last visit on 25 Jul 2015. 
50 Junker, K. W., communicated to the author on 28 Jul 2014 
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water pollution prevention and control exists at the governmental level.51 The “Ten-Year 
Framework for Energy and Environmental Cooperation - Clean Water Action” focuses on 
strengthening permit system, researching water quality standards, and developing the total 
maximum daily loading (TMDL) plan.52  From 2015, the USA and PRC commenced 
collaboration on air pollution control with more technical and economic exchange. China 
borrowed the water permit concept from the USA in the 1980s and has tried for more than 20 
years to transplant it into its own legal system. However, China’s water permit system has 
been so far not successful in achieving its goals: pollution discharge without permit and 
violation of permit requirements are wide spread. Some Chinese cities, e.g. Jinhua and Jiaxing 
in Zhejiang Province gave up permits institution in the 1990s.53 Thus, despite the fact that the 
PRC and the USA are at different stages of utilizing the water permit system, both countries 
share the same problem, i.e., how a permit system can be effectively implemented and 
enforced.  
 
Second, water permit rules will survive by providing citizens with “access rights”, including 
access to environmental information, participation in the governmental decisions and the legal 
process. These access rights are embodied by Section 505 of the USA CWA, allowing 
citizens the ability to enforce the laws when the government was unwilling or unable to do 
so.54 These so-called “citizen suit” provisions, included in every major environmental law of 
the USA, allow citizens to sue violators in federal court. Congress intended citizen suits to 
supplement government action, when underfunded or overworked agencies could not ensure 
that all laws are complied with.55 As government enforcement becomes increasingly difficult 
due to reduced budget and governmental oversight, citizen enforcement of environmental law 
is more necessary than ever. More details of the USA citizen suit against polluters are given 
in Chapter 6. 
 
                                                
51 USA EPA: EPA Collaboration with China. http://www2.epa.gov/international-cooperation/epa-collaboration-
china#agreements, last visit on 25 Jul 2015. 
52 U.S. Department of States (2008): The U.S.-China Strategic Economic Dialogue (SED): the Ten Year 
Framework for Energy and Environment Cooperation (TYF) – Clean Water Action Plan.  
http://www.state.gov/e/oes/eqt/tenyearframework/141878.htm, last visit on 25 Jul 2015.   
53 Xu, J. L. (徐家良) and X. X. Fan (范笑仙) (2002): Institutional arrangement, institutional change and limits of 
governmental control - analysis of development of the effluents permit system. Quarterly J. Shanghai Academy 
of Social Sciences, 2002-01, 13 - 20. In Chinese: “制度安排、制度变迁与政府管制限度——对排污许可证制度演变过
程的分析”, 上海社会科学院学术季刊 2002 年第 1 期, p13-20. 
54 North & South Rivers Watershed Ass’n v. Scituate, 949 F.2d 552, 555 (1st Cir. 1991) (stating, “The primary 
function of the provision for citizen suits is to enable private parties to assist in enforcement efforts where 
Federal and State authorities appear unwilling to act.”) 
55 Ohio Environmental Council (2012): A Citizen’s Guide to Clean Water Act Enforcement. 
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The “access rights” have become more meaningful for resolving China’s increasing 
environmental incidents which have triggered social instability (see Chapter 6).  In China, the 
decision-making progress is still non transparent such that the public has no or few channels 
to obtain information about administrators’ decisions, although there is a hearing process 
during the administrative permitting process.56 In this, the participants have to agree with the 
governmental decisions by raising their hands during the hearing, and in most cases, it is 
difficult for the victims affected by the decisions to make a change. Furthermore, conflicts 
between rapidly degrading water quality and booming public appeals for safe water are ever 
growing and causing social unrest in some regions. Thus, to endow the public the possibility 
to endeavor their environmental rights is a new challenge.  
 
Third, different from the USA, the PRC has established 134 environmental and resources 
protection courts and tribunals to resolve environmental disputes. But interestingly, these 
environmental courts have been rather idle. For example, the First Environment Tribunal in 
Guiyang (贵阳) of Guizhou Province tried 624 cases since 2007, 10 cases of which involved 
public interests, while the Environmental Tribunal in Kunming (昆明) of Yunnan Province 
only dealt with 6 cases regarding public interests since its establishment in 2008.57 At the 
same time, China’s environmental disputes have been escalating. Since 1998, the number of 
environment disputes increased by more than 20% p.a. and since 2005 by 30% p.a.58  
 
Fourthly, in comparison with the USA EPA, China’s environmental protection authorities are 
limited in resources and political power to contest against local governments because they are 
attached to the local governments and are hesitant to challenge the dischargers which are 
economically important for the local economic development. Thus, courts and citizens 
become the only channel to challenge the polluters. But due to the lack of citizen access to the 
pollutant discharge information of enterprises, and government’s reluctance to offer discharge 
monitoring reports to the public, the chance to raise lawsuits against polluters with credible 
evidence of pollution is small. Furthermore, the monitoring results carried out by citizens are 
often regarded as unlawful. It is thus difficult for the public to resort to the legal process. Also 
the court is short of professional judges to deal with water pollution issues.  
                                                
56 Article 46 and 47 of the Administrative Permission Law of the PRC 
57 Kunming City Intermediate People’s Court (Oct 2013): Environmental Judicial Protection Green Book, 环境司
法保护状况绿皮书. 
58 Gao, Y. (高原) (2012): Awkwardness of 77 Environmental Courts. Law Weekly, 13 Jun 2012. 77个环保法庭的
尴尬, 法治周末. http://huanbao.gongyi.ifeng.com/detail_2012_06/13/15256042_0.shtml, last visit on 25 Jul 2015. 
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Fifthly, in the earlier years (1948-1970), the USA federal government relied on the states to 
control water pollution by themselves. But this self-control arrangement was not effective in 
improving the water quality. Some states reduced their own environment standards, including 
water-quality standards, to attract investment, increase employment and raise tax revenues. 
This is now happening in the PRC. In the 1970s, the USA Congress made federal 
environmental laws which were mainly implemented by the federal EPA, and the states 
became cooperative partners for the implementation of the federal laws under the supervision 
of the EPA. In other words, the USA environment legal system transformed from “state self-
control” to “cooperation under federalism”. In China, environmental laws are promulgated by 
the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress of China (SCNPC). The Ministry 
of Environmental Protection (MEP) is then authorized to explain how to implement the law in 
the form of regulations. Further, the governments and the People’s Congresses at the 
provincial level have the right to interpret and supplement the provisions of the laws and the 
regulations, in the form of “implementation rules” or “measures”. This legislative process 
depends on the interpretation of the local governments and legislative bodies, which often 
result in an altered version of the original law and non-uniform implementation across the 
country.  
 
In summary, the USA experience in the implementation of the water permit system provides 
the PRC with abundant conceptual sources to work out the regulatory design and enforcement 
strategies, and deserves to be carefully examined as a reference for China to revamp the water 
permit system in a new water pollution control law era.  
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Chapter 3: The USA CWA/NPDES Permit Program 
3.1 Historical Review of the Clean Water Act 
The USA Constitution makes no express grant of power to regulate the nation’s waters.59 
However, the Commerce Clause60, which authorizes the Congress to manage the interstate 
commercial activities, has served as the basis for nearly every major environmental and public 
health law passed by Congress, including the CWA. Because the Supreme Court has made 
clear that Congress is free under the Commerce Clause to legislate not only against economic 
problems, but also against public health problems and moral and social problems, so long as 
those problems are a burden on interstate commerce.61 And the Necessary and Proper Clause62 
gives Congress great flexibility to legislate the means needed to exercise its commerce power 
effectively.  
In 1972, the USA Congress enacted the Amendments of Federal Water Pollution Control Act 
(FWPCA), i.e., the CWA, as a significant expansion of the FWPCA of 1948, to control the 
national water pollution with the combined efforts of federal and states governments. At the 
federal level, Congress authorizes the EPA to write regulations that explain the critical details 
necessary to implement environmental laws. At the states level, taking the NPDES permit 
program as an example, at least 70% or 80% of the permitting workload imposed by federal 
statutes is now done by the states. The precondition of the delegation is that the state 
legislature must have passed authorizing legislation that is at least as stringent as the federal 
standard while demonstrating the State has adequate resources to run the program.  
The objective of the CWA is “to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological 
integrity of the Nation’s waters”63, and “there was a new ethical premise that the water should 
simply be clean. There was a political view, that pollution was a national problem and 
                                                
59 Austin, J. E. and D. B. Myers Jr. (2007): Anchoring the Clean Water Act: Congress’s Constitutional Sources 
of Power to Protect the Nation’s Waters, American Constitution Society for Law and Policy, p1. 
60 The Congress shall have the power to regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, 
and with the Indian Tribes. Article I, Section 8, Clause 3, USA Constitution. 
61 Id, 59, Austin, J. E. and D. B. Myers Jr. (2007), p3.   
62 Congress has the power "to make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the 
foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or 
any Department or Officer thereof. Article I, Section 8. Clause 18, USA Constitution. 
63 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) 
 31 
required federal intervention.”64 The enforcement of the CWA has contributed much to the 
cleanup of the waterways in the USA: the amount of point source pollutants discharge has 
decreased substantially, and the rate of wetland loss has decreased, and many waterways are 
cleaner than before.65 The law is a milestone marking the greater responsibility of the nation 
towards the environment.  
 
Table 3.1: History of the USA Clean Water Act and Major Amendments (codified generally as 33 U.S.C. 
§§1251 – 1387)66 
 
Year Act Public Law 
1948 Federal Water Pollution Control Act P.L.80–845 (Act of Jun 30, 1948) 
1956 Water Pollution Control Act of 1956 P.L.84–660 (Act of Jul 9, 1956) 
1961 Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments P.L.87–88 
1965 Water Quality Act of 1965 P.L.89–234 
1970 Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970 P.L.89–753 
1972 Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments P.L.91–224, Part I 
1977 Clean Water Act of 1977 P.L.95–217 
1981 Municipal Wastewater Treatment Construction 
Grants Amendments 
P.L.97–117 
1987 Water Quality Act of 1987 P.L.100-4 
 
The first USA legislative effort for water pollution control is traceable to “The River and 
Harbors Act of 1899”67. Section 10 of that act prohibited any obstruction to the navigable 
capacity of any of the waters, as well as the excavation or filling of a lake or stream of the 
USA. Section 13 further prohibited the discharge or deposit of any refuse into navigable 
national waters. This act provided the legal basis for deposit prohibition until the Supreme 
Court’s decision in USA versus Standard Oil, 384 USA 224 (1966),68 construed to apply it to 
water pollution control issues. The issue in this case was the meaning and intent of the 
Congress with regard to the term “refuse” in the Act. The Court made clear that it viewed the 
Act as applying equally to pollution and obstructions.69 Also in the 2006 Rapanos v. United 
States70 case, the U.S. Supreme Court confined the reach of the CWA’s term “navigable 
                                                
64 Houck, O.A. (2002): “The Clean Water Act TMDL Program”, Environmental Law Institute; 2 ed. p11. 
65 Andreen, W. L. and S. C. Jones (2008): The Clean Water Act: A Blue Print for Reform, Center for Progressive 
Reform White Paper 802.  
66 Copeland, C. (2010): Clean Water Act: A Summary of the Law. Congressional Research Service, 7-5700, 
RL30030. 
67 33 U.S.C. § 407: The River and Harbors Act of 1899. Mar 3, 1899, Ch. 425, Sec. 9, 30 Stat. 1151. 
68http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=14285088702155293794&hl=en&as_sdt=6&as_vis=1&oi=schol
arr, last visit on 25 Jul 2015. 
69 Schoenbaum, T. J. and R. H. Rosenberg  (1996): Environmental Policy Law, 3rd ed., University Casebook 
Series. p1129. 
70 126 S. Ct. 2208, 36 ELR 20116 (2006). 
 32 
waters” that might prevent the protection of law of many wetland and other small water 
bodies.71 
 
The evolution of the CWA is outlined in Table 3.1. The most significant water pollution 
control law in the USA was the FWPCA72 of 1948, which provided the foundation for the 
existing framework of water pollution control laws. At that time, it depended primarily on the 
states to enact and enforce the law, with the focus to require the states to establish their own 
water quality standards according to the water utility goals. A major flaw of the Act was that 
the free use of the waters was presumed. The Act stated that the environmental protection 
agencies must prove the harms caused by the specific sources of pollution. This flaw 
hampered the motivation of the states to trace the sources of pollution and to enforce the law. 
Thus, industrial effluents continued to be discharged freely into rivers and lakes throughout 
the country. For example, Lake Erie was declared “dead” in the 1960s as most living species 
had ceased to exist in the lake due to water pollution, and it remains quick sick even today.73  
 
In 1965, the Congress adopted the Water Quality Act74, an amendment to the FWPCA of 
1948, and required all states to establish their own water quality standard and implementation 
plan to achieve the standard. In spite of the great efforts by the federal and state governments, 
the water pollution control had little success.75   
 
The water pollution crisis in the USA reached epic proportions by the early 1970s. Some 70% 
of the annual industrial wastewater (~ 53 Gt) was discharged without treatment, and the rest 
only with rudimentary treatment. The discharge of organic sewage pollutants dramatically 
increased. 63 types of recorded fishes were killed and almost 1/3 of drinking water contained 
chemicals exceeding Public Health Service limits.76 Confronted with the water pollution crisis, 
                                                
71 Boudreax, P. (2007): A new Clean Water Act. Environmental Law Reporter, News & Analysis, 37 ELR 
10171-10196.  
72 33 U.S.C. §§1251 - 1376: The Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1948. 30 Jun 1948; Ch. 758; P.L. 845, 
62 Stat. 1155. 
73 New York Times (Mar 14, 2013): Spring Rain, “Then Foul Algae in Ailing Lake Erie”.  
74 U.S.C. (1965) The Water Quality Act. 
75 Andreen, W. L. (2003): “The Evolution of Water Pollution Control in the United States – State, Local, and 
Federal Efforts, 1789-1972: Part II”, 22 Stan. Envtl. L.J. 215, p240-55.	  
76 Andreen, W. L. (2008): Delegated Federalism versus Devolution: Some Insights from the History of Water 
Pollution Control in, Preemption Choice: The Theory, Law, and Reality of Federalism Core Questions 13, in 
William W. Buzbee, ed., Cambridge Uni. Press. 
 33 
the USA Congress responded in 1972 with the CWA77 “to restore and maintain the chemical, 
physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters”78. 
3.2 Revolutionary Legal Characteristics of the CWA  
The CWA has several revolutionary characteristics. Most significantly, it converted the 
conception of the 1948 FWPCA from the presumption of free discharge of water pollutants 
into the national waters to discharge with permission. This represents a federal regulatory 
change to water pollutants discharge behavior and simplifies the definition of water pollution 
as “the man-made or man-induced alteration of the chemical, physical, biological, and 
radiological integrity of water”.79 Section 301 of the law prohibits the illegal discharge of 
pollutants without permit. The law also states that violation of the permit conditions is 
illegal,80 no matter whether the discharge causes harm.  
 
For a long period, environmental legislation in the USA was a matter for the states and local 
governments. However, state environmental laws are not applicable to trans-boundary water 
pollution problems. The CWA was revolutionary also because it made a cooperative 
institutional arrangement under federalism, and within this arrangement, the federal 
government was the primary authority over the water pollution control affairs and the states, 
delegated with limited powers under the supervision of the federal government, were the 
secondary authority.   
 
The CWA not only created broad federal jurisdiction over the waters of the USA, but also the 
basic structure for regulating pollutants discharged into its waters and for regulating the 
surface water quality standards. A comprehensive strategy was developed to achieve the 
objectives of the law, namely, the “National Pollutants Discharge Elimination System” 
(NPDES)81. The NPDES makes concrete the requirements for the limitation of wastewater 
discharge using the following three key components:	  Effluent water discharge standard; 
Water quality based standard, and total maximum daily loads; Enforcement of the law.  
                                                
77 33 U.S.C. §§1251-1387, CWA Sec.101-607. 
78 33 U.S.C. §1251(a), CWA Sec. 101 (a). 
79 33 U.S.C. §1362 (19), Section 502 (19). 
80 33 U.S.C. §§1311(a), 1342, 1344. CWA Sec. 301(a), Sec.402 and Sec. 404.  
81 33 U.S.C. §1342(a), Sec. 402 CWA. 
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(The CWA made provisions for federal law enforcement in Section 309.82 Other components 
of the NPDES include: mechanism for funding the building and upgrading of sewage 
treatment plants; voluntary planning system to address nonpoint source pollution; and 
wetlands permitting program. These components are not considered in this thesis.) 
 
The CWA is also featured with a citizen suit provision (Section 505 of the CWA) in the 
statutory enforcement scheme allowing private citizens to act like a private attorney general 
against persons who are alleged to violate permit requirements or against the administrators 
for failure to enforce the law. The citizen suit is realized by making a calculation between the 
permittee-made Discharge Monitoring Reports (DMRs) and the officially- required discharge 
limitation. Permittees must submit a DMR for each numbered outfall and each measured 
pollutant to the state, and all of those must be available to the public for review. Due to the 
USA Freedom of Information Act, explicitly applying only to executive branch government 
agencies, these USA agencies make all bureaucratic and technical procedures accessible for 
the public’s application for the document from that agency. Agencies are also subject to 
penalties for hindering the process of a petition for information. The USA federal and state 
EPAs have developed various databases and tools to safeguard the citizens’ “right to know” 
about the food safety, air pollution, water quality, toxic substances, hazardous wastes etc. 
They have designed the web-based DMR Pollutant Loading Tool to help the public determine 
who is discharging, what pollutants they are discharging and how much, and where they are 
discharging. The tool calculates pollutant loadings from permit and DMR data from the EPA's 
Integrated Compliance Information System for the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination 
System (ICIS-NPDES). Data are available from the year 2007 to the present.83 On the report, 
the limit for the pollutant is listed beside the measurement from the sample.  If the sample 
exceeds the limit, the sampler must make an “x” in a column called “violation.”  The member 
of the public can then demand that the state take enforcement action within 30 days.  If the 
state does not, the public can enforce the law. This process is extremely powerful and makes 
                                                
82 Any person who violates section 301, 302, 306, 307, 308, 311(b)(3), 318 or 405 of this Act, or any permit 
condition or limitation implementing any of such sections in a permit issued under section 402 of this Act by the 
Administrator, or by a State, or in a permit issued under section 404 of this Act by a State, or any requirement 
imposed in a pretreatment program approved under section 402(a)(3) or 402(b)(8) of this Act, and any person 
who violates any order issued by the Administrator under subsection (a) of this section, shall be subject to a civil 
penalty not to exceed $25,000 per day for each violation. In determining the amount of a civil penalty the court 
shall consider the seriousness of the violation or violations, the economic benefit (if any) resulting from the 
violation, any history of such violations, any good-faith efforts to comply with the applicable requirements, the 
economic impact of the penalty on the violator, and such other matters as justice may require. For purposes of 
this subsection, a single operational upset which leads to simultaneous violations of more than one pollutant 
parameter shall be treated as a single violation. 
83 http://cfpub.epa.gov/dmr/, last visit on 25 Jul 2015. 
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the CWA, in practice, very different from China.84 More detailed discussions on these issues 
are given in Chapter 6.   
3.3 The NPDES Permit Program  
When the CWA was passed, it was hoped that discharges would be eliminated by 1985. This 
goal was not achieved, but with improved technology the discharge standard will be tightened 
over time until pollution discharge is eliminated. Permit limitations are set either according to 
technology-based effluent limits or water-quality-based standards, whichever is more 
stringent. Technology-based limits are set for those types of dischargers such as mining 
industries, taking into account what level of pollution control is economically and 
technologically feasible for all dischargers of each type, as the minimum requirements for the 
permittees, technology-based limits are sometimes not sufficient to protect receiving waters 
from pollution, so the water quality based standards must be complied with. The NPDES 
permit carries source-specific regulations and, once issued, the performance obligations. 
Significant penalties may result from violations of the regulations and obligations.85  
 
Unlike uniform technology-based effluents limits, water quality based standards are tailored 
to the use designations and values of specific water bodies, made by states and approved by 
the federal EPA; the states must then set technical criteria, narrative description or numeric, in 
general, the use designation will dictate the criteria that will be applied, for example, if a 
water is designated for general use, which includes swimming use, there will be criteria for 
pathogens that will be applicable.86 
3.3.1 Technology-based Standard  
The basic philosophy of the CWA/NPDES is to prevent water pollution through technological 
innovation and advancement. Thus, as the USA Congress enacted the law, priority was set to 
the technology-based controls at the point source discharges, i.e., each point source discharger 
must obtain a permit and comply with the relevant limitations the permit requires. 
Noncompliance with the permit requirements results in administrative, civil or criminal 
penalties. The technology-based standard limits the effluent discharge at its source and 
                                                
84 Junker, K. W., letter to the author on 28 Jul 2014. 
85 Schoenbaum, T. J. and R. H. Rosenberg (1996): Environmental Policy Law. 3rd ed., Westbury, N.Y.: 
Foundation Press, p1245. 
86 Illinois Water Quality and the Clean Water Act: A Report of the Environmental Law & Policy Center. Oct 
2003, p7, http://elpc.org/wp-content/uploads/2008/06/ilwaterquality1.pdf 
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demands basic wastewater treatment before it enters the surface waters of the US. This 
standard requires the same level of technological treatment for a particular industry and 
prevents the dischargers from escaping from the states with stricter legal requirements to the 
states that are more lenient.   
 
The technology-based standards are determined on the basis of a number of factors, including 
the available technology of different industries, the type of pollutants, the amount of pollutant 
production, the techniques for wastewater treatment etc. Three categories of standards have 
been developed for (1) industrial sources; (2) public-owned treatment water facilities 
(POTWs); and (3) indirect discharge sources (with the exception of urban water treatment 
facilities).87  
 
This technology-based standard requires the EPA, authorized by the law, to consider what 
pollution reduction controls are available to best meet the congressional goals, and requires 
the industry to select the technology that best satisfies the controls. The EPA has thus 
established more than 50 sets of standards for a wide spectrum of industries, including coal 
mining, chemical manufacturing, iron and steel, etc.88 These standards are then incorporated 
into the NPDES as criteria for permits issuance for specific facilities. With this approach, the 
NPDES sets concrete and measurable limits on the amount of pollutants discharged.  
 
To establish the technology-based standard, pollutants discharged from industrial sources are 
classified into the types of conventional, toxic, non-toxic, or nonconventional. As detailed in 
Table 3.2, industrial dischargers must comply with the Best Practicable Control Technology 
Currently Available (BPT), Best Conventional Pollutant Control Technology (BCT), and Best 
Available Technology (BAT). New sources are required to follow the Best Available 
Demonstrated Control Technology (BADT).  
 
The standards for POTWs (Public Owned Treatment Works) differ somewhat from those for 
industrial sources. POTWs are required to implement “secondary treatment” to reduce the 
oxygen demand of organic waste and total suspended solids by 85%. For industries 
discharging toxic pollutants into a POTW system, “pretreatment standards” apply. The EPA 
promulgated the “general pretreatment requirements” which require the elimination or drastic 
                                                
87 Id, 86, Illinois Water Quality and the Clean Water Act. 
88 McGaffey, K. M. (2003): Water Pollution Control Under the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System. 
In “The Clean Water Act Handbook”, 2nd ed. By Mark Ryan. Chicago, Ill.: Section of Environment, Energy, 
and Resources, American Bar Association.  
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reduction of wastes that would interfere with the POTW operation or leak through the 
POTWs to the receiving water. The EPA also promulgates “categorical pretreatment 
standards” which limit the amount of pollutants that facilities within particular industries are 
allowed to discharge.89  Separate standards are promulgated for existing sources and new 
sources, and POTWs have the power to impose additional requirements.90 The CWA rules 
that the public treatment facilities must reach the second class water treatment standard by Jul 
1, 1977, designed the USA EPA for the public treatment facilities.  
 
Technology-based regulation is even-handed in that all members of the same industry are 
treated equally. Because technology-based standards set minimal levels of control with which 
all states must comply, these standards take away incentives that industry might have to 
relocate in states with less severe environmental problems or to states with less stringent 
standards.91 Furthermore, as the standards are incorporated into the NPDES, the permit 
compliance and enforcement are significantly simplified. The permittee knows exactly what is 
expected and regulators, what is required of the various sources. The determination of 
violations becomes relatively simple, because each permittee must periodically file “discharge 
monitoring report” which allows a comparison of the discharger’s actual performance with 
the permit requirements. Because of this regulatory scheme, dischargers have to monitor their 
discharges and report the results to the regulators, as the EPA may conduct compliance 
inspections and the CWA imposes penalties on false reporting. 
 
Much of the recent water quality improvement in the USA owes to the technology-based 
standards. It is believed to be responsible for the dramatic reduction of industrial and urban 
effluent discharges. It has been reported that, from 1973 to 1995, the amount of BOD 
discharges from industrial point sources fell by 40%.92 This represented a decline from 5406 
tons/day to 3243 tons/day (for USA national statistics, see Chapter 6). In 1998, the EPA 
estimated that discharges of toxic pollutants had been reduced by almost 10.8 million kg (24 
                                                
89 This is a useful measure for China. For example, the Jiangsu permit regulation does not set categorical 
pretreatment standards. Consequently, industries transfer polluted waters to the POTWs, increasing the treatment 
cost and often making POTWs the secondary polluters.  
90 Percival, R.V., C. H. Schroeder, A. S. Miller and J. P. Leape (2009): “Environmental Regulation: Law Science 
& Policy”, p696. Aspen Publishers.  
91 Glicksman, R. L. (2009): The Advantages of Technology-Based Standards in Protecting Health, Safety, and 
the Environment.  http://www.progressivereform.org/perspstatutory.cfm 
92 Stoddard, A., J. B. Harcum, J. T. Simpson, J. R. Pagenkopf and R. K. Bastian (2002): “Municipal Wastewater 
Treatment: Evaluating Improvements in National Water Quality”. Wiley, pp672.  
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million pounds) annually, much of which was attributed to the significant declines in toxic 
discharges from the pulp and paper, aluminum, iron, steel, and leather industries.93,94  
 
Table 3.2: Technology-based pollutants discharge standards.95 
 
Technology-Based Standards 
Pollutant Standard How Set Level of Protection 
Conventional 
Pollutants.   
Biological oxygen 
demanding material 
(BOD), total suspended 
solids, fecal coliform, 
pH, oil and grease.  
Best Practicable 
Control Technology 
Currently Available 
(BPT). The original 1977 
deadline requirement. 
(Originally used to 
regulate conventional 
pollutants and non-
conventional, non-toxic 
pollutants.) 
 
Best Conventional 
Pollutant Control 
Technology (BCT).BCT 
was to be implemented 
between 1983 and 1989. 
Reasonable efforts. 
Based on the “average of 
the best” by well-
operating plants in an 
industrial category. 
Subject to some cost-
benefit balancing. 
 
 
 
 
Between reasonable 
efforts and best efforts. 
May be required if 
deemed to be cost-
effective under two cost-
benefit tests. Subject to 
stringent marginal cost 
analysis. 
Baseline. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Although envisioned as 
often more stringent than 
BPT, almost always the 
same as BPT.  
Toxic and 
Nonconventional, Non-
toxic pollutants. EPA 
currently lists 126 
priority toxic pollutants, 
including mercury, lead 
and arsenic. Pollutants 
that fall into the 
nonconventional 
category, which includes, 
among others, heat, 
chlorine, and ammonia. 
Best Available 
Technology 
Economically 
Achievable (BAT). BAT 
was to be implemented 
between 1983 and 1989. 
Best Efforts. Based on 
the nest of the best 
performance within an 
industrial category. 
Consideration of cost, but 
no requirement that cost 
be compared to benefit. 
Most stringent 
New sources of toxic, 
conventional and non-
toxic, nonconventional 
pollutants. 
Best Available 
Demonstrated Control 
Technology (BADT). All 
new sources must 
incorporate the most 
technologically advanced 
discharge treatment 
processes. 
 At least as stringent as 
BAT for toxics and non-
conventional, non-toxic 
pollutants. Conventional 
pollutants are also 
encompassed within the 
standard. 
 
In addition to the technology-based standards for point source controls, the USA federal EPA 
and the states also issue “general permits” to regulate facilities that have similar operations 
                                                
93 Andreen, W. L. (2003–2004): Water Quality Today - Has the Clean Water Act been a Success? 55 Ala. L. Rev. 
537 n. 268.  
94 Schroeder, C.H. and R. Steinzor (2004): A New Progressive Agenda for Public Health and the Environment: 
A Project of the Center for Progressive Regulation. Carolina Academic Press, pp268.  
95 Andreen, W. L. and S. C. Jones (2008): The Clean Water Act: A Blue Print for Reform, Center for Progressive 
Reform White Paper 802, Table 3. 
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and type of discharge. In many cases, identical effluent limitations and requirements have 
been compiled into one permit that can be applied to certain categories of discharges.96 
General permits are used to cover discharges that have a minimal affect on the environment. 
They simplify the permit application form, and reduce the states’ issuance processing time, 
allowing quicker review time. In practice, storm waters associated with the construction or 
industrial activities, or small municipal storm waters tend to be subject to general permits. But 
general permits cannot replace individual permits, as the authorities retain the right to require 
dischargers to apply for individual permits. General permits issued by the states rely on self-
regulation. This practice is believed to be ineffective. It has been reported that “Polluted storm 
water runoff is the leading cause of impairment to 40% of surveyed USA water bodies which 
do not meet water quality standards.”97, 98  
3.3.2 Water Quality Standard (WQS) 
While effluent limitations focus on the waste stream as it flows out of a pipe, water quality 
standards focus on the overall quality of the receiving water. This is a vital aspect of the Act’s 
comprehensive regulatory strategy because compliance with effluent limitations alone does 
not necessarily result in good, or even adequate, stream quality. For waters that are unable to 
meet water quality standards after the application of effluent limitations, the states are to 
establish TMDL and allocate the pollutant loading among the responsible sources. 99 
 
Three considerations are taken in the WQS:  
(1) Designations of the water’s beneficial uses;  
(2) Water quality criteria necessary to protect the beneficial uses. The criteria are 
established by the states and reviewed by the federal EPA. The basic criteria is that 
substances must not be discharged into the USA waters whenever and wherever, 
which threaten human and aquatic lives;  
(3) Anti-degradation policy including preventive measures, implementation strategy, 
enforcement, supervision and inspection.  
States are also responsible for setting the interstate WQS. 
                                                
96  http://www.epa.ohio.gov/dsw/permits/gpfact.aspx 
97 NPDES Regulation and Effluent Limitation Guidelines and Standards for CAFOs, 68 Fed. Reg. 7176 (12 Feb 
2003)	  
98 Thorne, J. H. (2004): NPDES Permits Have Come to the Animal Feeding Industry. 19 Nat. Res. & Env’t 76, 
77. 	  
99Andreen, W. L. (2007): Motivating Enforcement: Institutional Culture and the Clean Water Act. Pace 
Environmental Law Review (PELR), Volum 24, 67. U of Alabama Public Law Research Paper No. 985121.  
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The purpose of the WQS is to allow the states to assess whether the technology-based 
standard is adequate to protect the water quality. The WQS allows states   
(1) to identify waters which fail to meet the water quality standards despite the application 
of the technology-based standards;  
(2) to target these waters by taking into account the severity of the pollution; and  
(3) to determine the “total maximum daily loads” (TMDLs) so that these waters meet the 
applicable water quality standards. A TMDL sets the total loading for each of the 
relevant pollutants, which is then divided into a loading to be allocated to the 
contributing point sources (Waste Load Allocation) and a loading allocated to non-
point and natural sources (Load Allocation).  
 
If the TMDL sets much stricter requirements than the technology-based standards on the point 
sources, then the states must work to reduce point and nonpoint sources of pollution so that 
the water quality standards can be met, as the CWA Section 303 rules the NPDES permits 
must include more stringent limitations necessary to meet the WQS. Accordingly, when the 
TMDLs are established, dischargers must comply with the more stringent permit limitations 
to meet the waste load allocation under the TMDLs.  
3.3.3 Institutional Arrangement: Cooperation between EPA and States 
The dual-standard strategy created a mechanism for the federation and the states to cooperate 
on water quality issues. The NPDES permit system is administrated by the federal EPA and 
the authorized states (now 46 states and 1 territory)100 in the form of “cooperative federalism”. 
Cooperative federalism is a congressional or administrative effort101 to induce states to 
participate in a coordinated federal program.102 In the case of environmental protection, it 
focuses on federal EPA’s pollution control laws where states participate in the 
implementation of federal standards. 103  The USA federal government in some cases 
(California v. U.S.104，Schaffer v. Weast105), provides financial support to the state for its 
own programs, if it is not in compliance with federal conditions, the state will lose significant 
federal funding; in other cases (Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation 
                                                
100  http://water.epa.gov/action/cleanwater40/cwa101.cfm, last visit on 25 Jul 2015. 
101 Fischman, R., (2005): Cooperative Federalism and Natural Resources Law. NYU Environmental Law Journal 
14, p179, p189 
102 Id, 101, Fischman, R., (2005), p184.  
103 Id, 101, Fischman, R., (2005), p189. 
104 438 U.S. 645 (1978) 
105 546 U.S.49 (2005) 
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Association106，FERC v. Mississippi107，Arkansas v. Oklahoma108), the Congress states that 
it will take over the regulation of an activity at the national level, unless the State’s 
implementation of its own regulation meets minimum federal standards.  
Overall, cooperative federalism is a concept of federalism in which national, state, and local 
governments interact cooperatively and collectively to solve common problems, and it is a 
method to encourage the states to implement the federal programs. For example, under the 
CWA, the federal EPA decides the national policy and technology-based standards, the states 
tailor the standards and if the technology-based standards do not secure the water quality in 
the relevant states, then the water quality standard prevails over the technology-based 
standard for permit issuance. States also implement the NPDES permit schemes and enforce 
laws (states administrative and judicial procedures). 
 
By now, 46 states have been delegated with permit administration authority in different 
scopes.109 The states, however, must comply with the federal requirements and are subject to 
the EPA’s supervision. The EPA is entitled to veto the decisions of states. If a state fails to 
administer its NPDES authority, then the EPA has a mandatory duty to initiate proceedings 
under the CWA Section 402110 to withdraw delegated NPDES permitting authority when it 
has the factual knowledge of shortfalls in the program of the state, as for the case of Save the 
Valley, Inc. v. USA EPA111. But the EPA has used its veto power only 13 times since 1972, 
with the most recent being the Spruce No. 1 Mine case on 13 Jan 2011.112  The federal EPA is 
typically seen as the “dominant partner” in the federal-state collaboration, but the USA 
Constitution reserved to states all powers that were not explicitly allocated to the federal 
government, and the federal resources are limited, the federal government often relies heavily 
on state cooperation and involvement to achieve national environmental goals.113  
 
                                                
106 452 U.S. 264 (1981) 
107 456 U.S. 742 (1982) 
108 503 U.S. 91 (1992) 
109 Another important permit system is the “dredge and fill” permit program, under which the USA Army Corps 
of Engineers issues these permits to allow the removal (dredging) and addition (fill) of materials from or to 
navigable waters. The Corps has delegated dredge and fill permitting to only several states. The CWA Section 
404, 33 U.S.C.  §1344. This study only considers the NPDES water permit system.  
110 33 U.S.C. §1342(c)(3). 
111 223F. Supreme Court 2d 997. 
112 USA EPA (2011): The Clean Water Act Section 404(c) “Veto Authority”.  
http://water.epa.gov/lawsregs/guidance/cwa/dredgdis/upload/404c.pdf, last visit on 25 Jul 2015. 
113  Sweeney, K. M. and S. A. Armstrong (2013): Cooperative Federalism in Environmental Law: A Growing 
Role for Industry, 21st Section Fall Meeting Baltimore, MD October 9-12, p2.  
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An essential advantageous effect of the cooperative federalism114 is that it could avoid the 
pollution facilities moving from the states with more stringent mechanisms imposed on the 
states with less stringent water quality standards, because the technology-based standards are 
nationally equally applicable and the water quality standards are also subject to the guidance 
of the federal EPA. At the same time, it is an incentive for the states to establish their own 
rules for permit compliance and law enforcement. This is particularly relevant for China. To 
prevent water pollution of the Taihu Lake in the late 2000s to early 2010s, polluting chemical 
plants were transferred out of Zhoutie Town and sold to less developed regions, resulting in 
water pollution in these regions (see Chapter 7). 
3.4 An Appraisal of NPDES: Successes and Problems 
The primary goal of water quality protection in the USA is to achieve clean and safe water 
required by the CWA and the SDWA (Safe Drinking Water Act).	  Studies show that the 
NPDES has been remarkably successful in achieving these goals. Much of this success is 
attributed to the implementation of the technology-based standards and the enforcement of the 
law. In 1998, the USA federal EPA estimated that the implementation of the technology-
based standards resulted in a reduction of conventional pollutants discharge by 49 kt and toxic 
pollutants discharge by 10.8 kt per year.115  
 
The use of the technology-based standards is a “do-your-best” approach. However, the EPA 
has made no major updates to the standards since their establishment in 1982, although the 
technology has significantly advanced. The lack of upgrading of the technology-based 
standards means that they no longer represent the “do-your-best” philosophy. Recent USA 
EPA reports indicate that newer technology-based standards will be developed, aiming at 
reducing the discharge even further.  
 
The absolute level of pollutant discharge in the USA remains high. According to the USA 
EPA116, more than 100 kt of toxic chemicals were discharged into the waters in 2011. This 
level of toxic discharge has hardly changed over the years. About 1/5 of this amount was 
released from indirect industrial dischargers subject to the pretreatment program. Many 
facilities fail to meet pretreatment standards, but as a customer of the POTW, an indirect 
                                                
114 Id, 101, Fischman, R. (2005), pp183, 187-188. 
115 Schroeder, C. and R. I. Steinzor (2005): A New Progressive Agenda for Public Health and the Environment. 
Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press, pp228.  	  
116 USA EPA (2013): 2011 Toxic Release Inventory National Analysis Overview 
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discharger generally “can expect more sympathetic monitoring and enforcement from the 
POTW than would a direct discharger from a state or federal permitting agency.”117  
 
Although the NPDES takes the dual-standard approach, its success mostly owes to the 
technology-based standard. In recent years, the WQS has been increasingly used to help 
prevent water pollution. According to the federal EPA statistics, since Oct 1995, the states 
have reported 41,567 water bodies as impaired to the federal EPA (CWA §305b and §303d) 
and 72,305 causes of impairment. In terms of the federal cumulative total, 51,699 TMDLs 
have been implemented and 54,715 causes of impairment addressed.  
 
Table 3.3: The USA national number of TMDLs implemented and the number of causes of impairments 
addressed since Oct 1995.118 The EPA Fiscal Year starts Oct 1 and ends Sep 30. 
 
Fiscal Year Number of TMDLs No. of Causes of 
Impairment Addressed 
1996 122 123 
1997 337 351 
1998 402 408 
1999 330 373 
2000 1,557 1,583 
2001 2,580 2,616 
2002 2,743 2,823 
2003 2,999 3,272 
2004 3,378 3,636 
2005 4,317 4,632 
2006 4,210 4,563 
2007 4,321 4,651 
2008 9,262 9,545 
2009 4,402 4,628 
2010 2,567 2,703 
2011 2,830 3,113 
2012 2,885 3,154 
2013 2,359 2,442 
2014 98 99 
Total 51,699 54,715 
 
 
Table 3.3 shows that the number of TMDLs implementation increased from 122 in 1996 to 
9262 in 2008, and since then has been declining. This shows that while the NPDES takes a 
dual-standard strategy, it has taken more than a decade for the strategy of the WQS to reveal 
                                                
117 Goldfarb, W., U. Krogmann and C. Hopkins (1999): Unsafe Sewage Sludge or Beneficial Biosolids?: 
Liability, Planning, and Management Issues Regarding the Land Application of Sewage Treatment Residuals, 26 
B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. pp687, 697-698. 
118 USA EPA, http://iaspub.epa.gov/waters10/attains_nation_cy.control?p_report_type=T, last visit on 25 Jul 
2015 
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its true potential. This is because the federal EPA was initially primarily occupied with 
establishing and implementing the technology-based standards.119 In addition, the WQS are in 
practice difficult to implement, as it must be based on extensive water quality monitoring and 
sophisticated decision supporting system, such as the Geographic Information System and 
water quality models. Even today, more than four decades since the CWA was implemented, 
the USA only monitors 31.3% of rivers and stream sections (miles), 44.4% lakes, reservoirs 
and ponds (acres), 40.0% bays and estuaries (miles2), 14.0% coastal shorelines (miles), 3.1% 
ocean and near coastal waters (miles2) and only 1.1% wetlands (acres). The best monitored 
water bodies are the Great Lakes shoreline (85.2%, miles) and waters (88.1%, miles2). 120 
 
The USA experience shows that for developing countries such as China, where a rigorous 
water monitoring system and decision supporting tools are yet to be developed, it would not 
function to use the WQS as the primary tool for water pollution prevention and control. Even 
with political willingness, action cannot be taken in the absence of scientific data. 
 
In addition to the technical feasibility, the success of the NPDES depends critically on the 
following five factors: 
(1) a new ethical premise that the water should simply be clean; 
(2) the sound design of discharge limitations for permit holders; 
(3) the enforcement of the law;   
(4) the close cooperation between the federal EPA and the states; and   
(5) public input.  
 
The NPDES was designed to prevent water pollution from point sources. It has become 
increasingly clear that non-point sources (e.g. agriculture, atmospheric deposition etc.) of 
water pollution must also be considered. However, for the state to assign pollution reductions 
to nonpoint sources and to enforce their assignment are more difficult than to control point 
sources.  
                                                
119 Houck, O. A. (2002): The Clean Water Act TMDL Program: law, Policy, and Implementation. Environmental 
Law Institute, pp362.  
120 USA EPA, National Summary of State Information, Assessed Waters of United States, 
https://ofmpub.epa.gov/waters10/attains_nation_cy.control, last visit 18 Apr 2016. 
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Chapter 4: China’s Water Pollutants Discharge Permit System 
 
For years, uncontrolled discharge of industrial and domestic wastewater as a result of 
industrialization and urbanization and the widespread use of pesticides and fertilizers for 
farming have caused severe degradation of water quality in China. China’s legal system is 
forced into action to develop water protection laws in response to the pressing problem of 
water pollution. At the time when the USA Congress enacted the CWA in 1972, an 
environmental legal framework was  non-existent in China. This Chapter describes the 
statutes and regulations for China’s water pollutants discharge permit system, with reference 
to the USA CWA/NPDES described in Chapter 3, with full awareness that the political, 
social-economic and cultural backgrounds for the environmental legal frameworks of the two 
countries are profoundly different. 
4.1 Water Pollution in China 
China comprises 20% of the world’s population but only 7% of global water resources. While 
the country has 2400 ~ 2800 billion m3 available in total per year121, the amount of available 
water per capita is only 2093 m3 (northern China 750 m3), 1/3 of the world average and ¼ of 
the USA average of 9044 m3. By 2030, if China’s population increases to 1500 million, then 
the water availability per capita is expected to decrease to 1500 ~ 1760 m3/year (northern 
China 250 m3), which is at the water scarcity threshold of 1700 m3/year.  
 
Water resource distribution in China, due to the monsoon climate and topography, is highly 
variable in space and time. The major rivers in China together with their annual runoffs are 
shown in Appendix A1. The basic facts are that Southeast China has abundant water and 
frequent floods, while Northwest China has water shortages and frequent droughts. Large 
uncertainties exist for the future water resources in China, in part, as consequence of climate 
change. Over the past half century, North China has become drier and warmer, but South 
China, wetter122. In general, China has been experiencing more frequent severe floods and 
droughts.123  
                                                
121 World Bank (2013): 2013 Environment. World Development Indicators: Freshwater. Data for 2011 are used, 
http://wdi.worldbank.org/table/3.5 
122 Ye, J. S., W. H. Li, L. F. Li and F. Zhang (2013): North drying and south wetting summer precipitation trend 
over China and its potential linkage with aerosol loading. Atmos. Res. 125-126, p12–19. 
123 Yu, M. X., Q. F. Li, M. J. Hayes, M. D. Svoboda and R. R. Heim (2013): Are droughts becoming more 
frequent or severe in China based on the Standardized Precipitation Evapotranspiration Index: 1951–2010? Int. J. 
Clim. DOI: 10.1002/joc.3701. 
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China’s modernization has been accompanied by the rapid increase of industrial water usage, 
massive urbanization and urban domestic water use. By 2008, China had 190 cities with 
populations exceeding 300,000, 60 exceeding 1 million, and 10 exceeding 5 million and one 
over 10 million.124 In 2012, the Ministry of Water Resources (MWR) announced that out of 
the 663 cities in China, more than 400 were suffering from water shortages, with 110 
classified as “severe”.125  
 
China’s wastewater is divided into three main categories:  
(1) domestic sewage; 
(2) industrial wastewater with high concentrations of conventional (e.g. oil and grease), 
toxic (e.g. heavy metals, volatile organic compounds) or other nonconventional 
pollutants (e.g. ammonia); and  
(3) agricultural wastewater with sediment, nutrients of fertilizers and pesticides. 
 
Among these categories, domestic sewage and industrial wastewater are subject to more strict 
regulations, while agricultural wastewater flows more or less freely. According to the MEP, 
by 2012, China had 8173 surface-water quality cross-section monitoring stations in its main 
water systems and 2995 drinking water quality monitoring stations126. Measurements of water 
quality include water temperature, pH, turbidity, electrical conductivity, BOD5 and COD Mn 
(高锰酸盐指数), volatile Phenol (挥发酚类), Ammonia-Nitrogen (NH3-N) (氨氮) and total 
organic carbon (总有机碳). Using these measurements, the water quality is classified into 5 
grades as following: 
• Grade I: unpolluted water; 
• Grade II: safe for rare and valuable aquatic species; 
• Grade III: can be used for swimming and aqua farm, as well as sanctuary for common 
fish species;  
• Grade IV: can be used for industrial and recreational activities, pending no direct 
contact with human bodies;  
• Grade V: only acceptable for agricultural uses and landscape design; 
• Grade V+: not suitable for any use. 
                                                
124 China City Statistical Yearbook 2008. China Statistics Press, p480.  
125 Ministry of Water Resources: http://www.mwr.gov.cn/english/cpws.html, last visit on 25 Jul 2015 
126 MEP (11 Apr 2013): Report on the State of the Environment in China 2012. 全国环境统计公报( 2012 年)  
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According to the MEP127, in 2009, the seven major rivers of China: Changjiang, Yellow, Pearl, 
Songhuajiang, Huaihe and Liaohe rivers were already polluted. Among the 408 sections of 
203 rivers monitored, sections with water quality Grade I to III, Grade IV to V, and Grade V+, 
accounted respectively for 57.3%, 24.3% and 18.4%. The major three lakes, Taihu, Dianchi 
and Chaohu Lake were severely polluted with high Total Nitrogen (TN) and Total 
Phosphorus (TP) contents. This lead to large scaled algae disasters, e.g., in Taihu in 1996, 
2003 and 2007.  
 
China’s water resources have also been threatened by pollution incidents. In 2009, for 
example, the MEP dealt with 171 environmental incidents, 80 of which were water pollution 
accidents.128 These pollution events caused great damage to public welfare and resulted in 
heavy economic losses, which were eventually cleaned up by the government.  In 2012, the 
MEP reported129 that 73% of China’s surface waters has water quality Grade I-III, 11.3% 
Grade IV, 6.1% Grade V and 8.7% Grade V+. 
 
 
Figure 4.1: Area fraction of China’s water quality grades for April 2012.130 
 
International researchers provided a more grim assessment of China’s water pollution 
problem. For instance, Gleik et al. (2009)131 pointed out that “China’s water resources are 
over allocated, inefficiently used, and grossly polluted by human and industrial wastes, to the 
point that vast stretches of rivers are dead and dying, lakes are cesspools of waste, 
groundwater aquifers are over-pumped and unsustainably consumed, uncounted species of 
                                                
127 MEP (2010): Report on the State of the Environment in China 2009, http://english.mep.gov.cn/ 
128 Id, 127, MEP (2010) 
129 MEP (2012): Report on the State of the Environment in China 2011, http://english.mep.gov.cn  
130 Id, 129, MEP (2012) 
131 Gleik, P. H., H. Cooley, M. J. Cohen, M. Morikawa, J. Morrison and M. Palaniappan (2009): The World's 
Water 2008-2009: The Biennial Report of freshwater Resources. Islandpress, pp423.  
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aquatic life have been driven to extinction, and direct adverse impacts on both human and 
ecosystem health are widespread and growing”.  
 
 
Figure 4.2: Discharge of wastewater in China since 1981. Industrial wastewater discharge, domestic wastewater 
discharge and total wastewater discharge are shown in billions of tons. Data for domestic wastewater discharge 
and total wastewater discharge prior to 2000 are not available. Data for the period 2001 – 2012 are obtained from 
the Report on the State of Environment of China for 2001 - 2012132, which are available from the data center of 
the MEP, and the data for the period prior to 2001 are obtained from the National Bureau of Statistics of China133.  
 
The trend of total wastewater discharge in China has been on the increase (Fig 4.2). While the 
industrial wastewater discharge has been limited to the levels of the 1980s, the domestic 
wastewater discharge has been sharply increasing since the record began in 2001 due to an 
increased middle class in China with more disposable income, and correspondingly more use 
of resources. Controlling the general population’s domestic use of water is far more difficult 
than controlling the dirty industries.134 
 
From 2001 to 2012, the annual total COD emissions decreased from 14.05 to 12.70 Mt, and 
the annual total ammonia emissions increased from 1.25 to 1.73 Mt. These numbers did not 
include the agricultural sources. Since 2011, the MEP has included the COD and ammonia 
emissions from the agricultural sources. The annual total COD emission amounts to 24.24 Mt 
for 2012 and the annual total ammonia emission amounts to 2.54 Mt.  
 
                                                
132 MEP, Report on the State of Environment for 2001 – 2012. Data from the Waste Water Section in Chinese 
(not in English version) at http://www.mep.gov.cn/zwgk/hjtj/.  
133 Vennemo, H., K. Aunan, H. Lindhjem and H. M. Seip (2009): Environmental Pollution in China: Status and 
Trends.  Rev Environ Econ Policy 3(2): 209-230.doi: 10.1093/reep/rep009 
134 Junker, K. W., letter to the author on 28 Jul 2014. 
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Water pollution leads to water-related diseases, especially among children. For instance, 
intestinal worms associated with lack of safe water and adequate sanitation is a serious 
problem in rural China since the 1990s. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) Environmental Indicators issued in 2007 estimated that 30,000 rural 
children in China died each year from diarrhea caused by polluted water.135 The World Health 
Organization reported an incidence of 108.4 mortalities per 100,000 persons from diarrhea-
related illness in China in 2002.136  
 
The emphasis of China’s social economic development over the past few decades has been 
strongly tilted towards economic growth to create opportunities for employment and income 
increase. In today’s China, there is no doubt that these are the foremost factors which 
determine social stability, although people’s satisfaction can be measured in various ways137. 
The impressive economic growth has been accompanied by the neglect of environmental 
protection. In the context of this thesis, the prevention of water pollution is thus hampered by 
the passive attitude of the local governments which prefer to protect local industries and 
economic opportunities. Corruption and the desire for rapid economic growth are crippling 
China’s environmental agencies at provincial levels.138 At the same time, water pollution also 
threatens social stability, because significant outbreaks of water pollution related illnesses, 
including cancers in heavily polluted areas, drive up health care costs and trigger social unrest. 
There is a growing internal dissent and conflict over both water allocation and water quality, 
raising new political pressures on the government to more seriously address the nation’s water 
problems. In 2005, the Chinese government acknowledged that 50,000 environment-related 
protests occurred that year, many of which were related to water pollution.139   
 
4.2 Legal Characteristics of Water Pollution Prevention and Control Law 2008 
In the USA, the Supreme Court has the authority to invalidate legislation or executive actions 
which, in the Court's judgment, conflicts with the Constitution. This power of "judicial 
                                                
135 OECD (2007). “OECD Environmental Performance Review of China”. Paris, Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development.  
136 World Health Organization (2003): “Children’s Mortality Rates 2003”. 	  
137 Easterlin, R. A., R. Morgan, M. Switek and F. Wang (2012): China’s life satisfaction, 1990 – 2010. 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 109, 9775 – 9780, 
doi:10.1073/pnas.1205672109.  
138 Turner, J. L. (2006): New Ripples and Responses to China’s Water Woes. Woodrow Wilson International 
Center for Scholars, China Brief, Vol 6, Issue 25. 
139 Id, 138, Turner, J. L. (2006). 
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review" 140 gives the Court a crucial responsibility in assuring individual rights, as well as in 
maintaining a "living Constitution". China’s Constitution also enjoys the highest status. 
However, it plays only a symbolic role as directives for legislature, governmental action and 
citizens, but no institution could rely on it to decide the case of controversy which may be 
unconstitutional.  
China’s Constitution (1982) has explicitly stipulated in the General Principles (Chapter I) that 
all natural resources including waters are owned by the state, that is, by all people… The state 
ensures the rational use of natural resources… Appropriation or damaging of natural 
resources by any organization or individual by whatever means is prohibited (Article 9); the 
state protects and improves the environment in which people live and the ecological 
environment. It prevents and controls pollution and other public hazards (Article 26). These 
two articles establish the “obligation of the state” to protect environment and control pollution.  
However, this “obligation of the state” could not be applied as a constitutional basis for 
institutions, NGOs, or citizens to a lawsuit against the national or local governments. Neither 
such cases related with natural resources and environmental having ever been heard in a legal 
process.   
The Constitution authorizes the SCNPC to enact and amend laws, with the exception of those 
which should be enacted by the NPC (Article 67, Sentence 2) such as criminal law, civil law 
and administrative law. In practice, the environment related laws including the EPL and 
WPPCL, are written by the SCNPC. The State Council is the highest administration 
organisation of China. It is authorized by the Constitution to adopt administrative measures, 
enact administrative rules and regulations and issue decisions and orders in accordance with 
the Constitution and the law (Article 89, Sentence 1); the MEP is a department of the State 
Council and it is in charge of implementing the environmental laws and drafting the national 
effluent discharge standards.    
Correspondingly, the local environmental regulations are provided by the Local People’s 
Congress of provinces and municipalities (directly under the Central Government) and their 
standing committees, which must not contravene the Constitution and the law and 
                                                
140 The power of “judicial review” of the Supreme Court deprives not directly from  the expression of the 
Constitution, but was confirmed by Chief Justice John Marshall in Marbury v. Madison. In this decision, the 
Chief Justice asserted that the Supreme Court's responsibility to overturn unconstitutional legislation was a 
necessary consequence of its sworn duty to uphold the Constitution. That oath could not be fulfilled any other 
way. "It is emphatically the province of the judicial department to say what the law is," he declared. Chief 
Justice Charles Evans Hughes: "The republic endures and this is the symbol of its faith."  
http://www.supremecourt.gov/about/constitutional.aspx 
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administrative rules and regulations, and Local People’s Congress should report such local 
regulations to the SCNPC for the record (Article 100, Constitution). Local EPAs also have the 
power to manage local environmental affairs, and the power to enact local standards, which 
could be stricter than the national standards. 
 
 
Figure 4.2: Environmental legal framework of China, which consists of national fundamental laws, the basic 
environmental law and individual environmental laws. The laws are implemented through administrative 
regulations, rules and policies. The diagram is drawn with reference to Qi and Zhou (2009)141 and Chen and Piao 
(1994).142  
 
4.2.1 Overview of Environmental Legal Framework of China  
China’s fundamental Environmental Protection Law (EPL), passed in 1989, could not keep in 
steps with the recent social and economic evolution. In 2011, the NPC started to revise the 
EPL. After four reviews by the SCNPC and twice public comments, it was passed on 24 Apr 
2014 to be effective from 1 Jan 2015. The EPL contains 70 Articles in total and is now the 
leading statute for the environmental protection legal system. Article 45 of the EPL stipulates 
                                                
141 Qi, Y. and X. Zhou (2009): Water Pollution Control in China: Review of laws, regulations and policies and 
their implementation. Economic Analysis Team Institute for Global Environmental Strategies (IGES).	  
142 Chen, H. G. and G. Z. Piao (1994): Foundation of Environmental Law. China Environmental Science Press, 
Beijing.	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that the states should adopt the pollution permit system, that producers should discharge 
pollutants in accordance with the permit requirements, and that it is unlawful to discharge 
without a permit.143 The permit system, in theory, crystallizes the requirements for pollutant 
discharge application, standards, monitoring, etc. Hence, for the discharger, the permit system 
is a law-abiding basis: a legal enforcement ground for the environment protection agency, and 
a source of pollutant discharge information for the public.    
The WPPCL is a pioneering environmental law in the legislation history of the PRC, as the 
CWA is in the USA. The WPPCL was enacted in 1984, five years ahead of the EPL and other 
environment laws. It has served as a model for other environment laws which followed. The 
entire Chinese environmental legal framework has evolved over the years and is now at the 
stage as illustrated in Fig 4.2. In China’s legal system, the constitutional law, criminal law, 
civil law and administration law are national laws fundamental to environmental laws and all 
other laws. The Constitution (1982) explicitly stipulated in Articles 9, 10, 22 and 26 that “The 
country protects proper use of natural resources, precious animals and plants. The country 
protects living environment and ecology, prevents and controls environmental pollution”. The 
Criminal Law (1997) explicitly stipulated in Chapter 6 that “Damaging environment is a 
specific crime and have to commit criminal responsibility” and the Civil Law (1986) 
explicitly stipulates in Chapter 6 that “Anyone who damages the environment should commit 
civil responsibility”. The EPL was first enacted in 1979 and officially issued in 1989. It rules 
on the principles, objectives, policies, key measures, management systems, organizational 
structures and legal responsibilities of environmental protection. The EPL enjoys high statutes 
in the legal system and acts as the basis for all other specific environmental laws, including 
pollution prevention and control laws, conservations laws and environmental management 
laws. The WPPCL is now a specific pollution prevention and control law dedicated to water.  
 
For law implementation, the State Council and the relevant national administrative authorities 
(MEP, MWR etc.) establish regulations and rules which include operational plans, technical 
standards, enforcement measures etc. Over the years, China has established a large quantity 
(c.a. 2000) of administrative regulations, rules, policies and decrees. This vast amount of rules 
                                                
143Article 45: the State shall adopt pollution administrative permit system in accordance with the law. Enterprises, 
public institutions and other producers and business operators pursuant to pollution permit system shall 
discharge pollutants in accordance with the requirements of their permits; No pollutant discharge is allowed 
without a pollutant discharge permit. China Daily, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/language_tips/trans/2014-
05/20/content_17522868_4.htm, last visit on 25 Jul 2015 
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partly reflects the urgency of the pollution problem and partly implies that many of these rules 
are to date, not successful.  
 
Since the level of social-economic development in China is heterogeneous, the regulations 
and rules embody the spirit of “adaptation to local conditions”. Local People’s Congresses are 
responsible for interpreting the national laws and making correspondingly the local level 
statutes, while local governments are responsible for making local regulations and rules.  
 
For major river basins, the regulations and rules (e.g. the Provisional Regulations on Water 
Pollution Prevention and Control of Huaihe River Basin) are made jointly by the State 
Council and the relevant administrative authorities, the MEP and MWR in particular, local 
governments and relevant local administrative authorities, and river-basin management 
committees. Further, local governments can make regulations and rules for their 
administration jurisdictions, such as the “Taihu Lake Water Pollution Prevention and Control 
Ordinance of Jiangsu Province” 144. 
 
The WPPCL and related regulations have evolved considerably over time, with underlining 
philosophy and strategy that has evolved from “long-term concentration control” and “end of 
pipe cleaning up” to “total emission control” and “pollution prevention”, from administrative 
“region-based pollution control” to “river-basin-based management”, from “point-source 
control” to “all sources control” and from “single administrative mandatory orders” to 
“economic and legal tools”. The WPPCL is however by no means completely and 
successfully implemented, and the environmental legal framework is still being tested and 
effective water pollution prevention and control measures to cope with the demand for 
pollutants discharge are yet to be found.  
 
4.2.2 Revolutionary Amendments to WPPCL in 2008 
With this background, the SCNPC substantially revised the WPPCL in 2008. The 
amendments have the following new features:  
(1) Increased responsibility of the local governments (at or above the country level) for water 
protection and enhanced supervision of the performance of the local governments by means 
of the “target responsibility system” and “evaluation system” (Article 5). 
                                                
144 Standing Committee of the People’s Congress of Jiangsu Province, China: 江苏省太湖水污染防治条例. Passed 
on 14 Jun 1996; Amended on 27 Sep 2007, 29 Sep 2010, 12 Jan 2012; Effective on 1 Feb 2012. 
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(2) More stringent liability for water polluters by increasing amount of administrative 
penalties (Chapter 7). Article 83 stipulates that in the event of most severe pollution accidents, 
the penalty shall amount to 30% of the total economic damage and therefore should there be 
no upper limit of the penalty. 
(3) Adoption of the “Total Effluent Control on Major Water Pollutants” strategy. Article 18 
stipulates that the governments at the provincial level should establish and control the total 
amount of key water pollutants allowed to be discharged, and allocate the total amount to 
local governments at the city and county level. These local governments should then 
distribute their allocations to the enterprises in the relevant administrative territories. In the 
process of TEC implementation, governments have wide discretionary power to distribute the 
allocation among the lower-level local governments and among the enterprises. Therefore, the 
abuse of this discretion and unfair distribution may be an inherent risk of the TEC strategy. 
(4) The water pollutants discharge permit system (Article 20) is written into the law. In fact, a 
permit program already existed in China since 1988. But over the 20-year period (1988 – 
2008), this program was largely ignored and rarely enforced and thus, it only existed in name. 
Although the WPDP system has been written into the WPPCL 2008, matching regulations for 
its operation is until today not in place.  
(5) Article 88 of this law made significant progress in facilitating the environmental damage 
litigation. Not only that the large number of victims could elect a representative for initiating 
a joint litigation (S.1) and the local EPA and social organizations could support the victims to 
raise a lawsuit (S.2), but also law firms and lawyers are encouraged to provide them with 
legal assistance (S.3). Article 88 guarantees only the victims with more opportunities to 
protect their interests through legal action. Also, NGOs have no standing to raise a lawsuit 
against polluters, because they are not “directly injured persons”. Moreover, according to 
Article74 of the “Opinions of the Supreme Court on the Application of Civil Procedure Law 
of People’s Republic of China”145, and Article 4 of the “Several Provisions on the Evidence of 
the Civil Procedure”146, the plaintiff should prove that “the fact of damages” exists, and the 
defendant should prove for the “iusta causa excusationis” (exemptions to the provisions of 
law) or no causality between the behavior and the damage results. The defendant otherwise 
loses the lawsuit, for that the reversal of the burden of proof applies. Although the burden of 
proof has been reversed from the plaintiff to the defendant, the plaintiff still has to prove: (1) 
the existence of the illegal behavior of the defendant, and (2) the existence of the consequent 
                                                
145《关于适用〈中华人民共和国民事诉讼法〉若干问题的意见》, 第七十四条, in Chinese. 
146 《关于民事诉讼证据的若干规定》, 第四条, in Chinese. 
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damages. It is extremely difficulty for the plaintiff to single out the responsible polluter 
among a large number of polluters, as this requires sophisticated technical and scientific 
methods to prove that the damages are the consequences of a particular pollutant. How can 
poor and ill villagers afford this? For this question, the USA tort law may offer a solution. In 
the latter law, individuals and groups can sue manufacturers and polluters who contribute a 
share of harm to the environment, and then it is up to the defendants to fight among 
themselves to see who pays and how much each pays. The justification is that if a defendant 
enjoys the benefits of the industrial economy and the industrial market, then the same 
defendant must bear the costs of demonstrating it has little or no liability. This is an economic 
way of shifting burdens of proof, not one based upon theories of liability or fault.147 
4.3 The Role of Permit 
Over the past years, China has changed her “pollutant concentration control” strategy to total 
emission control (TEC) strategy which is the current leading strategy. This concept was 
incorporated as a legal provision in the WPPCL in 1996. The total amount of permissible 
emission of certain pollutant, for example, COD is determined and the central government 
allocates the emission targets to each province, and then local governments allocate the 
amount of emissions among industries by use of a permit system. The TEC strategy proved to 
be useful to allow the government to make macroscopic adjustment to meet certain target, for 
example, the reduction of CO2 emission through promoting energy efficiency or closure of 
emission producers.  
 
However, the TEC strategy is prone to failure in water quality protection. The total 
permissible pollution emission depends on the pollution carrying capacity and pollution 
purification capacity of the water bodies. It is difficult to estimate these capacities, so that the 
total permissible pollution emission cannot be reliably determined. The process of emission 
allocation is complicated to the extreme and is vulnerable to manipulation. The continued 
deterioration of China’s water environment has demonstrated that the TEC strategy failed to 
achieve the objectives of the WPPCL.  
 
With this background, it is seen that the role of the WPDP is on the one hand, similar to the 
NPDES of the USA, a legal institution which raises the requirements for dischargers, and on 
the other hand, is used as an instrument to support the TEC strategy. In the CWA of the USA, 
                                                
147 Junker, K. W., communicated to the author on 28 Jul 2014. 
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the final elimination goal of water pollutants discharge depends on the success of the permit 
system, in contrast to China where the use of the WPDP depends on the TEC institution, for 
which permits serve to resolve the total amount of pollutant.  
4.4 Regulations 
A common feature of China’s environmental laws is that they only state the general principles 
but their implementation relies on administrative regulations made by the State Council/MEP. 
Local governments and Environmental Protection Bureaus (EPBs) are also authorized to issue 
detailed regulations within their administrative jurisdiction. The administrative regulations 
differ from statutes, as they are frequently changed in accordance with policy priorities. These 
regulations are either made by the ministerial administrative agencies or by the provincial 
People’s Congress and enforced by local EPBs. Over the past few decades, China’s legislators 
have rapidly passed laws for environment and resource protection, but few of these laws seem 
to have achieved their objectives in practice. The WPPCL rules to employ innovative 
institutions such as an effluent permit program to control water pollutants discharge with 
strict provisions, but it has so far failed to reverse China’s trend of increased water pollution. 
The reasons for the lack of success can be multiple, including judicial, economic, 
technological and implementation-and-enforcement related problems.   
 
In 1988, the SEPA established the “Interim Regulations for Water Pollutants Discharge 
Permit Management”.148 These regulations became invalid in 2007. In fact, they were in 2000 
replaced by the “Detailed Rules for Implementation of the Water Pollution Prevention and 
Control Law (1996)” (known as “Detailed Rules 2000”) that were enacted by the State 
Council.149 Legally, the 1996 WPPCL has been replaced by the 2008 amendments, but a new 
set of regulations for the implementation of the 2008 WPPCL is until today not finalized.150 
By 2014, 23 provinces/municipalities151have developed their own permit regulations152, but in 
practice “Detailed Rules 2000” still serve as the legal basis for manufacturer.  
4.4.1 Permit Issuance and Management 
                                                
148 Interim regulations for Water Pollutants Discharge Permit Management (1988). In Chinese: 水污染物排放许
可证管理暂行办法. 
149 State Council of the PRC, Decree No. 284 (Mar 20, 2000): Detailed Rules for Implementation of the Water 
Pollution Prevention and Control Law. In Chinese: 中华人民共和国水污染防治法实施细则. 
150 MEP (2008): Protocol on Regulations for Management of Pollutants Discharge Permit. In Chinese: 关于征求
对《排污许可证管理条例》（征求意见稿）意见的函;  环办函 [2008]16 号 
151 In China, Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin and Chongqing, are directly governed by the central government.  
152 Fujian, Guangdong, Zhejiang, Jiangsu, Yunnan, Hubei, Hunan, Sichuan, Gansu, Shanghai, Anhui, Shan’xi, 
Qinghai, Jilin, Heilongjiang, Shanxi, Hebei, Henan, Beijing, Tianjin, Jiangxi, Chongqing and Inner Mongolia. 
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Under the federal system, the USA federal EPA has the leading authority for issuance and 
management of pollution discharge permit. In practice, this authority is delegated to the state 
EPAs. In the case of inappropriate permit issuance, the federal EPA has the veto power. In 
this way, the federal and state EPAs cooperate to control the permit related issues. In some 
cases, this federal and state cooperative arrangement, i.e., centralized standard setting and 
decentralized implementation and enforcement, is believed to have weaknesses (e.g. in 
wetlands protection) and it has been argued that supplementing federal regulations to retain 
flexibility for the state to assume permitting authority may be desirable.153    
 
In contrast, China has a “top to bottom” administrative system. The MEP supervises the 
national permit issuance and answers the questions from local EPBs.	  The provincial EPBs 
determine the executive power of the lower-level (city-county level) EPBs for issuing permit, 
and the city-county level EPBs estimate the total emission of pollutants for their 
administrative regions. For certain areas and certain types of pollutants which belong to the 
national TEC program, the local EPBs estimate the total emission based on the water quality 
standard, which is subject to the approval of the MEP. The discharge permits are then issued 
by the local EPBs, if the applicants satisfy certain conditions, primarily if the wastewater to 
be discharged satisfies the discharge standard. If discharge is expected to exceed 500 tons/day 
and COD to exceed 0.5 tons/day, the permit needs to be issued by a provincial EPB. For 
smaller discharges, the local EPB has the authority to issue the discharge permit. 
	  
China’s water pollutants permit depends on the characteristics of the wastewater chemistry 
and the amount being discharged. Chinese National Standard GB 8978-1996154 describes 
wastewater chemistry using 56 parameters, including COD, BOD, PH, oil, Ammonia 
Nitrogen etc. If wastewater is pretreated at the factory for disposal to a city water treatment 
center, level 3 is generally sufficient. If discharge is sent to a fresh water body (i.e. lake, river, 
pond, or stream), level 2 or 1 is needed. Local regulations and standards may be, but not must 
be, stricter than the national GB level. In that case, the factory’s EIA specifies the tighter of 
the two.155 If local governments have none of their own standards, then the national standards 
apply. The local government must not enact a lower standard than the corresponding national 
                                                
153 Sakyi, A. M. (2010): Mitigation banking: Is state assumption of permitting authority more effective? 34 Wm. 
& Mary Envtl. L. & Pol'y Rev. 1027 (2010), http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmelpr/vol34/ iss3/8:p1027-1052. 
154 English version of the Chinese National Standard GB 8978-1996: http://chinawaterrisk.org/wp-
content/uploads/2011/05/Maximum-Allowable-Discharge-Concentrations-For-Other-Pollutants-in-China.pdf 
155 Seidelson, C. (2012): Commissioning an Industrial Wastewater Treatment System in China. International 
Journal of Latest Research in Science and Technology, Vol. 1, Issue 2, p76-79 
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standard, and the State Council has the power to veto the lower standard (Article 89, Sentence 
14 of the Constitution). 
 
Thus, China’s WPDP management system employs a mixture of “different levels” and 
“different categories”. While the MEP is legally responsible for the permit issuance, it does 
not have the administrative capability to manage all discharge permits. Therefore, the 
discharge permits for major industrial and urban pollution sources are issued by the local 
EPBs at the provincial level on behalf of the MEP, and the “simple” discharge permits for 
minor pollution sources are issued by the local EPBs at the city-county level.  
 
In practice, the construction of an enterprise is subject to an environmental impact assessment 
(EIA) by the local EPB. The EIA includes a statement on the enterprise’s potential impact on 
the water environment. To discharge wastewater the enterprise must have a permit. The type 
of permit depends on the type of pollutants and the quantity of the discharge. China National 
Standard GB describes wastewater bio-chemical characters using 56 parameters (further 
discussions in Chapter 5).  
4.4.2 Monitoring and Inspection  
The permit system is supported through monitoring and inspection procedures. The local EPB 
measures the levels of pollution of the discharged water and examines whether the discharge 
behavior of the permit-holder complies with the permit standards. Such checks are either done 
by the local EPB or contracted external laboratories. If the discharge is found to be in non-
compliance with the permit requirements, the local EPB has the authority to impose 
administrative fines and request on site monitoring. On site monitoring is requested if 156 
• Discharge is more than 100 tons/day or COD more than 30kg/day;  
• Discharge is found to have exceeded by 2 times the allowable limits;  
• The enterprise is directed by the government to reduce pollutant discharge. 
 
Further, the monitoring must be carried out with equipment (a) approved by the local EPB, (b) 
regularly calibrated by the Quality Assurance Bureau, and (c) linked with the local EPB 
automatic data collection. The government regulates the monitoring procedure by issuing an 
Environmental Pollution Control license to the designers of water treatment facilities. For 
instance, if the facility’s discharge exceeds 500 tons/day and COD 0.5 tons/day, then the 
                                                
156 Id, 155, Seidelson, C. (2012) 
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designer must hold a Class A or B license issued by the Provincial Construction Bureau. 
Otherwise, a Class C license issued by the local Construction Bureau is required. A further 
regulation is used to control waste pollutants discharge. Major water treatment facilities 
(discharge exceeds 50 kt/day) must hold a Class A permit issued by the MEP, while minor 
facilities must have a Class B permit issued by the provincial EPB.  
 
In this system, it is often economically disadvantageous for EPB to enforce the law, because 
EPB is subordinate to the local government and the welfare of the EPB officials depend on 
the local economy. The highest priority of the EPB is thus to act in line with the local 
economic interests rather than the enforcement of the law. As the local EPB officials are also 
responsible for environmental monitoring, it has happened that local EPB officers are charged 
with of duty negligence in the case of major environmental disasters, such as the 13 Nov 2005 
Songhuajiang water pollution.  
4.5 Pilot Projects of China’s Water Pollutants Discharge Permit System  
The efficiency of the permit system has been tested in pilot programs. The first pilot study 
was carried out in Shanghai in 1985 along the Huangpu River, and later in several large cities 
(e.g. Shenzhen and Chongqing). The SEPA issued in 1988 the Interim Regulations for Water 
Pollutants Discharge Permit Management (Ref. 135) and extended the system nationwide in 
1989-1991. In the “Detailed Rules for the Implementation of the Water Pollution Prevention 
and Control Law”157, the legal liability of the water pollutants discharge was first defined, as 
Article 44 of the rules states that non-compliance with the WPDP must be rectified within 
given time and may be subject to a fine up to 50000 CNY. For serious offenders, the 
discharge permits could be canceled. In Nov 2011, the State Council issued a policy paper on 
WPDP trading, 158  urging the implementation of a permit system and water pollutants 
emission trading. Unfortunately, the proposition of the policy paper is rather unrealistic 
because the China’s WPDP is not mature and has numerous flaws.159, 160, 161  
 
                                                
157 水污染防治法实施细则 in Chinese 
158 国务院关于加强环境保护重点工作的意见, 国发〔2011〕35 号 in Chinese 
159 Qi, Y. and X. Zhou (2009): Water Pollution Control in China: Review of laws, regulations and policies and 
their implementation. Economic Analysis Team Institute for Global Environmental Strategies (IGES).  
160 Zhao, C.赵晨 and Y. Tie 铁燕 (2005):  中美水环境标准法律制度比较研究 对我国水污染防治法律的修订启示 in
水污染防治立法和循环经济立法研究—2005 年全国环境资源法学研讨会论文集（第一册）. 
161 Seidelson, C. (2012): Commissioning an Industrial Waste Water Treatment System in China. International 
Journal of Latest Research in Science and Technology, Vol 1, Issue 2, p76-79.  
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TEC was adopted in “the 9th Five-Year Plan 162 of National Economic and Social 
Development & the Outline of 2010 Long-Term Plan Targets” of the Chinese government as 
a leading strategy for environmental protection. In 1996, it became a part of the WPPCL.163 
The “Implementation Rules on the Law of the People’s Republic of China on Prevention and 
Control of Water Pollution” proposed by the State Council in 2000 provided some practical 
guidelines for implementing the system, including:  
• water pollutant report and registration; 
• establishment of targets for the total pollution load control in a specific area and the 
distribution of pollutant reduction quotas among pollutant dischargers in the area; 
• issuance of pollutant discharge permits; 
• supervision and regulation of permits. 
Local EPBs were authorized to monitor the behavior of the permit-holder and impose fines on 
those who violated the permit conditions.  
 
The success of the system implemented in China so far has been questioned by experts. The 
existing problems are listed below:  
• Low implementation rate:  Only about 10-20% of the enterprises registered for water 
pollutant discharge actually receive permits.164 The actual rate is even lower if all 
discharging enterprises (registered and unregistered) are taken into consideration. In 
less developed areas, the system has not been implemented at all. By 2006, the ratio 
was less than 35% 165  (520,000 registered enterprises and 180,000 permitted 
enterprises).  
• Lack of stability and continuity: China lacks an executable legislation on pollutant 
discharge permits, and the implementation of the permit system relies on government 
regulations which differ for different regions and can easily change according to the 
overall policy priorities of the governments.  
• Lack of authority: The permit system is poorly managed due to the lack of expertise 
and administrative bureaucracy causing delays in permit issuance and insufficient 
                                                
162 China makes “Five-Year Plans” as a political instrument for social-economic development, but they are also 
directive for legislature actions.  
163 WPPCL Article 16. 
164 Li, Z. P. (2005): The Challenges of China’s Discharge Permit System and Effective Solutions. Temple 
Journal of Sci. Tech & Envtl. Law, Vol. XXIV, p375-395.	  
165 Qi, Y. and X. Zhou (2009): Water Pollution Control in China: Review of laws, regulations and policies and 
their implementation. Economic Analysis Team Institute for Global Environmental Strategies (IGES). Figure 9 
and 10 therein.	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supervision, monitoring and enforcement. Consequently, the permit system lacks the 
necessary authority.  
• Distortion and corruption: It is stated in the regulation that applications for permits 
must be examined before permits can be granted. In practice, applications are a 
formality and rarely rejected as a consequence of distortion and corruption. The most 
recent case occurred in Guangxi Province, where the official of Hezhou city’s EPB 
received money from the mining company. The official granted a discharge permit to 
this company that did not satisfy the requirements of permit issuance. The company 
then discharged its wastewaters to the Hejiang River, causing the death of large 
quantities of fish due to heavy metals.166  
4.6 Summary 
Based on the past experience, and with referral to the NPDES, several reasons for the lack of 
success of the permit system can be identified, including: 
• Legislative Support: Although the TEC strategy and the permit system are stated in the 
law, their legal mandate is limited, because they are subject to interpretation by the 
administrative bodies at several levels.  
• National Priority: The Chinese governments at all levels were, until very recently, 
preoccupied with economic development and social stability. The implementation and 
enforcement of the permit system has been so far of low priority.  
• Resources: In addition to laws and regulations, the implementation of the permit 
system requires water management expertise, staff, infrastructures, financial resources 
and technological support. China has been building up these capacities over the years 
and has recently significantly increased the investment for environmental protection. 
In 2007, the total investment on environmental protection reached 338.76 billion CNY 
(1.36% GDP),167 while by 2012 the investment reached 825.36 billion CNY (1.59% 
GDP).168  
• Information: The lack of access for the public to environmental data has a strong 
negative impact on the effectiveness of the permit system. It is a major challenge to 
achieve information transparency in an authoritarian system with a complex 
administrative structure. Environmental information disclosure ends up being the 
                                                
166 China Daily (2014): http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/hqgj/jryw/2014-03-19/content_11429918.html, last visit 
on 25 Jul 2015 
167 MEP (24 Sep 2008): 全国环境状态公报(2007 年); Report on the State of Environment for 2007. 
168 MEP (11Apr 2013): 全国环境状态公报(2013 年); Report on the State of Environment for 2013. 
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weakest in the most polluted cities.  The Institute of Public and Environmental affairs 
(IPE) led by Ma Jun, is the most well-known NGO in China, which compiled the first 
Water Pollution Map of China in 2006. This map combines official-published and 
self-collected data, providing the public a free entrance to the effluent discharge data 
from enterprises, sewage treatment works and on-line monitoring operators. Local 
environmental statues is also monitored by the map.169 The pollution map is a great 
progress made by a NGO. Multinational companies such as Nike and Walmart have 
been using the online databases of the IPE to monitor Chinese suppliers, exerting 
pressure through the international supply chain to improve the environmental practices 
of local enterprises.170 
 
In 2008, the MEP brought the “Measures for Open Environmental Information” into 
effect, requiring governments to disclose information on: (1) environmental laws, 
regulations, and standards; (2) allocation of emissions quotas and permits; (3) 
pollution fees and penalties collected; (4) exemptions, reductions, or postponements 
granted; (5) outcomes of investigations into public complaints; and (6) lists of 
violators of environmental regulations. However, these measures place only the 
burden of disclosure on government rather than industry. Only enterprises that have 
exceeded pollution standards are required to disclose their emissions, a pathway for 
the public to obtain information about routine emission statistics is absent. The 
measures from the MEP have lower-level legal effects than laws such as the State 
Secrets Law, which are enacted by the NPC. Accordingly, the government can refuse 
to disclose the required information for state secret reasons. Measures are designed to 
improve the governance outcomes rather than to protect any individual rights. This is 
in contrast to the USA Freedom of Information Act.171 The major platforms for 
making environment information available are websites of central and local 
governments, “China Environment News”, and the “Bulletin of Environmental 
Protection Ministry”.172 
 
                                                
169 Institute of Public and Environmental Affairs: http://www.ipe.org.cn/pollution/index.aspx, last visit on 25 Jul 
2015 
170 Tan, Y. L. (2012): Transparency without Democracy: The Unexpected Effects of China’s Environmental 
Disclosure Policy. Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration, and Institutions, Vol. 27, 
p37–62, doi:10.1111/gove.12018 
171 Id, 170, Tan, Y. L. (2012). 
172 Annual Report 2013 about the Government Information Opening of Environmental Protection Ministry.  
www.mep.gov.cn, last visit on 12 May 2015. 
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Chapter 5: Comparison of Permit Requirements in USA and 
China 
 
The US permit requirements consist of three components, including effluent limits, self 
monitoring schedule and reporting schedule. Effluent limits serve as the primary mechanism 
in NPDES permits for controlling discharges of pollutants to receiving waters, and the other 
two components are for safeguarding the effluent limits to be complied with. The USA EPA 
and the delegated states use a variety of techniques to monitor permittees’ compliance, 
including on-site inspections and review of data submitted by the permittees. Technical 
assistance is also available to facilities struggling with the NPDES compliance. This chapter 
examines the core requirements of the USA effluent discharge permit, which can be used as 
reference for improvement of China’s WPPCL/WPDP system.  
5.1 Comparison of Effluent Limits Mechanisms 
5.1.1 USA technology-based standard vs. China’s effluent standard 
The USA technology-based controls use the national effluent guidelines (EGs) established by 
the EPA to produce an environmental outcome by having requirements of the EGs factored 
into individual facilities’ discharge permits when they are renewed. Today, the EPA has 
developed EGs for 58 categories of industries. The EGs require a minimum level of treatment 
for industrial/municipal point sources based on the currently available treatment technologies 
while allowing the discharger to use any available control technique to meet the limitations.173. 
Concretely, when establishing the EGs, the EPA assesses certain factors such as age of the 
equipment and facilities, manufacturing and engineering processes, energy requirements, and 
economic cost.174 According to the EPA, EGs are responsible for preventing the discharge of 
almost 700 billion pounds of pollutants each year,175 but the USA Office of Inspector General 
questioned the effectiveness of the EGs. In 2004, they concluded that the impact of the EGs 
                                                
173 EPA NPDES Permit Writers’ Manual, p49, http://water.epa.gov/polwaste/npdes/basics/upload/chapt_05.pdf 
174 Id, 173, EPA NPDES Permit Writers’ Manual, p55. 
175 USA Office of Inspector General (24 Aug 2004): Effectiveness of Effluent Guidelines Program for Reducing 
Pollutant Discharges Uncertainty. Report No. 2004-P-00025.  
http://www.epa.gov/oig/reports/2004/20040824-2004-P-00025.pdf, last visit on 12 May 2015 
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remained uncertain, due to the lack of pollutant discharge data from the EPA.176 This author 
attempted to obtain more recent reports on the effectiveness of the EGs, but without success.   
 
China’s MEP has also made technology-based effluent standards, covering 64 categories of 
industries, municipal sewage treatment plants and animal feeding plants. These standards are 
made in accordance with the national water quality standard and may take into consideration 
the national economic and technical conditions (S.1 Article 13 of the WPPCL).  
 
The SEPA of China published the first Environmental Quality Standard for Surface Water in 
1983, which was subsequently revised in 1988, 1999 and 2001. For waters of different grades, 
different water quality standards were specified using 24 basic pollutant concentrations and 
85 other drinking-water specific items. Table 5.1 shows a sub-section of the basic pollutants 
concentrations for the different water quality standards.  
 
Table 5.1: Basic pollutant concentrations of water quality grades I to V in mg/l except for temperature and pH 
values.177 Only the first 9 types are listed for example, and the rest of the 54 types are omitted from the table. 
 
No. Type I II III IV V 
1 Temp Man-made temperature change (-2oC, 1oC) 
2 pH 6-9 
3 COD Mn > 7.5 6 5 3 2 
4 volatile Phenol index < 2 4 6 10 10 
5 COD < 15 15 20 30 40 
6 BOD5 < 3 3 4 6 10 
7 NH3-N < 0.15 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 
8 Total P < 0.02 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 
9 Total N < 0.2 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 
… rest omitted … 
 
To design the discharge standards, wastewaters are first divided into 8 major categories, 
including industrial, agricultural, domestic, transport-related, service-related (e.g. medical), 
water-treatment-related, surface-runoff related, and the remainder wastewaters. For each 
category, sub-categories are defined and for each sub-category, the MEP establishes detailed 
discharge standards for a wide variety of pollutants. The standards for the different categories 
further differ for existing and new sources. The MEP has already developed a large number of 
water pollutant discharge standards for the 8 major categories and numerous sub-categories of 
                                                
176 Id, 175, USA Office of Inspector General (24 Aug 2004). 
177 National Standard of the People’s Republic of China, GB3838-2002, Environmental Quality Standards for 
Surface Water, 2002, published by National Environmental Protection Administration. 
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wastewaters.178 Despite these recent improvements, the discharge standards are by no means 
complete. It has been reported that the MEP plans to establish 25 more discharge limitation 
standards in 2014. 
 
In practice, the discharge standards are commonly established by the MEP and the 
administrative authority responsible for given industries. For example, China Steel Ltd (via 
Wuhan Safety Research Institute), in consultation with the MEP, established the Discharge 
Standard of Water Pollutants for Iron Steel Industry (Table 5.2). 
 
Table 5.2: Section of the Discharge Standard of Water Pollutants for the Iron and Steel Industry. The limits are 
given in mg/l except for pH values.179 
 
No. Pollutants Industry 
Limits for Direct 
Discharge 
Industry 
Limits for Indirect 
Discharge 
Monitor 
Location 
  Steel - Iron - Steel Iron Pipe end 
1 pH 6 – 9 
2 Suspended martial 50 100 
3 CODcr 60 200 
4 NH3-N 8 - 8 - 8 15 
5 Total N 20 - 20 - 20 35 
6 Total P 1.0 - - - 1.0 2.0 
… rest omitted … 
 
In contrast to the USA, China’s provincial governments also have the power to make their 
own effluent standards in absence of the corresponding national standards or to make stricter 
standards than the national ones (S.2 Article13 of the WPPCL). Whether a discharger has 
complied with the standards depends mainly on the statistics of its discharge outlet or of the 
outlet of processing workshop.180 Moreover, China’s effluent standards do not distinguish 
between pollutants such as the USA’s BPT, BCT and BAT (Chapter 3), but make different 
requirements for the existing and new sources. New sources have stricter standards than the 
existing ones. The reason is that (as in the USA) new sources have normally greater chances 
of utilizing advanced manufacturing processes and equipments. In practice, local standards 
are playing a leading role in effluent discharge permit issuance, and prevail over the national 
standards. If local and national standards are in conflicts, e.g. in a water pollution dispute, the 
                                                
178 There are 64 sets of effluent standards, made by the Department of Science, Technology, and Standard.  
http://kjs.mep.gov.cn/hjbhbz/bzwb/shjbh/swrwpfbz/index.htm, last visit on 12 Mai 2015. 
179 National Standard of the People’s Republic of China, GB13456-2012, Discharge Standard of Water 
Pollutants for Iron and Steel Industry, published by National Environmental Protection Administration. 
180 Id, 179, GB13456-2012. 
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local standards apply.181 In view of this, industrial enterprises prefer to be located in provinces 
with more relaxed standards. In the 1970s, the USA EPA realized this legislature flaw and 
thus set up national effluent guidelines to avoid its occurrence.  
  
On the other hand, stricter local effluent standards will compel industrial entities to make 
more costly internal changes in manufacturing and engineering processes rendering them less 
competitive. The case of Shandong Province is a good example. In Mar 2003, Shandong 
Province issued its “Discharge Standard of Water Pollutants for Pulp and Paper Industry in 
Shandong Province”, which was implemented in 3 phases over 8 years. Pollutant-
concentration based requirements were tightened, phase by phase. Since then, the number of 
paper manufacturing enterprises has reduced from more than 200 to no more than 20. Most of 
them were weeded out due to the stricter standards, but those survived are now front runners 
of the paper manufacturing industry of China. In view of this successful transition, the MEP 
issued the national “Discharge Standard of Water Pollutants for Pulp and Paper Industry” in 
2008, drafted in collaboration with the Shandong EPB, Shandong Environment Design 
Institute, State MEP Standard Research Institute, and Shandong Environmental Protection 
Science and Research Institute. 182  
5.1.2 USA Water-Quality-Based Standard vs. China’s Total Effluent Control   
In contrast to the NPDES which depends either on the technology-based standards or water-
quality-based standards (in fact, the technology-based standards are most widely applied, as 
required by S.301(b) and S.306 of the CWA; only in some cases, enforceable requirements 
beyond technology-based standards are in place, when a valuable water resource need be 
protected by more stringent permit limitations183), the fundamental provisional measure for 
China’s permit program is the TEC. The 1988 “Interim Regulations for WPDP Management” 
claims the TEC to be the core of the permit program. This basic strategy remains valid until 
today. In practice, permit holders should not only comply with the requirement of effluent 
standards, but also satisfy the allocated responsibilities of effluent reduction based on the TEC 
strategy.   
 
                                                
181  How to make water pollutants discharge standards? In Chinese:水污染的排放标准是如何制定的？ 
http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/flsyywd/flwd/2002-04/17/content_292246.htm, last visit on 12 May 2015 
182  Discharge standard of water pollutants for pulp and paper industry.  
http://kjs.mep.gov.cn/hjbhbz/bzwb/shjbh/swrwpfbz/200807/W020120105578237397478.pdf, last visit on 12 
May 2015 
183 http://water.epa.gov/scitech/swguidance/standards/handbook/chapter07.cfm, last visit on 12 May 2015. 
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China’s TEC is similarly designed as the NPDES WQS being exercised in the USA. Both of 
them provide the “pollutants reduction load allocation mechanism” through which the amount 
of pollution entering the water bodies is controlled. Under Section 303(d) of the USA CWA, 
states, territories, and authorized tribes are required to identify lists of impaired waters which 
do not meet WQS even after the implementation of pollution control technology. The law 
requires that these jurisdictions establish TMDLs for impaired waters. A TMDL is a 
calculation of the maximum amount of a pollutant that a water body can receive and still meet 
the WQS. An allocation of that load among the various sources of that pollutant is written into 
permit requirements, forming the water quality-based discharge limits. Actually, the TMDL is 
a corrective measure for the impaired water bodies. Once the TMDL is developed, the permit 
holders must accept the adjusted limits in accordance with the allocated reduction loads. 
Under Section 303(d), the EPA is required to review and approve a state’s list of impaired 
waters and TMDLs. If a state fails to do so, the CWA requires the EPA to develop an 
impaired waters list for the state and make its own TMDL determination. The EPA is not 
authorized to implement a TMDL, but leaves this to the states. However, states’ strategies for 
implementation vary widely. Only a few have laws requiring implementation plans, while 
many others rely on less structured policies. Until 2011, there have been over 46,000 TMDLs 
developed, and the most recent information indicates there are over 41,000 water bodies 
which still require a TMDL to initiate corrective measures.184 Much staff and funding 
resources are therefore needed. But the CWA provides no dedicated funding for TMDL 
development and/or implementation.185 Meanwhile, the active involvement of the public is an 
important supportive factor to provide more resources for TMDL. Between 1992 and 2004, 
citizens filed nearly 40 suits in 38 states to force EPA to implement the TMDL program. 186 
The CWA requires public involvement in developing TMDLs, but the level of citizen 
involvement varies from state to state. Typically, states will circulate a draft of threatened and 
impaired waters list and a draft TMDLs and allow 30 to 60 days for public comment. In some 
cases, hearings are also held. The public often contributes useful data and information about 
impaired water bodies, and offers insights about their community that may ensure the success 
of one pollutant reduction strategy over another. Citizen information and participation can 
                                                
184 Rosaura Conde, Watershed Branch of EPA’s Assessment and Watershed Protection Division: Addressing 303 
(d) listed waters through Total Maximum Daily Load (TMDLs). 
http://water.epa.gov/learn/training/standardsacademy/upload/module_tmdl.pdf, last visit on 12 May 2015 
185 Copeland, C. (21 Sep 2012): Clean Water Act and Pollutant Total Maximum Daily Loads (TMDLs), p17. 
Congressional Research Service, 7-5700, R42752.  
186May, J. R. (2004): The rise and repose of assimilation-based water quality, Part I: TMDL litigation. 
Environmental Law Reporter, News & Analysis, 34 ELR, 10247-10260. 
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improve the quality of TMDLs and speed up the cleanup of impaired waters or secure 
protection of threatened waters.187  
 
China’s TEC strategy aims at establishing the total allowed discharge amount of pollutants 
within a limited region or watershed and during a limited period, taking into consideration the 
water quality goal and pollution assimilating capacity of the water body. It is finalized by the 
allocation of pollutants reduction loads among dischargers. Today, it is a leading pollution 
control approach regulated by Article 20 of the WPPCL. It is hoped that the TEC can 
overcome the flaws of effluent standard, but in reality it contains inherently numerous 
problems. In the following, the differences between the USA’s TMDL and China’s TEC are 
discussed.  
 
1. Preconditions for a total pollution control plan: In the USA, only when the water body 
is identified as impaired, can TMDL be initiated by the states. It is not a nationwide 
TEC plan, but a corrective approach to restore the quality of some waters. China’s 
TEC is developed every five years in the national Five-Year-Plan (since 1995) by the 
MEP as a political goal of the nation. It is effective for and implemented by all 
provinces which develop their own Five-Year-Plans and write the allocated reduction 
loads into their plans. The MEP examines the implementation result of each province 
on a half-yearly basis.188  
 
2. Control scopes: The USA TMDL targets pollutants from point and nonpoint sources, 
and accounts for uncertainties in the analysis and modeling (e.g. climate change).189 
The controlled pollutants cover conventional, non-conventional and toxic pollutants, 
and for each pollutant, a TMDL plan exists. China’s TEC aims to control “major 
pollutants” from industrial and municipal point sources and animal feeding farms. The 
pollutants may differ for each Five-Year-Plan.190 The most recent 12th Five-Year-Plan 
                                                
187  http://water.epa.gov/lawsregs/lawsguidance/cwa/tmdl/overviewoftmdl.cfm, last visit on 12 May 2015 
188 MEP (24 Sep 2014): “Bulletin about the amount of effluents discharge in each province, autonomous region 
and municipal city during the first half year”. In Chinese: 2014年上半年各省自治区直辖市主要污染物排放量指标
公报. http://www.mep.gov.cn/gkml/hbb/qt/201409/t20140924_289464.htm, last visit on 12 May 2015 
189 TMDL = Wasteload Allocation (WLA) + Load Allocation (LA) + Margin of Safety (MOS) 
190 The 9th FYP controls 8 types of pollutants including COD, petroleum, cyanide, arsenic, mercury, lead, 
cadmium and chromium IV; the 10th FYP controls COD and ammonia nitrogen, due to the reduction of heavy 
metal; the 11th FYP controls COD, TN and TP. See Wu, Y. Y., D. Wang, W. J. Zhang, D. Shan and Y. Chen 
Yan (2010): Total effluent control in Japan and its inspiration for China. China Environmental Plan Institute. In 
Chinese:日本区域水污染物排放总量控制制度对我国的启示, http://www.caep.org.cn/uploadfile/参考 2010/重要信息
201012：中日总量控制比较.pdf. Important environmental information reference, 6-12, p17, last visit on 12 May 
2015 
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defines only four types of pollutants for TEC, including COD, SO2, ammonia-nitrogen 
and NOX.191 TEC is thus a strategy far removed from a comprehensive water quality 
protection, because controlling only four pollutants is insufficient for protection of a 
water body, along the uncertainty inherent in any the total pollutants calculation. 
 
3. Implementation of a total pollution control plan:  the USA TMDL is a pollution 
"budget" for a water body or watershed that establishes the pollutant reduction needed 
from each pollutant source to meet water quality goals.192 Therefore, each TMDL plan 
expresses the relationship between the necessary reduction of the pollutant of concern 
and the attainment of the water quality target.193 TMDL can be made every two years 
if necessary, because the CWA requires the states to renew their list of impaired 
waters biennially, and in order to develop a TMDL plan, states should: (1) select the 
pollutant that leads to the water pollution; (2) estimate the waterbody’s assimilative 
capacity; (3) define all sources of the pollution to the waterbody; (4) make a predictive 
analysis of pollution in the waterbody and determine the total allowable pollution load; 
and (5) allocate the allowable pollution among the different pollution sources in a 
manner that water quality standards are achieved.194 Once the TMDL plan is renewed 
and approved by the EPA, state’s EPA can then implement the TMDL plan through 
dividing the total predictive waste load to local areas in “kg/day”. In the process of 
TMDL development, states must take into consideration the seasonal variation of a 
water body. This allows a TMDL plan to include different requirements for the dry 
and wet seasons.  
 
In contrast, first, China’s TEC plan is made according to the different social-
economical status and hydrological conditions of the eastern, central and western 
regions of China. Due to the lack of technical support and data, the predictive analysis 
of total wasteload can be made neither on the basis of a scientific computing method, 
nor pollution assimilative capacity of the water bodies. Rather it is decided by political 
                                                
191 MEP (Dec 2011): Rules for the Total Effluent Reduction Calculation of 12th Five-Year-Plan. 十二五主要污染
物总量减排核算细则. http://www.mep.gov.cn/gkml/hbb/bwj/201206/W020121012519874173523.pdf, last visit 
on 12 May 2015 
192 What is a Total Maximum Daily Load (TMDL)? Available http://dnr.wi.gov/topic/tmdls/tmdlprocess.html 
193  http://www.epa.gov/region5/water/wshednps/pdf/min_merc_final%20dec%20doc%203-27-07.pdf, last visit 
on 12 May 2015 
194  http://water.epa.gov/lawsregs/lawsguidance/cwa/tmdl/dec3.cfm, last visit on 12 May 2015 
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intent and public concern.195 Second, China’s TEC aims at pollution reduction by 
means of governmental control, not at WQS restoration through scientific survey and 
prediction. Even if the TEC goals are achieved according to the semi annual reports of 
the provincial EPBs, the water bodies can still be polluted on a daily basis. Third, 
China’s TEC targets are determined every five years. In such a long period, pollutants 
accumulation, pollution sources, water purification capacity and water mass 
(influenced by e.g. water usage and climate change) vary significantly and may affect 
the adequacy of the TEC target. Fourth, the permitted amount of discharge is first 
allocated among provinces, then among counties, and finally among the discharge 
entities, in the form of “total allowed discharge concentration” (m/L), or “total 
allowed discharge speed” (km/h), or “total allowed discharge amount of unit product” 
(kg/t).196 Then, the permit holders are requested to comply with the minimum level of 
effluent standard requirement and the pollutants reduction requirement. There is 
however no legal document for explanation of their relationships. Fifth, the USA has 
established total daily load control, and China has chosen a total yearly load even five 
year load control. 
 
4. Public input: the USA CWA encourages citizens to be involved in the TMDL 
process. They assist with assessing water bodies, monitoring water quality, suggesting 
possible control actions, reviewing TMDL drafts, posting comments on states websites, 
and attending public meetings.197 Regarding China’s TEC, the public has no access to 
any information about its establishment or its implementation.  
 
5. Enforcement: TMDL is integrated into the USA CWA/NPDES. If a discharger does 
not comply with that, then he constitutes a violation of the permit, and the 
enforcement of the NPDES is based on “strict liability”. As described further in 
Chapter 6, NPDES compliance is enforced in four different ways: (1) self monitoring, 
i.e., permit holders report violation and take corrective actions; (2) EPA’s civil penalty 
or administrative fine of up to $25,000 per violation per day; (3) citizen suit, i.e., if a 
citizen believes that the EPA cannot prevent future violation, he can file a citizen suit 
                                                
195 MOEP (20 Aug 2009): Seeking for a new model for Total Pollutants Control of 12th Five-Year-Plan. 
Important Environmental Information Reference 5-11. 努力探索 “十二五”污染物排放总量控制新模, p18. 
196 Song, G. J. (宋国军, 2000): Total effluent control and concentration control for pollutants discharge in China, 
Environmental Protection Journal 2000 (6), p11-13. 论中国污染物排放总量控制和浓度控制. 环境保护, 2000 年第
六期。 
197  http://www.epa.gov/region1/eco/tmdl/publicp.html, last visit on 12 May 2015 
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against the polluter to have stronger restrictions or against the EPA for non-diligence; 
(4) criminal prosecution, i.e., if a permit holder discharges pollutants without a permit, 
publishes false monitoring reports etc., individuals may be charged for criminal 
offence.   
 
In contrast, China’s WPPCL regulates in a very specific way to react to the local 
governments that did not achieve the load reduction goal and the dischargers who 
violated the law by “publishing his name”. In practice, the names of the governments 
or enterprises are published on a MEP list, and these named entities must take 
corrective actions such as technology improvement of wastewater treatment, 
installation of online monitoring equipment etc. under the MEP supervision (in 
Chinese: 挂 牌 督 办 ). Otherwise, the MEP will arrange a meeting with local 
governmental officials to talk about their responsibility. In the case of severe 
environmental accidents, the officials assume political accountabilities such as 
accepting responsibility and resigning their position, according to the “Provisional 
Regulation for Implementation of Official Accountability” issued by the Central 
Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and the State Council in 2009.198  
                                                
198 Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (2009), 
http://www.gov.cn/gongbao/content/2009/content_1371343.htm, last visit on 25 Jul 2015 
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5.2 TEC Strategy and its Risks 
China’s WPDP institution to achieve water quality standards is shown in Figure 5.1, which 
can be summarized as follows. The MEP establishes the environment quality standards for 
waters. These standards are to be achieved by TEC through discharge allocation and setting 
discharge standards. But according to the WPPCL, technological and economic conditions of 
the country must be taken into consideration, so the industries could contribute to the 
development of discharge standards. The discharge permits are issued by the local EPBs at 
city-county level to the individual dischargers. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.1: A diagram (summarized by this author) for illustration of the institution of China’s WPDP system. 
MEP establishes the environment water quality standards. The standards are to be achieved by TEC. The total 
waste load is then allocated to discharging units. The standards of discharged waters are defined by the MEP in 
consultation with industries, and the discharge permits are issued by local EPB. Recently, MEP started to 
conduct semi-annual reviews of major dischargers. Due to climate change, water levels vary. During low waters, 
the same TEC strategy may result in water quality disaster. 
	  
This is a very complex model and the potential for its failure is significant, because the total 
emission of pollutants becomes uncontrollable if the discharge standards are flawed or 
violated. China has already published a sizable set of discharge standards, but explicit 
information as to how the standards are designed cannot be found in the official documents of 
the MEP.  
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The risks for the WPDP to fail can be illustrated by a simple analysis. As Chapra (2008) 
explains199 the accumulation for pollutant (e.g. COD) in a water body is given by 
 
A (Accumulation) = P (Pollutant Discharge) – R (Purification)     (5.1) 
 
where P equals the discharged wastewater times the pollution concentration in that water (Cd). 
The increase of pollution concentration in the water body (C) is A divided by the water body 
mass (M). C does not change if discharge equals purification. If discharge is more than 
purification, then water quality deteriorates. Even for such a simple case, using concentration-
based water-quality standard (i.e. C) to determine the concentration-based discharge standard 
(i.e. Cd) is problematic, because purification is in general unknown, and it is useless to control 
Cd and not P.   
 
Relationship (5.1) shows that C also depends on the water pollution carrying capacity. During 
times of low water levels, water quality is poorer for the same discharge. Thus, during low 
waters, C can be very large and water pollution disasters more likely. Indeed, the famous 
Taihu eutrophication disaster in 2005 and 2007 both occurred during the low water period 
(see Chapter 6).  
 
For the TEC implementation, China is divided into administrative regions and main 
catchment basins. The idea is that for each region/basin the total emission should be limited to 
ensure water quality. The author is not aware of concrete data for the total emission limits for 
the main basins, e.g. the Changjiang Basin which covers a vast area of 1.8 million km2 (see 
Appendix I). Studies on the total emission limits for small water systems have been done, e.g., 
Xie et al. (2014) studied the western Taihu Lake and reported that the total emission limit of 
COD was 60 kt/year and of NH3-N (ammonia nitrogen), total N (nitrogen), and total P 
(phosphorus) about 4.0, 6.0 and 0.4 kt/year200, respectively. The claims are yet to be validated 
but are useful for deriving discharge standards for the local area. However, such data are not 
available in general and thus the TEC strategy lacks the scientific basis.  
 
A major difference between the CWA/NPDES of the USA and the WPPCL/WPDP of China 
is that the former has incorporated the concept of TMDL. The USA federal and state EPAs 
                                                
199 Chapra, S. C. (2008): Surface Water Quality Modeling, Lecture 1, Introduction, p13. Waveland Press Inc. 
200 Xie, R. R., Y. Pang and K. Bao (2014): Spatiotemporal distribution of water environmental capacity—a 
case study on the western areas of Taihu Lake in Jiangsu Province, China. Environmental Science and 
Pollution Research. DOI 10.1007/s11356-013-2088-9. 
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have used a variety of methods to develop TMDLs during the past decade. Clearly, the 
incorporation of TMDL in the NPDES requires strong water management capability, as the 
major setbacks of its implementation in the USA and decades of legal battles and 
controversies clearly show. 201, 202 The TMDL concept is yet to be implemented in China’s 
WPPCL/WPDP. The 1988 “Interim Regulations for WPDP Management”203 rule that a 
discharge permit is issued if the discharged water meets the requirements of discharge 
standards, without specifying the TMDL. Relationship (5.1) and the related discussions show 
this practice is seriously flawed, because an industry can discharge a large amount of polluted 
water with concentration satisfying the discharge standards and still cause severe water 
pollution.  
 
The basis of the TEC strategy being employed in China is fragile, as the minimal requirement 
for the strategy to work is that a TMDL is applied, which is not yet the case in China. To 
determine TMDL, the pollutants purification capacity (R), the pollutants carrying capacity (M) 
and the demand for discharge of polluted water (P) must be known. While R involves 
complex bio-geochemical processes and M, hydro-climatological processes, P involves 
social-economic activities, making the estimate of TMDL a formidable task. It is however not 
all hopeless, because China has invested heavily in building up the water quality monitoring 
network and the MEP has commissioned the “Major Science and Technology Program for 
Water Pollution Control and Treatment”204, so that implementing a TMDL within the WPDP 
is expected in the near future.  
 
By 2010, the total water usage in China was 600 Gt,  of which 61% was used for agriculture, 
24% for industrial and 13% for domestic purposes. 205  The estimated total industrial 
wastewater discharge was 23.75 Gt, while the total domestic wastewater discharge was 37.98 
Gt.206 Again COD is used as an example to illustrate the above discussions. Suppose for 
industrial and domestic purposes, water is taken from water bodies of Category III and the 
                                                
201 May, J. R. (2004): The rise and repose of assimilation-based water quality, Part I: TMDL litigation. 
Environmental Law Reporter, News & Analysis, 34 ELR, 10247-10260. 
202 May, J. R. (2006): Clean Water Act developments: the aftermath of TMDL litigation: consent decrees and 
settlement agreements. 36th Annual Advanced ALI-ABA Course of Study Environmental Law, 9-10 Feb 2006, 
Washington D. C.  
203 Effective from 1988 to 2007, the MEP has in 2007 decided to abolish this interim regulation.  
204 MEP, http://nwpcp.mep.gov.cn 
205 National Bureau of Statistics of China (2011): “China Statistical Yearbook 2010”.  
206 MEP (2012): Report on the State of Environment for 2010; 全国环境状态公报 (2010 年). 
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wastewater after use is discharged back to the same water bodies. Then, the net total 
discharge of COD can be computed using the data shown in Fig 5.2:   
.  
 
Figure 5.2: Differences between water-quality standard (WQS) and industrial and domestic water pollutants 
discharge permit standard (DPS) for water-quality categories III, IV and V. 
 
CODnet = 23.75 Gt x (180 – 20) mg/l + 37.98 Gt x (60 – 20)  mg/l = 5.32 Mt  (5.2) 
 
This implies that the environment must have the capacity to absorb 5.32 Mt of COD p.a., in 
order for the water quality to remain unchanged. But, in that year, the total COD discharged 
was 12.381 Mt207 excluding agricultural runoff, more than twice of the discharge standard 
required for water quality of Grade III. Consequently, it leads to water quality deterioration.  
 
The TEC strategy is particularly risky if the permit system is not well monitored and strongly 
enforced. If the monitoring is limited to the quality of discharged water, and not the daily load, 
then the TEC target is vulnerable. In addition, according to Ma et al. (2013)208, 15.5 Gt of 
industrial wastewater (62% of the total) was discharged per year without permit.   
 
The core problem can be traced back to the original purpose of the WPPCL which is designed 
to “balance” economic development and environmental protection. Article 13 of the WPPCL 
states “on the basis of the national water environment standard, the State Council determines 
                                                
207 MEP (2012): Report on the State of Environment for 2010; 全国环境状态公报 (2010 年), 
http://zls.mep.gov.cn/hjtj/qghjtjgb/201201/t20120118_222703.htm, last visit on 12 May 2015. 
208 Ma, Z. et al. (2013): MEP Major Science and Technology Program for Water Pollution Control and 
Treatment, "Research on water price and tax policy of water environment protection in China", 水专项 “中国水环
境保护价格与税费政策示范研究”. http://nwpcp.mep.gov.cn/cgzl/zl/201312/t20131219265255.html, last visit on 
12 May 2015. 
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the national water pollutants discharge standard, taking into consideration the national 
economic and technological conditions”. In contrast, the USA CWA’s primary objective is 
“to restore and maintain the integrity of the nation’s waters. The objective is translated into 
two fundamental national goals: to eliminate the discharge of pollutants into the nation’s 
waters, and to achieve water quality levels that are fishable and swimmable.  
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Chapter 6: Comparison of Discharge Permit Enforcement 
 
An important component of a permit program is its legal enforcement, i.e., the proper legal 
response in case of non-compliance with requirements of the permit. In the USA, the two 
cornerstones for the enforcement of the CWA/NPDES include (1) citizens’ access to 
environmental information, to governmental decision making and to courts; and (2) 
government enforcement. In the PRC, the enforcement of the WPPCL/WPDP program 
appears to be rather inadequately limited to administrative sanctions. 
6.1 Legal Basis for Environmental Law Enforcement in China 
The enforcement of the WPPCL/WPDP system in China depends on the relationship of the 
WPPCL to other laws of the nation (Fig 4.3). The most important ones include the 
constitutional law which defines the environmental responsibility of the nation and the 
environmental rights of the citizens, to the civil and criminal laws which define the degree of 
civil sanction and criminal punishment for water pollution and to the administration law based 
upon which the WPPCL can be implemented.   
6.1.1 Environmental Access Rights   
Principle 10 of the “Rio Declaration” (1992) states that “access to information, public 
participation and access to justice (referred to as “environmental access rights”) are critical 
for sustainable development and are essential to addressing environmental issues fairly and 
effectively”209. In June 2012, 20 years after the signing of the Rio Declaration, Rio+20 
Declaration restated Principle 10 and emphasized the importance of societies based on the 
rule of law and standards of transparency and accountability. 210 The access rights have 
advanced from principle to actions both in the USA and PRC. For example, public input is 
transplanted into the USA/CWA TMDL development (as discussed in Chapter 5), and the 
citizen suits provision has been an indispensible factor in the CWA and other environment-
related statutes. China has also established a hearing process when making administrative 
decisions, and in 2015, the new EPL has developed special provisions regarding information 
                                                
209 Unit Nations General Assembly (1992): Rio Declaration on Environment and Development (Rio de Janeiro, 3 
-14 June 1992). A/CONF.151/26 (Vol. I) 
210 United Nations Environment Program (Jun 2012): Rio+20 Declaration on Justice, Governance and Law for 
Environmental Sustainability. http://www.unep.org, last visit on 12 May 2015 
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opening and public participation. In particular, 134 courts and tribunals have been established 
in 16 provinces of China for environmental and resources protection related cases,211 and in 
June 2014, the highest Court of the PRC founded its internal court for environment and 
resources. Despite the progress of the PRC in promoting environmental access rights, 
information availability to the public and enforcement of environmental laws require 
improvement.   
6.1.2 Basic Laws for Enforcement of Pollution Discharge  
In the Chinese legal framework, provisions on environmental protection can be found in civil 
and criminal laws. Article 124 of the General Principles of Civil Law states that “Any person 
who pollutes the environment and causes damage to others in violation of state provisions for 
environmental protection and the prevention of pollution shall bear civil liability in 
accordance with the law”.212 On this basis, the WPPCL does not require proof of fault or 
intention when imposing environmental civil liabilities. The situation is similar in the USA, 
i.e., environmental civil and administrative liability is a strict liability.   
 
China’s Criminal Law (1997) defined environmental pollution and natural resource 
destruction to be a crime (Articles 338-346). The 2011 Amendments to the Criminal 
Law213,214,215 lowered the threshold of the incrimination. But according to the “National 
Bulletin on Environmental Statistics (2010)”, there were only 11 environmental criminal 
cases, in comparison to 694 administrative review cases and 116,820 administrative penalty 
cases216. In the more recent National Bulletins for 2011, 2012 and 2013217, no criminal cases 
                                                
211  http://www.chinacourt.org/article/detail/2014/07/id/1339942.shtml 
212 NPC (1986): The General Principles of the Civil Law of the People's Republic of China, in Chinese,中华人民
共和国民法通则; Promulgated in 1986; Effective in 1987. 
213 Article 338 (1997): “Whoever, in violation of the regulations of the State, discharges, dumps or treats 
radioactive waste, waste containing pathogen of infectious diseases, toxic substances or other hazardous waste 
on the land or in the water bodies or the atmosphere, thus causing a major environmental pollution accident 
which leads to the serious consequences of heavy losses of public or private property or human casualties, shall 
be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of not more than three years or criminal detention and shall also, or 
shall only, be fined; if the consequences are especially serious, he shall be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment 
of not less than three years but not more than seven years and shall also be fined.” Translated by 
http://www.chinalawedu.com 
214 Article 338 (2011): “Whoever, in violation of the state provisions, discharges, dumps or disposes of any 
radioactive waste, any waste containing pathogens of any infectious disease, any poisonous substance or any 
other hazardous substance, which has caused serious environmental pollution, shall be sentenced to 
imprisonment of not more than 3 years or criminal detention and/or a fine; or if there are especially serious 
consequences, be sentenced to imprisonment of not less than 3 years but not more than 7 years and a fine.” 
Translated by http://www.ceolaws.net. 
215  http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/xinwen/2011-02/25/content_1625679.htm 
216 National Bulletin on Environmental Statistics (2010), in Chinese: 全国环境统计公报 2010,  
http://zls.mep.gov.cn/hjtj/.  
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were reported and the major environmental cases were all dealt with through administrative 
penalties and petition letters and visits (信访). These petition letters and visits were responded 
to by the special department of State Bureau for Letters and Calls. Also telephone and internet 
complaints now play a role in environmental quality supervision, and the proposals from NPC 
and People’s Political Consultative Conference (of non-communist party members) are 
important ways for solving environmental problems and disputes. This reflects that China’s 
government prefers to resort to administrative measures to deal with the possible violations of 
the environmental laws, other than to legal procedures. This practice better protects local 
industrial and economic development from legal sanctions. As a result, the criminal law has 
so far played little role in the field of environmental protection in China. 
 
On 28 Oct 2012, the SCNPC enacted the Environmental Impact Assessment Law (EIAL), 
aimed at national sustainable development and preventing harmful impacts of industrial 
activities on the environment. In 2008, the legislative body began to examine the enforcement 
status of the EIAL in five provinces, including Shanghai, Chongqing, Shan Dong, Shan Xi 
and Inner Mongolia.218 It was found that relationships of interests widely existed between the 
entities for environmental impact assessment (EIA) and for EIA review. It is often the case 
that the two belong to the same entity. According to the MEP, 333 EIA entities (1163 in total 
national wide) are affiliated with the local EPBs.219 As a consequence, the fairness and 
independence of the EIA result are often questionable. 
On 6 Dec 2001, the Supreme People’s Court adopted Several Provisions on Evidence of Civil 
Litigation.220 The provisions provided for example the judicial interpretation on the burden of 
proof of statutory exemptions as follows: “if the litigation of environmental damage 
compensation is caused by the environmental pollution, then the injurer shall bear the burden 
of proof of the statutory exemptions and the fact that there is no causation between his act and 
the damages.” Based on this provision, if the injured takes an action against the suspected 
polluter, then the latter shall bear the burden to prove or otherwise the causation between the 
                                                                                                                                                   
217 Id, 215, National Bulletin on Environmental Statistics but for 2011, 2012 and 2013. 
218 Chen, Z. L. (Vice Chairperson of NPC, 2008): Report on the enforcement status of the Environmental Impact 
Assessment Law. 陈至立, 全国人大常委会执法检查组关于检查《中华人民共和国环境影响评价法》实施情况的报
告.  http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/xinwen/2008-10/27/content_1538466.htm, last visit on 22 Jul 2015. 
219 Wang, E. D. (王尔德, 29 Jan 2013): Investigation of EIA implementation by the Ministry of Environmental 
Protection shows 88 entities have problems. 21 Century Economics. 环保部：环评机构专项执法抽查 88 家存问
题, 21 世纪经济报道.  http://finance.sina.com.cn/china/20130129/031214429919.shtml, last visit on 22 Jul 2015. 
220 Supreme People's Court of the PRC (6 Dec 2001): Some Provisions of the Supreme People's Court on 
Evidence in Civil Procedures. Promulgated on 6 Dec 2001; Implemented on 1 Apr 2002. No. 33 of [2001]. 最高
人民法院关于民事诉讼证据的若干规定, 法释〔2001〕33 号.  
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damage and the action. This is the precautionary principle, which is an approach to risk 
management stating that if an action or policy has a suspected risk of causing harm to the 
public or to the environment, in the absence of scientific consensus that the action or policy is 
not harmful, the burden of proof that it is not harmful falls on those taking an action.  
During 2000-2013, there were fewer than 60 lawsuits raised by environmental public interest 
groups in China. During 2011-2013, there were only 30,000 environmental dispute cases, in 
contrast to 10 million other cases heard by all national level courts. The High-Level Court of 
Guizhou Province reported that less than 1% of the environmental disputes could be dealt 
through the court system, and in 2013, environmental cases account only for 0.4% of the total 
cases in that province.221  Mr. Tang Lin, a Vice Dean of the Guizhou High-Level Court, 
concluded the reasons for that are (1) the requirements to commence a civil public interests 
litigation are rigorous; (2) it is difficult to collect evidence; (3) expert testimony incurs high 
costs; and (4) the probability of losing the case is high.    
 
The first obstacle listed above has been dealt with in the new EPL of 2015. In the past, the 
NGOs which raised a legal suit against polluters were often questioned by the defendant of 
their qualifications. Since the EPL of 2015, social organizations that are registered at the civil 
affairs departments of the governments at or above municipal levels, and are specialized in 
environmental protection public interest activities for five consecutive years or more without 
law violation records (Article 58), are qualified as plaintiffs for environmental lawsuits. In a 
recent case, the Environmental Protection Federation of Taizhou vs. Chang Long Chemical 
Engineer Company and other five chemical enterprises (Sep 2014, Middle-Level Court of 
Taizhou), the court recognized the Environmental Protection Federation of Taizhou as a 
qualified plaintiff, and decided upon a penalty of 160 million Chinese Yuan for water 
environmental compensation and reparation. The plaintiff, according to Article 58 of the 2015 
EPL, was not entitled to the economic benefits from the litigation. Instead, this huge amount 
of money was mostly used for the rehabilitation of the polluted waters and for other special 
local environmental programs. This is an ice-breaking case in China’s environmental 
protection legal history. While the plaintiff is empowered with legal qualifications, evidence 
collection is still difficult for pollution victims, and the determination of the amount and kinds 
                                                
221 Wang, L., Q. Yan, F. Li and X. Hu (8 Oct.2014): The situation that it is difficult to raise environmental 
lawsuit needs change. Economic Information. 王丽, 闫起磊, 李放, 胡星:  环境纠纷诉讼难亟待改. 经济参考报 
http://dz.jjckb.cn/www/pages/webpage2009/html/2014-10/08/content_96327.htm?div=-1, last visit on 22 Jul 
2015. 
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of compensation are also a challenge for the Chinese courts, which need more technical and 
expert legal assistance in this new field of law.   
 
In despite of the legislation’s progress and continuing exploration of the judicial system, 
pollution victims prefer to express their anger in the form of peaceful or violent demonstration 
against polluters and local governments. Such cases have become frequent in recent years and 
sometimes result in positive outcomes. For example, the 2007 Xiamen public “walking” 
protest against the PX (P-Xylene) construction,222 the 2012 Ningbo demonstration against the 
Sinopec Refinery construction, 223  and the 2011 Dalian demonstration against the PX 
construction.224 In the first two cases, the government yielded to the public pressure and 
reversed the original permissions for the constructions. In the last case, due to the lack of 
information and public reporting about the PX project, before the citizen of Dalian got to 
know the existence of the PX facility, it had been already operating for three years, and their 
“walking” protect was in vain.   
 
The Amendments to the Criminal Law of the PRC, which took effect on 1 May 2011, added 
new clauses on “crime of undermining environmental and resources protection” and on 
“crime of misconduct in environmental protection and monitoring”. Article 46 was revised 
(original Paragraph 338) as follows: “Whoever, in violation of State’s laws, discharges, 
dumps or disposes of radioactive waste, waste containing pathogen of infectious diseases, 
toxic substances or other hazardous waste, thus causing serious environmental pollution, shall 
be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of not more than three years or criminal detention 
and be concurrently or separately fined. If the consequences are especially serious, he/she 
shall be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of not less than three years but not more than 
seven years and be concurrently fined.” According to this article, the person who discharges 
toxic or hazardous wastes into national water and air, and causes pollution, shall be criminally 
liable.  However, waste discharge without immediate serious pollution appears to be able to 
escape from criminal responsibility. This loophole gives polluters the opportunity to pollute 
the environment without penalty imposed.   
 
                                                
222 Global Nonviolent Action Database (2007): Chinese residents force relocation of chemical plant in Xiamen, 
2007. 
223 Jacobs, A. (28 Oct 2012): New York Times, Protests over chemical plant force Chinese officials to back 
down. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/29/world/asia/protests-against-sinopec-plant-in-china-reach-third-
day.html 
224 Watts, J. (14 Aug 2011): The Guardian, Tens of thousands protest against chemical plant in northern China.  
http://www.theguardian.com 
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But apart from public protests, are there more effective mechanisms to deal with the 
environmental disputes? Or, as Principle 10 of the Rio Declaration proposes, to solve the 
disputes in court or tribunal? Until now, the answer is somewhat disappointing. On the one 
hand, the authority conceals the information about construction projects with environmental 
risks, or hides the pollution facts from the citizens until they find out the damage which has 
already occurred. This author is not aware of any cases of citizens taking legal action against 
the authorities for hiding the facts, or polluters for harming the environment after the facts are 
eventually exposed to the public. On the other hand, the citizens affected by water pollution 
often have great difficulties to initiate a legal process because courts are reluctant to deal with 
this kind of cases under political pressure and because they often do not have the capacity to 
provide scientific or technical evidence about water pollution. 
  
Clearly, the legal response to environmental pollution in China is not sufficient to protect the 
citizens from environmental harm. The combination of pollution dischargers without social 
responsibility and respect to law, a GDP-oriented government which acts as an umbrella for 
pollution and a court that is closely associated with the government practically shuts the door 
for citizens to appeal for their environmental interests. 
 
According to the law, an effluent discharger must have a permit. But the reality is very 
different, pollution discharge without permit, non-compliance with permit requirements and 
non-renewal of expired permit are so widely spread that local governments often ignore 
illegal pollution discharges.  Most polluters prefer to pay the small penalty rather than to stop 
illegal discharges. There are no official data for the illegal discharge status, but it is common 
in China, that effluents are discharged without control, for example, from the pharmaceutical 
industry. It was found in 2010, the Haerbin Pharmaceutical Factory (哈药集团) had directly 
discharged waste gases, waste water and solid wastes to the surrounding districts, and it was 
exposed in 2015 by the media that the Huaxing Pharmaceutical Factory （华星制药）had 
also directly discharged waste gases and water. Both of them are state-owned leading 
companies in China. In both case, the companies ended up with only having to pay the 
administrative penalties.  
  
Judicial intervention in administrative discretion in China is quite limited. Reasons are on the 
one hand, courts are reluctant to review the decisions of the administrators because of their 
financial dependence on the allocation of the local government’s treasury, although they are 
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entitled to do so. Only the non-issuance of permits in a designated period (20 days after EPB 
receives application) and dissatisfaction with the administrative penalty decision can be 
reviewed by the higher level administrations or directly by the courts. However, regarding the 
permit issuance that ignores potential environmental risks, permit violation or official failure 
in environmental monitoring and law enforcement, there is a legal vacuum in which the 
public can do little but to suffer silently or to protest aggressively. Whether the public can 
enjoy the legal standing to raise legal actions against administrators for improper permit 
issuance or against polluters for permit violation is a constant challenge for China’s judicial 
system.  
 
The 2008 WPPCL legislators were only willing to open a narrow door for the public to resort 
to legal actions for environmental protection or damage relief. Hereby, triple constraints are 
set up which makes the public resorting to judicial protection difficult. First, the plaintiff is 
confined to persons “directly injured” to have the legal standing to a raise lawsuit against the 
polluters for compensation of health or economic damages. The NGOs or the public who are 
not directly injured but possess environmental interests do not have the legal standing; second, 
the potential defendant is confined to the polluter who directly caused environmental damage, 
but not the decision maker who improperly issued the permit or negligently monitored the 
dischargers; third, the scope of a lawsuit is confined to the health and economic compensation 
of the directly injured, but not for the rehabilitation of the polluted water resources.  
 
In comparison, the 2012 “Amendments to the Civil Procedure Law” 225  provides the 
possibility for grassroots NGOs to bring lawsuits against environment polluters. Its Article 55 
states that: “Legal institutions and organizations can launch a legal action against persons who 
infringe on social public interests, including environmental polluters and others who encroach 
on the interests of the public”. This provision appears to facilitate public interests lawsuits and 
to provide social organizations the legal standing in environmental disputes. However, the 
term “legal institutions and organizations” are not precisely defined by the legislators, but left 
for the court to interpret. In 2013, the All-China Environment Federation (ACEF, 中华环保联
合会) has brought as plaintiff eight litigations, but all of them were refused to be heard by the 
                                                
225 Article 55 of the Civil Act: "Organizations with legal standing may file law suits in the people’s court against 
pollution to the environment, harm to the legitimate interests of consumers and public interest.” In Chinese: 《民
事訴訟法》第 55 条：“对污染环境、侵害众多消费者合法权益等损害社会公共利益的行为，法律规定的机关和有关
组织可以向人民法院提起诉讼.” 
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relevant courts with the reason of no standing.226 The courts responded that they were 
uncertain about which “legal institutions and organizations” have the legal standing and they 
needed to wait for the clarification from the legislators. In 2014, no public interest case was 
heard.  
 
In response to the ongoing litigation standing problems, the newly revised EPL 2015 allows 
NGOs to file a litigation in case of environmental pollution, ecological damage and harm to 
the public interests under the following preconditions227: (1) the NGOs must be registered at 
municipal level or higher level governments; (2) must be engaged in activities for 
environmental protection for 5 years or more and have no law violation records; (3) must not 
seek economic benefits from litigation. The courts shall accept the litigations filed by the 
NGOs that meet the above criteria. The 2015 EPL marks a new era for the public interests 
environmental litigation. In 2015, the ACEF raised two civil litigations and both were 
accepted to be heard by the Middle-Level Court of Dongying, Shandong. The Beijing Nature 
Friends and Fujian Green Family raised a lawsuit as joint plaintiffs against Fujian Nanping for 
dumping waste stones, which was accepted by the Middle-Level Court of Nanping.  
6.1.3 Independence of the Courts 
China’s political system is distinctly different from the USA political system. The Chinese 
Communist Party has absolute power over the branches of legislative, executive and judiciary. 
It is not the purpose of this study to comment on this political structure which has proven 
advantageous in many ways in governing the most populous country of the world, although it 
has been under continued criticisms from some western politicians. However, while China 
claims to have or strives to achieve judiciary independence, China’s judicial system has never 
been independent since the foundation of the PRC and indeed in the entire Chinese history. It 
is in particular not independent in checking and balancing the lawful behavior of the Chinese 
government. While the USA CWA/NPDES is strengthened through citizen and governmental 
enforcement, China’s political system only allows enforcement which relies heavily on 
                                                
226 Zhao, Y. L. (赵伊蕾), 2014: Last year, all of public interest litigation raised by the All- China Environment 
Federation were refused. China Youth Daily, 04 Apr 2014. http://zqb.cyol.com/html/2014-
04/04/nw.D110000zgqnb_20140404_3-05.htm, last visit on 22 Jul 2015. 
227 Article 58 of Environmental Protection Law published in China Daily on 20 May 2014 in Chinese and 
English. 新版《环境保护法》（双语）中国日报网 2014-05-20,   
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/language_tips/trans/2014-05/20/content_17522868_3.htm, last visit 22 Jul 2015. 
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administrative penalties with some legal involvement. As a consequence, as Wang (2007)228 
noted, China’s environmental law enforcement has two critical weaknesses:   
• Lack of Supervisory Power: the implementation of environmental laws falls under the 
jurisdiction of administrative agencies instead of the judiciary. While the formal 
supervisory power over the implementation of the environmental laws rests upon the 
legislature, this supervisory power is itself not properly enforced. 
• Lack of Public Participation: due to the lack of technical, legal and funding support, 
private persons often give up to file a lawsuit against polluters. Although the NGOs 
have more resources and sometimes are willing to raise litigation, their legal standing 
was not recognized by the courts in the past until the 2015 EPL. 229 The 2015 EPL also 
requires all level governments to disclose environmental information and encourages 
public participation in environmental monitoring.  
6.2 Governmental Enforcement Action 
The framework and organizational setting for environmental law enforcement in China, 
including the WPPCL, are illustrated in Fig 6.1. The enforcement is carried out primarily 
through political measures in response to pollution accidents or public pressure. The political 
measures are sometimes mixed with administrative and minor monetary penalties.  
 
In China, the institutional arrangement has evolved considerably over time and by the end of 
the 20th century, a dual leading system governing environmental management has come into 
existence with the so-called vertical and horizontal institutional arrangement. The vertical 
institutional arrangement refers to environment protection agencies at four different levels, i.e., 
the MEP under the State Council, the provincial EPBs, the municipal EPBs and the town-
level EPOs (Environmental Protection Offices). Local EPBs have the right to advise their 
upper level institutions. In the horizontal arrangement, other ministries are also involved in 
environmental protection in their administration sectors, e.g. the MWR. But the MEP is 
responsible for nationwide environmental protection and management, and the other 
authorities must cooperate with the MEP on major environmental issues. Also within the 
horizontal arrangement, China has established river basin management organizations, 
representing the MWR in charge of river basin management and development and major 
                                                
228 Wang, C. F. (2007): Chinese Environmental Law Enforcement: Current Deficiencies and Suggested Reforms. 
Vermont J Environmental Law 8, p159-193. 
229 It has taken several years for this author to complete this study. During this time, China’s environmental legal 
system has evolved at a fast pace. Updates need to be frequently made.  
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hydraulic projects and representing the MEP and MWR in charge of water pollution 
prevention and control.  
	  
 
 
Figure 6.1: The basic Chinese environmental law compliance/enforcement framework and organizational setting. 
  
6.2.1 Administrative Penalties  
Governmental enforcement action is the primary mechanism for WPPCL/WPDP enforcement.  
The concepts of administrative penalty, civil penalty, daily-loading penalty, etc. have been 
discussed during the WPPCL legislative process, but are in the end not fully adopted. The 
highest administrative penalty standard accounts for 500,000 CNY (Chinese Yuan) for the 
discharge of highly toxic wastewater, highly and moderately radioactive solid garbage and 
wastewater, and discharge of toxic effluents or polluted water containing pathogens by via 
seepage wells, pits, cracks or karst caves.230 The penalty is not levied per day. Again, the 
pollution control authority is the local EPB which is a branch of the local government and 
must comply with its socio-economic agenda. As economic growth has been, until very 
recently, the nation goal of China, and most water polluters are SOEs (State owned 
enterprises) which play a pivotal role in economic growth, providing the government with 
                                                
230 Article 76 of the WPPCL in Chinese: 向水体排放剧毒废液，或者将含有汞、镉、砷、铬、铅、氰化物、黄磷等
的可溶性剧毒废渣向水体排放、倾倒或者直接埋入地下的; 向水体排放、倾倒放射性固体废物或者含有高放射性、
中放射性物质的废水的；利用渗井、渗坑、裂隙或者溶洞排放、倾倒含有毒污染物的废水、含病原体的污水或者其
他废弃物的, 处五万元以上五十万元以下的罚款.  
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revenues and the public with employment, local EPBs have neither the incentives nor 
sufficient power to force industries to comply with environmental laws. In some cases, local 
EPBs even act as “umbrellas” to shield the polluters from legal punishment. If the polluter is a 
SOE, its political power often prevails over the legal authority to make way for the water 
pollutants discharge. Hence, the citizens, confronted with a government with political 
superiority and a company with economic superiority and the “umbrella” from the local EPB, 
are in a very weak position in the struggle for their environmental safety from pollution.  
 
Government enforcement actions take place mostly to contain the outcry of public 
dissatisfaction in the form of violence and/or massive peaceful demonstrations (e.g. a 
“walking” protest, as large numbers of people pretend to walk on the street to convey a 
political message), such as the earlier-mentioned case of the 2011 Dalian public “walking” 
demonstration. In such cases, the polluters and the pollution control administrators are 
simultaneously blamed by the public, and ironically the local EPBs are often punished for 
negligence in environmental monitoring (Appendix III).  
 
The government enforcement actions of the WPPCL/WPDP are mostly in the form of 
administrative penalties including:  
(1) Temporary closure and safety checks of the particular polluting facility; 
(2) Small fines on the polluters; 
(3) Temporary demotion or transfer of the responsible administrators;  
(4) Punishment of low-ranking EPB officers as scape-goats to quiet public dissatisfaction.  
The characteristics of this type of enforcement are clearly seen in the Nov 2005 severe water 
pollution case of the Songhua River. The incident was caused by the benzene plant explosion 
of the Jilin Petrochemical Company, and the Songhua River was severely polluted by the 
large amounts of toxic chemicals leaked to the river. The Communist Party of China and the 
government imposed party disciplinary and administrative punishments on 12 EPB officers, 
including the EPB Director of the Jilin Province. The former SEPA Director was relieved of 
his duty231 (but later appointed to be the Deputy Director of the National Development and 
Reform Commission 232 ). The investigation of the State Council concluded that Jilin 
                                                
231 Pan, P. P. (2005): China Fires Environment Agency Chief Over Handling of Toxic Spill. Washington Post 
Foreign Service (3 Dec 2005). 
232 Xinhua News Agency (7 Jan 2007): Sacked Environmental Chief Appointed NDRC Deputy Director.  
http://china.org.cn/english/environment/195234.htm, last visit on 23 Jul 2015. 
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Petrochemical Company, Jilin EPA and SEPA all have responsibilities for this incident 
(Appendix A2).  
 
Only in rare cases, the criminal law is invoked and imprisonment of polluters followed. This 
for example occurred in the case of the Jul 2009 Xinan Ji River233 arsenic wastewater 
pollution incident.234 Yixin (亿鑫) Chemicals illegally produced arsenilic acid (阿散酸) and 
stored large quantities of arsenic wastewater in a secret reservoir and on 20-23 Jul 2009, 
secretly pumped the wastewater into the river. As punishment, three persons were sentenced 
to 11, 6 and 5 years imprisonment, plus a civil lawsuit against the offenders.  
6.2.2 Contradiction to Governmental Enforcement: Pollution Economics  
Discharged industrial and domestic wastewater can be divided into 3 categories: (1) water 
satisfies; (2) exceeds and (3) fails the discharge standard. According to the official statistics of 
2010235, 95% of the industrial and 70% of the domestic wastewater fall into category 1236, 5% 
of the industrial and 30% of the domestic wastewater to category 2, and none to category 3.  
 
The discharge standards are in practice determined by the MEP in consultation with industries. 
In this process, the industries play a leading role, and the standards are primarily designed to 
protect their interests or at least, not to harm their interests. According to Ma et al. (2013)237, 
because of the large discrepancy between the water-quality standard and the low water 
pollutants discharge standard, the industries only need to pay a low fee for wastewater 
treatment to achieve an economic benefit of 200 billion CNY per year.  
 
Water pricing in China is very complex, involving 3 levels of government (national, 
provincial and local), 4 types of fees (water resource, supply, treatment and discharge fee), 5 
water quality categories (Chapter 3) and 6 administrative departments (Ministries of Finance, 
MEP, MWR etc.). Different water supply, treatment and discharge arrangements result in 
huge differences in the cost of industrial water use.  
                                                
233 In Shandong Province, 山东沂南涑河砷化物水污染事件 
234 Guangdong Environmental Inspection Net (2013): China’s 10 worst environmental pollution cases. Available 
in Chinese ,  http://www.28hb.com/posts/全国 10 大环境污染事件案例.html, last visit on 23 Jul 2015. 
235  MEP (2012): Report on the State of Environment for 2010; 全 国 环 境 状 态 公 报  (2010 年 ),  
http://zls.mep.gov.cn/hjtj/qghjtjgb/201201/t20120118_222703.htm, last visit on 12 May 2015. 
236 In contradiction to the statement of Z. Ma (2013). 
237 Ma, Z. (2013): Report for the MEP Project on "China’s water price and tax policy for water environmental 
protection". School of Environment and Natural Resources, China People’s University. 马中, 水专项“中国水环境
保护价格与税费政策示范研究”报告，中国人民大学环境学院.   
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Ma et al. (2013) estimated that the total industrial water use in China in 2009 was 73.2 billion 
m3.238 Most Chinese industries take natural water of Category III, and discharge back to the 
same natural water after treatment. The subsidized water resource fee is 0.13 CNY/m3 and the 
discharge fee also 0.13 CNY/m3. Thus, the cost of industrial water use is 0.26 CNY/m3 ( ~ 
0.04 USD/m3). The actual cost of the water is as follows: unsubsidized water resource fee 
0.75 CNY/m3, waste water treatment fee 1.28 CNY/m3 and discharge fee 0.13 CNY/m3, i.e., 
in total 2.16 CNY/m3. Thus, the industry makes an economic profit of 1.9 CNY/m3. This 
implies that the Chinese government is willing to sacrifice water quality for economic 
development, profoundly contradicting the WPPCL philosophy. A similar situation is found 
in the case of the domestic wastewater treatment, because wastewater treatment facilities are 
subsidized by the government, which is deemed necessary for social stability. 
  
Due to these fundamental contradictions, the Chinese government is handicapped to enforce 
the WPPCL. The enforcement actions of the Chinese government are mostly visible in cases 
of severe water pollution accidents when there is a public outcry, by sacrificing some EPB 
officers as scapegoats. A more interesting, but less visible form of the enforcement is that the 
Chinese government actually shoulders some of the responsibilities of water pollution caused 
by industrial and domestic wastewater discharges. For example, during the periods of the 10th 
and 11th Five Year Plan, the Chinese government spent 180 billion CNY for water pollution 
settlement. 239  
6.3 USA CWA Enforcement  
The CWA is supported by a compliance/enforcement scheme within the general framework of 
the environmental law enforcement. The concept of “environmental justice”, which is new to 
China, has become a widely accepted premise and the moral basis of environmental law 
enforcement in the USA. It has also become one of the EPA’s top priorities to integrate 
environmental justice into compliance/enforcement programs and program-
implementations.240  
 
The most frequent enforcement action is first administrative penalty, and followed by judicial 
(civil and criminal) actions by the states and the EPA. The EPA processed 1,440 final 
                                                
238 This is three times the estimate of the MEP shown in Figure 4.2, which was about 25 billion m3. Reasons for 
this difference are not clear.  
239 Id, 237, Ma, Z. (2013) 
240 USA EPA (2014): Plan EJ 2014 "Advancing EJ through Compliance and Enforcement" 
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administrative penalty orders in 2013241. The EPA may refer civil cases to the U.S. 
Department of Justice (DOJ), referring 138 civil cases in 2013. The U.S. Attorney General’s 
Office and the DOJ’s Environmental Crimes Section and the State Attorneys General, in 
coordination with the EPA criminal investigators and general counsel, may prosecute criminal 
violations against individuals or entities who knowingly disregard environmental laws or are 
criminally negligent. The EPA reported the assessment of nearly $1.15 billion in civil 
penalties (administrative and judicial) and $4.5 billion in combined criminal fines, restitution, 
and court-ordered environmental projects during 2013.242 However, more than four decades 
since the CWA was enacted in 1972, the CWA compliance/enforcement scheme has also 
shown deficiencies. At the present, about 50% of the NPDES (small-individual) permit 
holders violate the permit requirements. The overall effectiveness of the 
compliance/enforcement strategy of the EPA remains to be of considerable concern.  
6.3.1 Statutory framework, key players and infrastructure 
Environment law enforcement in the USA operates within a complex framework and 
organizational setting. While the laws and regulations are administered by the EPA, they also 
involve federal and state regulators and the regulated community. Fig 6.2 depicts the USA 
environmental law compliance/enforcement framework and the key players. The roles of the 
key players are briefly described below.  
 
                                                
241 USA Fiscal Year 
242 Esworthy, R. (2014): Federal Pollution Control Laws: How Are They Enforced? Congressional Research 
Service, 7-5700, RL34384.  
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Figure 6.2: The basic USA environmental law compliance/enforcement framework and organizational setting.  
 
 
EPA:  The EPA promulgates national regulations and standards; together with the delegate 
states, it is responsible for administrating the permitting, monitoring and enforcing programs; 
provides information to the public and technical and compliance assistance to the regulated 
community; employs various administrative and judicial tools, as well as incentives, to 
promote and ensure compliance.  
 
Department Of Justice (DOJ): The DOJ represents the EPA in civil and criminal legal 
actions against alleged violators; represents the EPA in defending laws, programs and 
regulations, when the EPA intervenes in, or is sued under, environmental citizen suits.  
  
Other Federal Agencies: The EPA and DOJ coordinate with other federal agencies, e.g., the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of Transportation (DOT), Department of 
Homeland Security, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, USA Internal 
Revenue Service (IRS) etc.  
 
Delegated Authority: The EPA delegates to states the authority to implement national 
programs. The delegate states must have demonstrated the capacity to administer and enforce 
the programs. In case of the CWA, they assume primary enforcement responsibilities and 
conduct a large proportion of inspections and enforcement actions.  
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Citizens: Citizens are authorized to participate in environmental law enforcement. They 
identify and report violations, comment on enforcement cases and initiate enforcement 
proceedings against violations; bring actions against the federal or state EPA for non 
diligence. Through the EPA “National Report a Violation” website, citizens can lodge online 
complaints, and through the “EPA Fugitives” website, assist in locating alleged 
environmental criminal fugitives.  
 
Regulated Community: it covers a range of industrial and non-industrial entities, federal 
facilities and state and local governments, including utilities, refineries, manufacturing and 
processing facilities, agriculture producers and processors, mobile sources, etc.  
 
6.3.2 Enforcement Tools and Mechanisms 
 
The USA EPA employs an array of tools to achieve law compliance, including monitoring, 
investigation, administrative and judicial (civil and criminal) actions, as well as compliance 
assistances and incentives. The tools have the following functions:  
• to identify and correct noncompliance; 
• to restore environmental damage; and 
• to impose penalties to deter violations. 
The idea behind the tools is to balance compliance through provision of guidance/assistance 
and violation correction by imposition of penalties and legal actions. In practice, the EPA 
takes a pragmatic approach with its compliance/enforcement programs relying more on 
pollution control technologies and focusing judicial actions on large cases that are expected to 
result in large environmental benefits.  
 
The EPA and the delegated states are empowered by the CWA to take enforcement actions.243 
The CWA Section 309244 rules that the primary enforcement options for the EPA include: 
• issue administrative compliance orders; 
• assess administrative penalties;  
• refer civil cases to the DOJ for penalties and injunctive relief; and  
• refer criminal cases to the DOJ for prosecution.245  
                                                
243 Glicksman, R. L. and D. H. Earnhart (2007): The Comparative Effectiveness of Government Interventions on 
Environmental Performance in the Chemical Industry, 26 Stan. Envtl. L. J. pp317, 332. 
244 33 U.S.C. § 1319. 
245  http://www2.epa.gov/enforcement/water-enforcement. Last visit on 23 Jul 2015. 
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In practice, the USA EPA takes tough civil and criminal enforcement actions against violators 
only as the last option, as reflected in the enforcement procedure of the Illinois State EPA 
(Fig 6.3). Most CWA/NPDES violations are dealt with and settled through Administrative 
Enforcement Actions (see also Section 6.3.6). Once a violation is identified, the EPA or state 
may give the permit holder an informal notice of permit violation or initiate a formal 
administrative action in the form of a notice of violation or an administrative order for 
compliance. An administrative order imposes legally enforceable requirements for achieving 
compliance within a specified period, but may or may not include sanctions and penalties. 
The administrative enforcement actions either: (1) require violators take actions to comply 
with the permit requirements; (2) revoke a violator’s permit to discharge; and/or (3) impose 
penalties for permit non-compliance. Most administrative enforcement actions lead to either 
consent agreements or final administrative orders. Administrative orders are processed at the 
federal level through an administrative adjudicatory process, filed before an administrative 
law judge, and at the regional level by the EPA’s regional judicial officers. 
 
Administrative enforcement actions may also include Supplement Environmental Projects 
(SEPs). These are projects beneficial to environmental and human health, which a violator 
undertakes voluntarily in exchange for mitigation of penalties. The application of SEPs as an 
enforcement mechanism has become more popular in recent years, as the benefit of a SEP 
appears to be more beneficial to the environment rather than monetary fines or penalties alone. 
246 
 
                                                
246 Gelpe, M. R. and J. L. Barnes (1990): Penalties in settlements of citizen suit enforcement actions under the 
Clean Water Act. William Mitchell Law Review 16, p1025-1040.  
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Figure 6.3: NPDES enforcement procedure of the USA Illinois State EPA. 
 
Civil cases constitute a large component of the enforcement actions, second only to 
administrative cases. They are lawsuits filed in court against permit holders for alleged 
violation of permit requirements or administrative orders. Civil cases may be filed in the 
federal district court by the DOJ on behalf of the EPA or by State Attorney General on behalf 
of the state. As with administrative cases, many civil judicial actions lead to a consent decree.  
 
The CWA Section 309(c) authorizes criminal enforcement actions against individuals or 
entities who negligently or deliberately violate the statute, especially for repeated offenders. 
The criminal enforcement scheme includes imprisonment, monetary penalties, or both. Any 
person, who negligently introduces into a sewer system or into a publicly owned treatment 
works any pollutant or hazardous substance which such person knew or reasonably should 
have known could cause personal injury or property damage, shall be punished by a fine of 
not less than $2,500 nor more than $25,000 per day of violation, or by imprisonment for not 
more than 1 year, or by both. It is a felony if it is committed “after a first conviction,” 
bringing a maximum $50,000 fine for each day of violation or up to two years in prison, or 
both.247 A party who is convicted of “knowingly” committing any of the same violations will 
face a penalty of “not less than $5,000 but not more than $50,000 per day of violation, or by 
imprisonment for not more than 3 years, or by both.” For a subsequent conviction, the 
maximum fine and prison sentence can be doubled to $100,000 a day and 6 years in prison. 
                                                
247 CWA, Section 309 (c)(1) 
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248 Section 309 (c)(3) states that who knowingly places another person in imminent danger of 
death or serious bodily injury, shall be subject to a fine of not more than $250,000 or 
imprisonment of not more than 15 years, or both; for an organization, not more than 
$1,000,000. Section 309 (c)(4) stipulates the punishment of false statements (knowingly) for a 
maximum $10,000 in fines, or not more than 2 years imprisonment, and doubled for repeat 
offenders. The EPA investigates federal environmental crimes and the AGO and DOJ 
prosecute criminal cases on behalf of the EPA.  
 
6.3.3 Violation Prevention 
 
Parallel to enforcement actions, the EPA and states also provide compliance assistance to 
permit holders to understand their obligations to prevent violations and reduce the need for 
enforcement actions. Also, the EPA and states assist violators to achieve compliance.249  
 
6.3.4 Monitoring, Inspections and Evaluations  
 
The basis of the enforcement programs is compliance monitoring, data compilation and 
evaluation of behavior of the regulated community. Data and data evaluation allow the EPA 
to identify violations and to set enforcement priorities. The data can eventually be used in an 
enforcement action. Monitoring discharge activities also increases the awareness of permit 
requirements and encourages compliance. Several forms of compliance monitoring have been 
introduced by the EPA:   
• Self-Monitoring/Reporting: the NPDES requires permit holders to monitor and record 
their own compliance statutes and report the results to the permitting authority. Self-
monitoring encourages the permit holders to better comply with the law.  
• Review: the EPA compiles and reviews the self-monitoring data and data otherwise 
collected.  
• Site Inspection and Evaluation: Inspections are conducted for initial assessment of 
permit compliance and the degree of non-compliance.  
• Area Monitoring: Area monitoring looks at environmental conditions in the vicinity of 
a facility, or across a certain geographic area.  
The EPA has a number of national databases including enforcement and compliance data 
elements, which are available to EPA staff and in some cases, state and local governments, 
but not open to the public. However, the Enforcement and Compliance History Online 
                                                
248 CWA, Section 309 (c)(2) 
249 State Agency Contributions to Enforcement and Compliance, ECOS 01-004, April 2001.   
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(ECHO), introduced in 2003 has become the most prominent publicly accessible database. A 
list and descriptions of the EPA’s enforcement/compliance databases can be found in the 
EPA’s “Compliance and Enforcement Data Systems” website.250  
6.3.5 Citizen Enforcement Action 
The federal EPA and the states have the obligation, according to the USA Freedom of 
Information Act, to disclose to citizens what they know, including to divulge evidence of a 
polluter’s violation of a permit limit.  
 
Civil enforcement actions constitute an indispensable component of the CWA enforcement 
strategy which supplements the EPA enforcement actions. Fourteen USA federal 
environmental laws empower citizens to act as “Private Attorney Generals” to enforce 
compliance.251 In particular, the CWA Section 505 states that any person has the right to 
commence a civil action on his own behalf against either (1) any person who violates an 
effluent standard or limitation, or (2) the EPA for failure to perform any act or duty…which is 
not discretionary.252  
 
The first issue concerning citizen action is the legal standing of the citizen. To have an 
individual standing, citizens must show: (1) they have suffered an injury in fact that is 
concrete and particularized, actual and imminent, and not conjectural or hypothetical; (2) the 
injury is fairly traceable to the defendant’s challenge action; (3) it is likely, as opposed to 
speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable court decision. Plaintiffs need not 
establish the causal connection with absolute scientific rigor. Citizen claimants need not show 
prudential standing. As a general matter, plaintiffs invoking federal laws should show their 
claim falls “within the zone of interests” meant to be protected by the statute. Yet, this does 
not apply when Congress grants citizen suits authority.  
 
Environmental citizen claimants are required to provide a 60-day notice before commencing 
an action under the CWA, although action may be brought immediately for violations of new 
source performance standards or toxic effluent limitations. No action may be commenced 
prior to the 60 days after the plaintiff has given notice of the alleged violations to the EPA, 
                                                
250  http://echo.epa.gov/facilities/facility-search?mediaSelected=all, last visit on 23 Jul 2015. 
251 May, J. (2004): Discharges from  historic mining properties: asserting and defending citizen suits under the 
Clean Water Act, p38, in Chapter 23 of “Proceedings of the rocky mountain mineral law fiftieth annual institute”, 
22-24 Jul 2004.  
252 33 U.S.C. §1365(a) 
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the state in which the alleged violation occurs and to the alleged violator of the standard, 
limitation, or order, provided by Section 505 (b) (1) (A) [33 U.S.C. 1365]. The EPA requires 
notice of intent to identify the specific standards and limitations the recipient of the notice is 
alleged to be violating, the person responsible, the location of the alleged violation, the date or 
dates of such violation, and the full name and address of the person giving the notice. 253 	  
 
The preclusion follows the following procedure: Advance notice of intent; government 
enforcement (civil action; administrative action; prior enforcement action); permit shield: 
compliance with a NPDES permit suffices for compliance with the Act (Section 402, 
33U.S.C.1342). The Act’s permit shield provision exempts pollutants known to but not 
regulated by the issuing agency from claims for unpermitted discharges. In the case of Piney 
Run Preservation Ass’n v. County Commissioners of Carrol County, Maryland,254 the Fourth 
Circuit reversed the decision of the lower court holding that it was unlawful for a wastewater 
treatment plant to discharge heated wastewater without expression in its NPDES permit, 
rather applied the “permit shield” provision of Section 402 (k), and ruled that the discharge 
not to be prohibited because: (1) a permit provision stating “discharge of pollutants not shown 
shall be illegal” is ambiguous and did not limit thermal discharge; (2) the permit did not 
expressly prohibit discharges of unlisted pollutants; and (3) the state was aware of the 
potential for thermal discharge when it issued the permit, yet did not set a corresponding 
effluent limit. This case created great controversy at the time.   
 
Citizens are also empowered to act against the EPA administrator if it fails to perform any 
nondiscretionary act or duty. Citizen suits are also important to develop new regulatory 
programs and to improve existing regulatory programs. The Flannery Decree, for example, as 
a result from the consolidation of several citizen law suits, required the EPA to issue BAT 
effluent limitations for 65 toxic pollutants.255  
 
On the other hand, barriers have been placed by the law to constrain the power of civil actions 
against alleged polluters. Most noticeably, citizens cannot sue for wholly past violations, 
unless they can show that the violations are likely to continue after they file a suit. A violator 
may thus cause tremendous harm with illegal discharges, but escape from citizen suits if it 
                                                
253 40 C.F.R. pt. 135 (2003) 
254 268 F. 3d 255 (4th Cir. 2001). 
255 Glicksman, R. L. (2004): The Value of Agency-Forcing Citizen Suits to Enforce Nondiscretionary Duties, 10 
Widener L. Rev. pp353, 362-364. 
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cannot be shown that the discharge might reasonably recur. Obviously, this is a significant 
barrier for citizen groups to act effectively.  
 
6.3.6 Statistics and Appraisal 
	  
A summary of the EPA environmental enforcement actions carried out over the 5 year period 
(2008–2012) are summarized in Tables 6.4 – 6.7 (adapted from Esworthy, 2013256). 	  
	  
Table 6.4: EPA Administrative, Civil and Criminal Enforcement Actions, FY2008-FY2012 
 
Enforcement Action 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Administrative Compliance Orders 1390   1588 1302 1324 1088 
Administrative Penalty Order Complaints 2056 1914 1901 1760 1760 
Final Administrative Penalty Orders 2084 1916 1830 1735 1780 
Civil Judicial Referral 280 277 233 199 179 
Civil Judicial Cases Concluded 192 201 200 182 144 
Criminal Judicial Referral N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 
Criminal Judicial Cases Initiated 319 387 346 371 321 
 
 
Table 6.5: Number of the EPA Enforcement Inspections and Evaluations by Statute, FY2008-FY2012 
 
Statute 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
CAA 3953 3384 3690 3558 4055 
CWA 3691 3488 3446 3364 3439 
SDWA 5946 6927 7034 5955 6161 
…      
Total 19882 19724 21012 18963 19834 
 
 
Table 6.6: Environmental Enforcement Penalties Assessed by EPA: Administrative, Civil, and Criminal, 
FY2008-FY2012 (nominal dollars in thousands—not adjusted for inflation) 
 
Statute 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Administrative $38,197 $31,609 $33,359 $44,881 $52,023 
Civil Judicial $88,356 $58,497 $70,249 $104,391 $155,539 
Criminala $63,454 $96,000 $41,000 $35,000 $44,000 
Total $190,108 $186,105 $144,600 $184,272 $251,562 
a. Criminal penalties represent fines and restitution.  
 
                                                
256 Esworthy, R. (2013): Federal Pollution Control Laws: How Are They Enforced? Congressional Research 
Service, 7-5700, RL34384. Data from the EPA databases  
http://www.epa.gov/compliance/data/results/nets.html 
http://www.epa.gov/enforcement/data/eoy2012/eoy-trends.html 
http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/reports/nets/netsg2inpectionslongterm.pdf 
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Table 6.7 Supplemental Environmental Projects (SEPs) Dollar Values as Reported by the EPA: FY2008-FY2012 
(dollars in thousands—not adjusted for inflation) 
 
Statute 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
CAA $15,679.8  $12,509.7  $8,160.0 $6,665.7 $6,244.5  
CWA $13,904.6  $5,264.9  $12,419.0  $10,488.0 $27,023.9 
SDWA $1,428.0  $3.8 $325.0  $1,212.8 $103.1 
…      
Total $39,046.1  $41,121.1  $23,774.3  $25,386.8  $43,606.0 
 
 
The data revealed that the EPA’s civil, administrative, criminal enforcement actions, 
environmental enforcement penalties assessed as well as SEPS have remained steady. In 2012, 
the EPA initiated 1088 administrative compliance orders and 1760 administrative penalty 
order complaints and imposed 1780 final administrative penalty orders257; referred 179 civil 
cases to the DOJ, filed 119 civil complaints with the court; concluded 144 cases and opened 
320 new cases. The civil penalties amounted to $207.6 million. EPA enforcement actions 
have increased weighting on SEPs, with a total of $43.6 million spend in 2012.   
 
 
Despite the robustness of the EPA program, the success of enforcement is mixed. According 
to Andreen (2007),258 the number of cases the EPA referred to the DOJ fell 55% between 
1997 and 2002. The most recent data show that the EPA opened 346 new environmental 
crime cases in 2010, an 11% decline from 387 in 2009. The number of people convicted for 
environmental crimes dropped from 738 in 2001 to 470 in 2006.259 Criminal charges were 
brought against 289 defendants in 2010. Of the cases completed during that year, 198 
defendants either pleaded guilty or were convicted at trial. Over the years, the conviction rate 
on average is approximately 90%. In 2010, individual criminal defendants were sentenced to 
a total of 72 years of jail-time. Another major form of law enforcement is economic penalties. 
In 2010, environmental criminal defendants were assessed a total of $41 million in fines and 
restitution, and the courts ordered criminal defendants to pay $18 million for environmental 
projects.260  
 
The rate of permit violation remains high. From 2003 to 2005, about 20% of all major 
dischargers were in substantial non-compliance with their permits. During 2005, 57% of these 
                                                
257 EPA-OECA, Enforcement Annual Results for Fiscal Year 2012, released on 17 Dec 2012,  
http://www.epa.gov/enforcement/data/eoy2012/eoy-data.html   
258 Andreen, W. L. (2007): Motivating Enforcement: Institutional Culture and the Clean Water Act, 24 Pace 
Envtl. L. Rev. 67.  http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol24/iss1/4 
259 Solomon, J. and J. Eilperin (2007): Bush’s EPA is pursuing fewer polluters. Wash. Post, 30 Sep 2007. 
260 Data from  http://www.epa.gov/Compliance/resources/reports/endofyear/eoy2010/criminal/index.html#cases  
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major dischargers (3600 out of 7000) exceeded their permit discharge limits at least once261. 
The most recent statistics of the EPA for 2010 shows that, in addition to the major facilities, 
the NPDES covers 440,000 small individually-permitted facilities, known as the ANCR 
(Annual Noncompliance Report) facilities. Permitting authorities (46 states and the Virgin 
Islands and federal EPA for the remaining 4 states) reviewed discharge data for 82% of 
ANCR permittees to determine whether violation occurred. The states which provide detailed 
data to the federal EPA are classified as “verified states” while the states which provide 
general statistics to the EPA as “non-verified states”. The violations are classified as 
violations and serious violations (Category I). An overview of the statistics is presented in 
Table 6.8. These statistics show that after 40 years of NPDES, about half of the ANCR permit 
holders (i.e. 47%, if data from the verified states are used) are in noncompliance with their 
permit requirements and 35% in serious non-compliance with their permit requirements. In 
2008, the permit violation rate was as high as 73% and Category I violation rate as high as 
60%. The EPA believes the more recent improvement of permit compliance is probably due 
to the publication of the data to the general public.  
 
Table 6.8: NPDES permit violation and serious violation rates for 2008, 2009 and 2010.262 
 
Year 2008 2009 2010 
Violation Rate – Verified States 73% 63% 47% 
Violation Rate – Non-verified States 39 36 44 
Violation Rate - Overall 45 45 45 
Category I Violation Rate – Verified  60 46 35 
Category I Violation Rate – Non-verified 18 25 25 
Category I Violation Rate – Overall 26 28 29 
 
The high rate of permit violation can be partially attributed to the insufficient capacity for law 
enforcement. Most of monitoring and enforcement tasks are carried out by the EPA regional 
offices. Yet, from 1997 to 2007, the enforcement funding to EPA regions decreased by 8% in 
inflation-adjusted terms, forcing the regional officials to reduce the number of enforcement 
staff by 5%. In 2003, the federal government targeted to eliminate 200 enforcement jobs.263 
Over the period 1997–2007, EPA’s grants to states to implement federal environmental 
programs declined by 9% in real terms, while the enforcement responsibilities increased.264 
The budget cuts affected the number and quality of enforcement actions directly, but they also 
                                                
261  Andreen, W. L. (2007): Motivating enforcement, citing the Office of Enforcement and Compliance 
Assurance of the EPA. 
262 USA EPA Annual Noncompliance Report, Calendar Year 2010. 
263 Mintz, J. A. (2004): “Treading Water”: A preliminary assessment of EPA enforcement during the Bush II 
administration, 34 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 10, pp912-10, 914  
264 GAO EPA-State Enforcement Report. 
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contributed to the “EPA’s loss of credibility as a stringent overseer of state enforcement and 
compliance.265 Over 2011-2012, congress cut the EPA’s budget by 18% from $10.3 billion to 
$8.5 billion. In particular, the funding for water quality fell 29%, from $5.6 billion to $4 
billion.266 This significantly weakened the ability of the EPA to fulfill its mandate in 
environmental law enforcement.   
 
6.3.7 Federal Facilities  
 
The federal government also causes pollution and is part of the regulated community. For 
example, the DOD (Department of Defense) and DOE (Department of Energy) are 
responsible for the largest and most polluted sites in the country.267 In general, federal 
facilities must adhere to the environmental laws and regulations to the same extent as other 
regulated bodies. However, legal questions exist when federal facilities are subject to 
enforcement actions, such as monetary penalties. Enforcement against federal facilities for 
violations of the CWA has encountered difficulties because of the interpretation of the USA 
Supreme Court of the CWA’s sovereign immunity provision and its definition of “person”. 
The CWA has provisions for federal facilities to comply with the law,268 but in the DOE v. 
Ohio case, the Supreme Court held that federal facilities and agencies are immune from civil 
penalties for past violations under the CWA because the Act does not unequivocally waive 
sovereign immunity for civil penalties.269 This decision also applied to the SDWA, but 
Congress amended the SDWA in 1996 to expressly waive federal sovereign immunity for 
civil administrative penalties.270 However, similar amendment has not been made to the CWA. 
Further, the Supreme Court also held in the DOE v. Ohio case that federal facilities were 
immune from civil penalties under the CWA’s citizen suit provisions because the USA was 
not included in the definition of “person”.271 Federal facilities enjoy until today immunity for 
non-compliance with the CWA.   
 
                                                
265 Flatt, V. B. (1997): A dirty river runs through it (the failure of enforcement in the Clean Water Act), 25 B.C. 
Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 1, 28. 
266 Davenport, C. (2013): National Journal Daily of 4 Mar 2013. 
267 Kassen, M. R. (1995): The Inadequacies of Congressional Attempts to Legislate Federal Facility Compliance 
with Environmental Requirements, 54 Md. L. Rev. 1475; Percival, Environmental Regulation, supra note 25 at 
1034; de Saillan, C. (2008): The Use of Immient Haxard Provisions of Environmental Laws to Compel Cleanup 
at Federal Facilities, 27 Stan. Envtl. L.J. 43, p4849. 
268 33 U.S.C. § 1323 
269 Andreen, W. L. and S. C. Jones (2008): The Clean Water Act A Blueprint For Reform, Center for Progressive 
Reform, White Paper #802. 
270 42 U.S.C. § 300(j)(6)(1996) 
271 Id. 270. 
 102 
The legal entanglement in the CWA enforcement actions against federal facilities is of 
particular relevance to China. China faces similar problems but on much larger dimensions. 
The Chinese state owns not only national facilities, such as those of the People’s Liberation 
Army, but also about 300,000 enterprises which dominate the Chinese economy. It is an 
enormous challenge to take enforcement actions against state owned facilities and major 
enterprises for compliance with the regulations under the WPPCL.  
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Chapter 7: A Case Study of China’s WPDP System 
 
With an area of 36,900 km2 and a watercourse of 120,000 km long, Taihu in Jiangsu Province 
is the third largest lake in China. 272  Its drainage basin is associated with the most 
economically developed areas of China, encompassing Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang and 
Anhui. In 2007, the total population of the basin was 49 million, with a total GDP of 2865 
billion CYN and a GDP per person twice that of the national average.273 The economic 
growth in the Taihu Basin depended mainly on chemical, paper-making, electroplating and 
other heavy pollution industries. The lack of environmental awareness and effective water 
pollution control measures resulted in serious pollution of Taihu and water quality disasters. 
Despite the implementation of the WPPCL/WPDP and highly publicized actions by the 
government, the water quality of Taihu has not significantly improved. Thus, Taihu serves as 
an excellent case to study the functioning of the WPPCL/WPDP. 
7.1: Taihu Pollution in 2007 
In 2007, Taihu saw the worst eutrophication outbreak in history. Large quantities of blue-
green algae in the lake degraded its water, causing severe water pollution and threatening the 
water safety of Wuxi City (population of 6.3 million). From the 1980s to the 2000s, the water 
quality of Taihu dropped from Grade II to III to Grade IV to V (Fig. 7.1) and in the five years 
prior to the 2007 eutrophication outbreak, the water quality of Taihu was consecutively 
classified as Category V. 274   
 
Since Apr 2007, it had been hot and dry in the Taihu area, and the water level low. The warm 
temperature and low rainfall provided the best conditions for the growth of blue-green algae. 
At the time of the outbreak, the nitrogen content in the fresh water was more than 4.6 mg/l 
with maximum levels exceeding 10.0 mg/l (10 times the standard for water-quality Category 
III, Table 5.1). The discharge of wastewater into Taihu massively exceeded the environmental 
capacity of the lake over a long period of time275, and the low water level exacerbated the 
gravity of the pollution with catastrophic consequences.  
                                                
272 State Council of China (2008): Integrated Plan for Taihu Basin Water Environment Treatment Plan. Revised 
in 2013. In Chinese: 太湖流域水环境综合治理总体方案.    
273 Management Bureau of Taihu Lake Basin (2008): Environment Statues Report of Taihu Lake. 
274 Data from  the Report on the State of Environment (SOE) for 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005 and 2006 published by 
the Ministry of Environmental Protection of China. 
275 Gao, C., J. Y. Zhu, K. W. Dai et al. (2003): Impact of rapid urbanization on water quality and related 
mitigation options in Taihu Lake area. Sci. Geogr. Sinica 23: pp746-750.  
 104 
The conflict between China’s desire for economic development and environment protection is 
clearly reflected in the Taihu case. Polluted water discharged into Taihu comes from 
industrial, domestic and agricultural sources. The large cities (e.g. Suzhou and Wuxi) and the 
town clusters in the Taihu Basin are strong in textile, chemical and food manufacturing. 
Although discharge standards exist, the transfer of low-technology and heavy-pollution 
industries to the town clusters resulted in large quantities of polluted water discharged into the 
waterways flowing to the lake. Fig 7.1 shows that the water quality very much worsened 
during 1981-2001. In 2007, the water quality was classified Category V or worse for 60% of 
the entire lake (Fig. 7.2). As the water quality worsened, the economy flourished. In 2006, 
Jiangsu Province achieved a GDP of 2.1 trillion CNY and became the 2nd largest economy of 
China. 
 
 
	  
Figure 7.1: Worsening of water quality during 1981-2001. Adapted from Shao et al. 2006.276 
 
Another major source of water pollution is domestic sewage. The lake basin has dense river 
networks, and the river banks are densely populated. People living along the rivers discharge 
sewage directly into the waterways, and thus the scattered sources of domestic wastewater 
have become a major problem of water pollution. The population density in the Taihu area 
has now reached about 1000/km2 and is one of the highest in the world, but the area seriously 
lacks the sewage treatment systems and infrastructures. 277 
 
                                                
276 Shao, M., X. Y. Tang, Y. H. Zhang and W. J. Li (2006): City clusters in China: air and surface water 
pollution. Front Ecol. Environ. 4 (7), pp353-361. 
277 Gao, C., J. Y. Zhu, K. W. Dai et al. (2003): Impact of rapid urbanization on water quality and related 
mitigation options in Taihu Lake area. Sci. Geogr. Sinica 23: pp746-750.  
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Agriculture is another main source of water pollution, and the modern agricultural activities 
have significantly increased non-point source pollution. On average, the application of 
chemical fertilizer (pure) increased from 24.4 kg/hectare in 1979 to the recent 66.7 kg/hectare. 
The increased use of fertilizers, as well as pesticides, has caused serious environmental 
pollution.278 However, the discharge of agricultural water pollutants in this region has no 
environmental standard whatsoever.  
7.2: Failure of the Permit Pilot Program for Taihu Basin 
Confronted with the worsening water quality in the Taihu region, the central and provincial 
governments took highly publicized clean-water actions. The best known example is the 
“Taihu Zero Action” 279 in 1999. The State Council jointly with the relevant provinces of 
Jiangsu, Zhejiang and Shanghai launched a massive clean-water campaign in the mid-1990s, 
in order to achieve the ambitious and unrealistic goal of “Taihu Clean Water” by 2000. The 
campaign reached its climax in 1998. It was announced that the “Taihu Zero Action” was 
completely successful, i.e. by 0:00 on 1 Jan 1999 all key sources of waste water discharge to 
the Taihu basin, comprising 1035 enterprises, had achieved the emissions standards. The 
“Taihu Zero Action” was to be the 1st phase of water pollution control for Taihu and by 2000, 
the water quality of flows into and from Taihu would have reached the targeted water quality 
standard (Category III).  
 
However, despite the government instrumented measures such as the “Taihu Zero Action” the 
water quality of Taihu continued to deteriorate. In the 1990s, the industrial and domestic 
wastewater discharges into Taihu were estimated respectively to be 540 Mt and 320 Mt per 
year. By 2000, the total point source discharge to Taihu was a massive 5.33 Gt (3.24 Gt from 
industrial and 2.09 Gt from domestic sources) 280. The water pollution control for Taihu was a 
total failure.  
 
A campaign similar to “Taihu Zero Action” was repeated for the region in 2006, the so-called 
“Three Chemical Remediation Action”, to use the “the most resolute, the most rigorous and 
thorough” measures to renovate small chemical plants. However, by the time of the 2007 
eutrophication outbreak, the government was unable to close a single small chemical plant.  
                                                
278 Li, J., Q. W. Min, Z. J. Li, W. J. Jiao, Z. Yuan and F. Lun (2012): Agricultural pollution pressure in the Taihu 
Lake Basin. Chinese J. Eco-Agriculture 20(3): p348-355. 
279 Sun, W. H. (孙红卫，2003): Comparative analysis of water quality of Taihu Lake around "Zero-Point Action”. 
Jiansu Environ. Sci. and Tech. 16(1), doi: 10.3969/j.issn.1674-4829.2003.01.014. 零点行动"前后太湖水质比较分
析. 
280 Qin, B. Q. (2008): Taihu Lake, China: Dynamics and Environmental Change. Springer.  
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In 2008, the Jiangsu provincial government imposed for the Taihu Basin the most stringent 
discharge standard in China for water treatment facilities.281 The government established 44 
new wastewater treatment facilities and required 169 existing wastewater treatment facilities 
to upgrade the discharge standard from Standard B to A (e.g. the permitted COD 
concentration was decreased from 60 to 50 mg/l). However, this significantly increased the 
cost of water treatment from 1.3 CNY/m3 to 2.0–2.2 CNY/m3. Statistics of the Jiangsu EPB 
shows that 70% of the wastewater treatment facilities did not comply with the standard, due to 
the high cost and the high concentration of the polluted water prior to the treatment. Until 
today, the water quality of Taihu remains poor.  
 
 
 
Figure 7.2: Percentage of water quality grade of Taihu for 2007 – 2011. The figure shows that water quality 
improvement over the 5 years was marginal. Data from the MEP Reports on State of the Environmental 2007, 
2008, 2009, 2010 and 2011. Data more recent than 2012 are not yet published.  
 
                                                
281 Jiangsu Province Environmental Protection Bureau (2007): Discharge Standard of Main Water Pollutants for 
Municipal Wastewater Treatment Plant & Key Industries of Taihu Area. Adopted on 8 Jul 2007; Effective on 1 
Jan 2008. 江苏省环境保护厅, 太湖流域城镇污水处理厂主要水污染物排放限值.江苏省地方标准 DB32/1072007.  
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Fig. 7.2 shows the water quality change for Taihu over the period 2008-2011282. The overall 
improvement of the water quality is marginal, if at all significant. The Taihu case study shows 
that the WPPCL/WPDP system has so far not functioned properly for many weaknesses, as 
discussed below: 
• Conflict between Economic Development and Environmental Protection: The role of 
the government in Taihu water pollution requires careful analysis. For a long period of 
time, the government placed economic growth to be the highest priority, and nurtured 
the chemical enterprises to flourish in the basin, which caused severe pollution.  
• Lack of Clear Definition of Legal Responsibility: Although the WPPCL was passed in 
1984 and the supporting criminal laws and civil procedure laws came to existence, no 
criminal or civil lawsuits have ever been filed in the Taihu water pollution case. The 
difficulty lies partly in the lack of clear definition of legal responsibility. This is 
especially the case for Taihu, as every industry “for the good of economy” is polluting 
the water. Who should then be responsible?  
• Ad hoc Governmental Administrative Enforcement: In the aftermath of the 2007 
Taihu water quality disaster, several large enterprises were suspended for water 
pollution rectification and administrative penalties were imposed on 5 local 
government officers due to non-diligence. This is clearly a white wash, as no legal 
charges can be taken against any individuals or any organization.  
• The protection of Taihu water quality requires regional cooperation, as it involves 
multiple administrative regions (Jiangsu, Anhui, Zhejiang and Shanghai). The 
administrative division has proven to be an institutional nightmare, as each of the 
regions has demands on the use of the Taihu water resources, but not one is willing to 
finance the water pollution prevention and control. The divisions between the various 
departments are equally formidable. For example, the environmental protection 
departments are responsible for monitoring and supervising the water environment; 
the water departments manage the rivers and lakes, while the construction departments 
manage the sewage systems. Farming, fish farming, chemical industries etc. all belong 
to different ministries. When the entire system deteriorates, then no administrative 
institution assumes full responsibility.  
 
                                                
282 Data the report of the State of Environment (SOE) for 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010 and 2011 published by the 
Ministry of Environmental Protection of China. Data more recent than 2012 are not yet available.  
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China continues to rely heavily on administrative measures for water pollution 
prevention and control. In 2008, the State Council approved the Integrated Plan for 
Taihu Basin Water Environment Treatment Plan 283  and the Jiangsu Province 
established the new Taihu Water Pollution Prevention and Treatment Office.284The 
effectiveness of the administrative measures remains to be assessed.  
• Lack of Public Enforcement of Law: The lack of public participation in environmental 
law enforcement is obvious in the Taihu case. No environmental NGO is actively 
involved in the enforcement of the law against water pollution. It has been claimed 
from unconfirmed sources, that a group of environmentalists applied twice to the Civil 
Affairs Department of Wuxi to form an environmental NGO but it was twice rejected 
with the argument that a NGO of this type was already in existence. It turned out that a 
social group of the sort indeed existed, but was never active. There is also a serious 
lack of information disclosure to the public. The government did not allow the public 
to have full access to important environmental data, supervision and participation. For 
example, the government did not acknowledge the serious Taihu water disaster of 
2007, until the media had reported the case.  
7.3 The Case of Town of Zhoutie (周铁镇) 
As an administrative response to the 2007 Taihu water quality disaster, 5 local government 
officers were demoted for negligence. Among the 5 officers, 3 were from the chemical 
industrial Town of Zhoutie285. At the time, one of the chemical plants was identified to have 
illegally discharged wastewater to the lake. The town, located at the western margin of the 
lake, occupies an area of 73.2 km2 and a lake coastline of 22 km. At one stage, the town 
accommodated more than 300 chemical manufacturers which contributed to 85% of the local 
economy. During the “Taihu Zero Action”, the number of chemical plants was reduced to 152 
by 2007, and since the implementation of the Integrated Plan for Taihu Basin Water 
Environment Treatment Plan in 2008, the number of chemical plants further reduced to 46. 
                                                
283 State Council of China (2008): Integrated Plan for Taihu Basin Water Environment Treatment Plan. Revised 
in 2013. In Chinese: 太湖流域水环境综合治理总体方案 
284 In Chinese: 江苏省太湖水污染防治办公室 
285 Qian, P. F. (钱鹏飞，2007): Out of the critical situation: Taihu after the water pollution accident of Wuxi. 走
出 危 局 ： 无 锡 水 污 染 事 件 后 的 太 湖 . People’s Daily: http://paper.people.com.cn/dd/html/2007-
08/15/content_19740890.htm, last visit on 22 Jul 2015. 
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Now, the contribution of the chemical industry to the local economy has been reduced to 
30%.286, 287     
 
The policy of the government successfully transformed the industrial structure of Zhoutie. 
Before 2007, the town supported a machinery-based industry contributing 10% to the local 
economy. Because the local chemical manufacturers moved out of the town, machinery 
manufacturers moved in. By 2011, Zhoutie has accumulated more 190 machinery 
manufacturers, contributing 50% of the 14 billion CNY local economy.  
 
According to the Jiangsu EPB, the water quality of the rivers in the vicinity of Zhoutie has 
improved from Category V+ to Category V or better. Also the areas of Taihu affected by the 
blue-green algae has been on the decline from the peak 1100 km2 in 2007 to the recent about 
500–600 km2, but scientists have pointed out that “restoring Taihu to a truly healthy state will 
be a challenge akin to ongoing efforts to bring polluted Lake Erie back from the near-dead.” 
288   
 
Although industrial water pollution in the Taihu Basin has been reduced through industrial 
structural change, agricultural water pollution issues have become more prominent. Zhoutie is 
also an area growing traditional food crops which demand much more nitrogen and 
phosphorus fertilizers for vegetable cultivation. Nitrogen and phosphorus are the main 
pollutants leading to blue-green algae blooms. For example, for rice cultivation, 150 kg/mu289 
organic fertilizers are applied per year. Zhoutie has 56000 mu of arable land, with 36000 mu 
for food production and 20000 mu for vegetable cultivation. The situation of Zhoutie is not 
unique in the Taihu Basin. The entire basin is increasingly threatened by water pollution due 
to agricultural activities.  
                                                
286 Li, S. L. (李少林, 2012): Taihu 100 Billion Yuan Environment Treatment: a Case Study of Zhoutie (太湖千亿
环境治理周铁样本调查). China Securities Journal, 20 Nov 2012. 
http://www.cs.com.cn/ssgs/gsxw/201211/t2012112037400311.html.  
287 Li, K. C., 2007: Zhoutie after the Wuxi water crisis. East Morning Herald, 18 Jul 2007. 无锡水危机之后的周
铁镇, http://www.sina.com.cn 2007 年 07 月 18 日 03:17, 东方早报. 
288 Stone, R. (2011): China aims to turn tide against toxic lake pollution. Science, New & Analysis, 2 Sep 2011: 
Vol. 333 no. 6047 pp1210-1211. DOI: 10.1126/science.333.6047.1210:  
289 1 mu = 666.67 m2 
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7.4 New Developments 
Recently, China has accelerated its WPPCL enforcement actions. On 1 Jan 2014, China 
enacted the Urban Water Discharge and Polluted Water Treatment Regulations.290 The 
regulations restated that future industrial enterprises, institutions, individuals and commercial 
households must have permits (drainage license) to discharge wastewater. Discharging 
polluted water without a permit shall incur a fine to a maximum of 500,000 CNY. Cities have 
also established monitoring hotlines for citizens to report water pollution events and activities.  
                                                
290 State Council of China (2013): 城镇排水与污水处理条例 
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Chapter 8: Conclusions and Recommendations 
8.1 Summary of Comparison 
It has been challenging to compare the legal systems of two countries as different as the USA 
and China. The two countries have very different political structures, economic developments, 
histories and cultures. The USA is a democratic country, in which the rule of law is essential, 
while China has a centralized power structure under the leadership of the Chinese Communist 
Party. The two countries also have different economic priorities. The USA is a developed 
country, while China is a developing country with a high priority on GDP growth, 
employment and social stability (Section 4.1). The USA has a much smaller population and 
more abundant natural resources, and in many ways faces less environmental pressure than 
China. The USA has a long history of environmental law practice, while China is still 
establishing its environmental legal framework. Despite these differences, China can greatly 
benefit from the USA experience to improve its WPPCL/WPDP, taking into consideration its 
political, economic, social and cultural realities.  
 
Both the CWA (USA) and WPPCL (PRC) are designed in response to water pollution 
problems in the respective countries, and both employ a discharge permit system as a vehicle 
to achieve the environmental management goals. However, while the CWA/NPDES has 
enjoyed much success in improving the water quality of the USA, the WPPCL/WPDP has not 
been able to curb the trend of increased water pollution in China, apart from some 
improvement in regions which have suffered disastrous water pollution levels. Then, what are 
the reasons? 
 
Substantial differences exist between the legal systems between the two countries. The 
foremost one lies in the objectives of the laws: the CWA aims to restore and maintain the 
chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the waters, while the WPPCL aims to balance 
economic development and environmental protection. The objective of the CWA places water 
integrity high on the national agenda and reflects the ethical premise of clean water. In 
contrast, the WPPCL retains economic development as the highest national agenda and water 
quality protection secondary. As a result, although the WPPCL provides a legal basis for 
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water quality protection in China, it at the same time provides an implicit justification of 
economic development at the expense of water quality. The catastrophic water pollution 
levels China experienced in recent years demonstrates the destructive powers of the explosive 
economic growth to the water integrity, which are far beyond the jurisdiction of the WPPCL.  
 
Table 8.1: Summary of comparison between the USA CWA/NPDES and PRC WPPCL/WPDP. 
 
 USA CWA/NPDES China WPPCL/WPDP 
Objectives  restore and maintain chemical, 
physical, and biological 
integrity of national waters: 
eliminate water pollutants 
discharge, goals of swimmable 
and fishable water 
Prevent and control water 
pollution, safeguard the 
drinking water, facilitate 
sustainable development of 
economic and society; balance 
economic development and 
environmental protection 
Role Essential Parallel to political decisions, 
becoming increasingly 
important 
Jurisdiction All waters of USA, territorial 
seas, and wetlands are 
protected by the law	  
Surface and ground water, 
drinking water safety with high 
priority, industrial and 
municipal wastewater with 
stricter control strategy 
Functionality  Detailed and functional Only principles; details given 
by regulations  
Standards Dual discharge standards, 
technology-based and water 
quality-based. Water quality-
based standard has potential 
but failed so far to play a major 
role 
Discharge standard and 
discharge allocation based on 
TEC with design flaws and 
difficulty in implementation  
Enforcement Governmental and citizen 
enforcement 
Weak in all aspects. Citizen 
enforcement is almost non-
existent 
 
 
The roles the laws play in the two countries also differ. While the CWA/NPDES plays a 
central role in the USA, the WPPCL/WPDP is in general supportive. For example, the most 
noticeable results in water pollution control achieved in the Taihu Basin in recent years 
cannot be attributed to the WPPCL/WPDP but to the political decisions of the government to 
close the heavily polluting chemical plants around the Taihu Lake and the direct investment 
by the government to develop the water treatment facilities. These administrative measures do 
not necessarily make use of the law. Changes in government policies can achieve quick 
results, but they are mostly ad-hoc and inconsistent.  
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The CWA has a broad scope of jurisdiction, i.e., it extensively defines all waters of the USA,  
including territorial seas and wetlands, are protected by the law, while the WPPCL is more 
specific and dedicated primarily to drinking water safety and then to industrial and municipal 
wastewater control. The legislation procedures in the USA and China are also very different. 
The CWA, legislated by the USA Congress, is a detailed law, further concretized via the 
NPDES to be directly executable and enforceable. By doing so, the NPDES becomes an 
integral part of the law. In contrast, the WPPCL legislated by the SCNPC stipulates only the 
principles of water pollution prevention and control and its implementation is realized via the 
regulations of the State Council, which until today (Jul 2015) are still in preparation. The 
legislation and implementation are thus not an integral part and consequently, although the 
SCNPC amended the WPPCL in 2008, it remains unimplemented for more than 6 years. The 
legislation-implementation process in China is further complicated, because the WPPCL can 
also be interpreted by the provincial legislative bodies, and the provincial governments need 
to respond to these interpretations and develop the corresponding regulations for 
implementation. So far, the WPDP is implemented based on the regulations of local 
governments, which do not apply across the entire country. This complicated process 
separates the law from implementation and generates a large degree of variations. The 
outcome in the reality becomes very different from what the law is supposed to achieve.  
 
On the technical level, the NPDES employs a dual-standard system, i.e., the technology-based 
standard and water quality-based standard. The technology-based standard has proved to be 
very successful, but the water quality-based standard, despite its potential, has failed to 
produce convincing results. Interestingly, China’s TEC strategy is more similar to the USA 
water quality-based approach, and the WPDP becomes merely a method for discharge 
allocation. As discussed in Chapter 5, the TEC strategy has flaws in its design, and in 
particular, it has large risks of failure if the WPDP is not checked by the TMDL. Technology-
based standards also exist in China, but they are so far proposed by the industries with the 
MEP only playing a supervisory role. The technology-based standards now implemented in 
China give permissive conditions for water pollutant discharge and it is said that all waters 
discharged from industrial point sources are polluted waters.  
 
Both the CWA/NPDES and the WPPCL/WPDP in theory employ administrative, civil and 
criminal enforcement measures. The CWA/NPDES relies heavily on administrative and civil 
enforcement (settlement of monetary penalties, or consent decree) and rarely on criminal 
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enforcement actions. The enforcement of WPPCL/WPDP relies primarily on administrative 
measures and administrative fines, which bypass civil and criminal legal actions. The 
administrative fines are mostly much lower than the cost needed for pollution relief or WPDP 
compliance. The lower cost practically allows permit holders to discharge pollutants without 
compliance. There have been very few cases of criminal enforcement actions against direct 
polluters in China, but quite a few cases against local EPB’s officers for non diligence of duty. 
Further discussion on law enforcement in China is given in Section 8.2.  
8.2 Summary on Enforcement of China’s WPPCL/WPDP 
Over the last three decades, significant progress has been made in the Chinese environmental 
legal framework with the enactment of a number of environmental laws (Fig 1.1). However, 
over the same period, China’s water quality has seriously deteriorated with water pollution 
reaching unprecedented levels. With population and economic growth, the pressure on 
China’s water quality is further increasing, and there is so far no clear evidence that the 
WPPCL can achieve its environmental objectives.  
 
The law itself is part of the problem for this situation, because disjunctions exist between the 
law and the practice (Wang, 2007).291 The rapid pace of environmental law legislation in 
response to the deteriorating environment makes them sometimes incompatible with the basic 
laws and unenforceable. For example, the WPPCL was enacted in 2008, but it was not until 1 
May 2011 when the “crime of undermining environmental and resources protection” and “of 
misconduct in environmental protection and monitoring” was clearly defined in the Criminal 
Law of People’s Republic of China.  
 
In China, the implementation of environmental laws is subject to administrative laws. 
However, the administrative laws are not well developed and the administrative organizations 
are unable to cope with the demand of the environmental laws. For example, China did not 
establish the MEP until 2008. Its predecessor, the SEPA, had little administrative power and 
was mainly an agency for environmental policy development, monitoring and statistics. The 
SEPA and local EPBs had then neither the power nor the capacity for adequate law 
enforcement.  
 
                                                
291 Wang, C. F. (2007): Chinese Environmental Law Enforcement: Current Deficiencies and Suggested Reforms. 
Vermont J Environmental Law 8, pp159-193. 
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A major problem for the WPPCL/WPDP is the weakness of the law enforcement mechanism. 
It appears in itself a contradiction that a law in a centralized political system cannot be 
effectively enforced. This shows that the enforcement of environmental laws cannot be 
considered in isolation. In a country of great complexity such as China, a law may exist, but 
purposely not enforced if it is inconsistent with the highest national priority, yet selectively 
enforced to balance the interests at regional and local scales. Over the last few decades, the 
highest national priority of China has been social stability and economic development. Thus, 
China spends a large amount of its revenue to sustain social stability, but provides little 
resources for environmental law enforcement. Public participation plays an important role in 
the CWA/NPDES of the USA, but a very little role in the WPPCL/WPDP of China. The 
subtle reason for this is that the existence of social groups and NGOs in China may be viewed 
as a potential threat to social stability. Public participation in environmental protection is 
probably most valuable during the process of environmental impact assessment. Article 5 of 
China’s EIAL292 stipulates that the state should encourage the general public to participate in 
environmental impact assessment. Articles 11 and 12 of the EIAL state that public opinions 
should be included in the assessment reports of construction projects. However, details of the 
public participation, e.g. number of participants, procedure and legal responsibilities, are not 
specified, which makes public participation in environmental impact assessment meaningless.  
 
Although the enforcement of the WPPCL/WPDP is lax in the national fabric, partial and local 
enforcement actions have been taken. Reliable statistics are not known to the author, but 
common experience indicates that a large majority of the WPDP holders do not comply with 
the permit requirements, the non-compliances are not promptly dealt with and the polluters 
are left free from corrective responsibilities. The lack of enforcement greatly weakens the 
authority of the law and generates a feedback towards the worsening of water quality 
nationwide.  
 
China’s environmental law enforcement is most active, when the public outrage in response to 
severe environmental pollution accidents is high. Such events often trigger social instability. 
China’s Criminal Law now includes articles which define environmental crimes. It is 
estimated that only 5% of environmental criminal violations have been prosecuted,293 because 
environmental authorities are reluctant to transfer environmental cases to judicial authorities 
and there is a lack of expertise to deal with environmental disputes in the judicial community.  
                                                
292 SCNPC, 28 Oct 2002, Environmental Impact Assessment Law, enactment on 1 Sep 2003.  
293 The Statistics of the State Environmental Protection Administration (2002).  
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The practical enforcement of the WPPCL/WPDP is the responsibility of local EPBs. State-
owned enterprises play a dominating role in China’s economy. The employment opportunities 
and tax revenues are essential to local governments. China’s WPPCL/WPDP enforcement 
relies primarily on administrative financial penalties.  The fines are mostly low, such that the 
polluters do not have to pay heavy fines and reduce the tax revenue of local governments. The 
local governments tend to interfere with the local EPBs and their enforcement activities. The 
final decision of administrative action rests on local government, rather than the EPB.  
8.3 Recommendations 
Despite the great contrasts between the USA and the PRC, it is still valuable to use the 
CWA/NPDES as a reference to consider how the WPPCL/WPDP can be better designed and 
implemented in China. Many specific recommendations can be made, but the following are 
considered to be most important294.  
 
Ethical Premise: China should promote its traditional ethical premise of “nature-human 
harmony” and the new ethical premise that “water must be clean”. Therefore, the economic 
factor should no longer serve as the determining or even the only consideration for the social 
welfare and people’s happiness. Economic expansion should no longer be the only measure 
for maintaining social stability. This ethical premise is now increasingly realized in China and 
the request of the people for a better environment is becoming stronger everyday. Thus, the 
objective of the WPPCL should no longer be the “balance” between economic development 
and environment protection, but the protection of water quality. Only by doing so, 
environmental protection can be placed among the highest priorities in the national agenda, 
not secondary to economic growth. The WPPCL should no longer have the dual role of 
providing a legal basis for water quality protection and an implicit justification of economic 
development at the expense of water resources.  
 
Concrete Law: the WPPCL only stipulates the principles while its implementation is done 
through regulations at various administrative levels. The disjunction between the law and 
practice has the unusual consequence, that after six years of its enactment (in 2008), the 
WPPCL is still waiting for regulations for its full implementation. Given China’s reality, 
embedded in the regulations are the priorities of the governments, which are not always 
                                                
294 China’s environmental legal framework has been evolving at a fast pace in the past few years. The author is 
pleased to observe that some of the recommendations made in this thesis are fully consistent with the new 
developments in China.    
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consistent with the original purpose of the law. It is thus desirable for the NPC to legislate 
concrete environmental laws that are directly implementable and are subject only to 
supplementary regulations, rather than heavy reliance on regulations.  
 
Discharge Standards: Chapter 5 demonstrates that the main function of China’s WPDP is to 
allocate the pollution discharge load to enterprises to serve the TEC strategy. The risks for the 
TEC to fail are large as it has serious flaws in its design. The dual-standard system employed 
in the USA NPDES functions much better. In particular, the technology-based standard has 
proven to be very successful, and the TMDL technique is necessary for the water-quality 
based standard to work, although the implementation of TMDL encountered considerable 
difficulties. China’s WPPCL/WDPD should adopt in future the dual standard approach. The 
law should authorize the MEP to establish technology-based standards and to introduce the 
TMDL technique to secure the effective implementation of the water-quality based standard.  
 
Enforcement: A major weakness of China’s WPPCL/WPDP is the lack of law enforcement. 
There are contradictory demands in the society, some working to enhance the enforcement, 
while others operating to weaken the enforcement. The enforcement of the WPPCL/WPDP 
employs in theory administrative, civil and criminal enforcement, but in practice its 
enforcement relies primarily on administrative measures which bypass all other legal actions. 
Therefore, in addition to the administrative measures, China should activate its entire legal 
system to enforce environmental laws. The law should authorize citizens to participate in law 
enforcement. Citizens should enjoy access to freedom of information and the right to take 
legal actions against alleged polluters and duty-negligent administrative bodies. Finally, the 
law should promote the culture of cooperative responsibility and to allow for incentives for 
the regulated community to comply with the law.  
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Appendix A1: Major rivers in China 
 
River    Length (km)  Drainage Area (km2) Runoff (km3) 
Changjiang (Yangtze)  6,300 1,808,500 951.3 
Huang He (Yellow)  5,464   752,443 66.1 
Heilongjiang (Amur)  3420   896,756 * 117.0 
Songhua (Sungari)  2,308   557,180 76.2 
Zhujiang (Pearl)  2,210   442,100  333.8 
Yarlung Zangbo 2,057   240,480 165.0 
Tarim    2,046   194,210   35.0 
Lancangjiang 1,826 167,486 74.0 
Nujiang  1,659   137,818   69.0 
Liaohe   1,390   228,960   14.8 
Haihe    1,090   263,631   28.8 ** 
Huaihe   1,000   269,283   62.2 
Irtysh  633 57,290 10.0 
Luan He 877   44,100 6.0 
Minjiang 541   60,992 58.6 
Total   5,224,473   2,039.0  
 
Notes: 
* Including the Songhua River Basin 
** Including the Luan He River Basin 
Source: http://www.eoearth.org/article/Water_profile_of_China 
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Appendix A2: Recent Water Pollution Events in China and Legal Responses295  
 
Among these cases, the Taihu water pollution disaster is the most outstanding, as it affected 
the largest area and population. The Taihu water pollution disaster occurred despite the 
implementation of the WPPCL/WPDP program and the highly publicized effort of the 
government, and reflects most clearly the difficulties in water pollution prevention and 
control in China and the problems in China’s environmental legal system. The 2007 Taihu 
water pollution case is therefore selected for a case study presented in Chapter 7 of the thesis. 
  
Event Pollution Impact Enforcement  Comments 
Jul 1994, Huaihe Rain forced release of 2x109m3 
upstream polluted water; serious 
downstream water pollution; 
affecting 1 million people over 54 
days 
Impossible to determine 
legal responsibility; No legal 
action 
Entire basin pollution by 
industry; Cross borders of 
Henan, Anhui, Jiangsu and 
Shandong 
Feb-Apr 2004, 
Tuojiang, Sichuan 
Discharge of waste water from 
Sichuan Chemical Company Ltd 
Negligence crime of local 
EPB; Imprisonment of 2 
EPB officers for 2.5 yrs,  1 
for 1.5 yrs 
Scapegoat approach; 
Protecting local industry. 
Apr 2005, 
Zhejiang 
Dongyang 
Local chemical and pesticides 
factory caused serious pollution 
Not known Confrontation of residents  
with police; Violence resulted 
10s deaths and 100s injuries; 
Damage of 10s police cars 
13 Nov 2005, 
Songhuajiang 
Jilin Petrochemical Company 
benzene plant exploded; Large 
amounts of toxic chemicals polluted 
Songhua River 
Party & administrative 
disciplinary punishment for 
12 EPA officers, including 
Jilin EPB Director and 
national  SEPA Director 
General 
Investigation of State 
Council: 1) Jilin 
Petrochemical, Jilin EPB 
inadequate response; 2) 
Petroleum China lacks 
environment awareness; 3) 
State EPA  
Apr 2005 Zhusan  County EPB allowed in 2001 
establishment of waste site without 
permission of villagers; EPA 
assessment later confirmed pollution 
of drinking water and arable land; 3 
deaths   
29.05.2006, villagers took 
legal actions against EPB for 
health & property damages 
and demand for 2.66 million 
CNY compensation 
 
15 Nov 2006, 
Sichuan Luzhou 
Power Plant  
Luzhou Power Plant 17 tons diesel 
fuel fixed with cooling water leaked 
through drainage system, causing 
Yangtze River pollution 
Ordered for immediate 
rectification; Plant fined 
200,000 CNY; Adm. 
penalties for responsible 
company officers 
Minor penalties  
20 Feb 2009, 
Jiangsu Yan City 
( 城市) 
Large quantities of Potassium salt 
waste water discharged into 
Mangtou River (蟒蛇 ) polluting 
drinking water for 200,000 people 
for 3 days; economic damage 
amounts to 5.4 million CNY 
Two legal representatives of 
the company were sentenced 
to 10 yrs and 6 yrs 
imprisonment for crimes of 
“discharging dangerous 
substances” 
First criminal case for 
environmental pollution in 
China. 
Jul 2009, 
Shangdong 山 
沂南涑河砷化物
水 染事件 
Yixin ( 鑫 ) Chemicals illegally 
produces,  Arsanilic acid (阿散酸), 
and stores large quantities of arsenic 
waste water a secrete reservoir. 20 - 
23 July, secretly pumping waste 
water into the Nansu （南涑）river 
One person sentenced to 11 
yrs prison; fine of 500,000 
CNY; Other two sentenced 
to 6 and 5 yrs prison; Civil 
law suit against offenders 
 
2007 
Jiangsu, Taihu 
Summer 2007, Taihu water level 
lowest in 50 yrs; High temperature 
and algie boom due to high nutrient 
lake water.  
Suspension of several large 
enterprises for rectification; 
Adm. penalties for 5 local 
government officers due to 
negligence 
Environment disaster due to 
long term water pollution. 
Unable to take legal actions 
against polluters. Local 
officers as scapegoat 
                                                
295  www.hrc.gov.cn 
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Appendix A3: Major USA Federal Pollution Control Laws 
 
Statute        Major USA Code 
Comprehensive Environmental Response 42 U.S.C. §§9601-9675 
Compensation, and Liability Act (Superfund)  
Clean Air Act 42 U.S.C. §§7401-7671 
Clean Water Act 33 U.S.C. §§1251-1387 
Safe Drinking Water Act 42 U.S.C. §§300f-300j 
Solid Waste Disposal Act/Resource Conservation and Recovery Act 42 U.S.C. §§6901-6991k 
Oil Pollution Control Act (1990) 33 U.S.C. §§2701 et seq. 
Environmental Planning and Community-Right-To-Know Act 42 U.S.C. §§11001-11050 
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act  7 U.S.C. §§136-136y 
Toxic Substances Control Act   15 U.S.C. §2601 et seq. 
Pollution Prosecution Act of 1990 42 U.S.C. §4321 
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Abbreviations: 
ACEF All-China Environment Federation 
AGO Attorney General’s Office (USA) 
ANCR Annual Noncompliance Report 
BAT Best Available Technology 
BADT Best Available Demonstrated Control Technology 
BCT Best Conventional Pollutant Control Technology 
BPT Best Practicable Control Technology Currently Available 
BOD Biological Oxygen Demanding material 
CAFO Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations 
CNY Chinese Yuan 
COD Chemical Oxygen Demand 
CWA Clean Water Act (USA) General Accountability Office 
DMR Discharge Monitoring Report 
DOD Department of Defense (USA) 
DOE Department of Energy (USA) 
DOJ Department of Justice (USA) 
DOT Department of Transportation (USA) 
ECHO Enforcement and Compliance History Online 
EIA Environmental Impact Assessment 
EIAL Environmental Impact Assessment Law (China) 
ENRD Environment and Natural Resources Division (USA DOJ) 
EPA Environmental Protection Agency (USA) 
EPA Environmental Protection Administration (China) 
EPB Environmental Protection Bureau (China) 
EPO Environmental Protection Office (China) 
EPL Environmental Protection Law (China) 
FWPCA Federal Water Pollution Control Act (USA) 
GAO General Accountability Office (USA) 
GB Guobiao, National Standard (China) 
GDP Gross Domestic Production 
MEP Ministry of Environmental Protection (China) 
MWR Ministry of Water Resources (China) 
NGO Non-Governmental Organization 
NPC National People’s Congress (China) 
NPDES National Pollutants Discharge Elimination System (USA) 
OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
POTW Public-Owned Treatment Water facilities 
PRC People’s Republic of China  
PSES Pretreatment Standard for Existing Sources 
PSNS Pretreatment Standard for New Sources 
SCNPC Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress (China) 
SDWA Safe Drinking Water Act (USA) 
SEP Supplement Environmental Projects 
SEPA State Environmental Protection Administration (China) 
TEC Total Emission Control; Total Effluent Control 
TEL Technology-based Effluent Limit 
TMDL Total Maximum Daily Loads 
TN Total Nitrogen 
TP Total Phosphorus 
UN United Nations  
USA The United States of America 
USC The United States Congress 
WPDP Water Pollutants Discharge Permit (China) 
WPPCL Water Pollution Prevention and Control Law of China 
WQS Water Quality based Standard 
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